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December 1991
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FIRST THINGS

A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life

The Mindless Self: Freud Triumphant
Marjorie Rosenberg

Education and the Mind Redeemed
John F. Crosby

Reagan's America, America's Reagan
James Nuechterlein

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Richard John Neuhaus

The Public Square

A Continuing Survey of Religion and Public Life

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LIBERAL INTELLECTUALS: HOW DO THEY GET THAT WAY?



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FIRST THINGS

A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life

DECEMBER 1991 • ISSUE 18

CORRESPONDENCE 2 *Edward R. Raupp, Germain Kopaczynski, Harold Pollack*

EDITORIAL 4 Euthanasia: Final Exit, Final Excuse

OPINION 8 *Jakob J. Petuchowski* A Rabbi's Christmas *Benjamin McArthur* A Protestant Shtetl *Stephanie Moussalli* Abortion on Second Thought

ARTICLES 16 *Marjorie Rosenberg* The Mindless Self: Freud Triumphant

23 *John F. Crosby* Education and the Mind Redeemed

29 *Paul H. Liben* Science Within the Limits of Truth

33 *Alvin F. Kimel, Jr.* The Grammar of Baptism

REVIEW ESSAY 38 *James Nuechterlein* Reagan's America, America's Reagan

BOOKS 47 *Gilbert Meilaender* The Crooked Timber of Humanity by Isaiah Berlin; *William J. Weston* Remembering Reinhold Niebuhr by Ursula M. Niebuhr; *Lawrence M. Mead* The Urban Underclass edited by Christopher Jencks and Paul E. Peterson, Inner-City Poverty in the United States edited by Lawrence E. Lynn, Jr. and Michael H. McGeary; *Phillip E. Johnson* Chapter and Verse by Mike Bryan; *Kevin L. Flannery* The Philosopher on Dover Beach by Roger Scruton; Briefly Noted

THE PUBLIC SQUARE 56 A Continuing Survey of Religion and Public Life by *Richard John Neuhaus*
This Month: The Feminist Revelation, etc.

Poetry by *Robert Schultz* (22) and *Eric Trethewey* (37)

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The Evils of Capitalism

While I agree with some of Peter Berger's observations in "Capitalism: The Continuing Revolution" (August/September), I disagree profoundly with his model, several key assumptions, and his conclusion.

First, the model. One of the reasons that economists tend to disagree is that they choose different models to explain the same data. Berger's model posits two economic systems: either an economic system is "capitalist," as exemplified by the United States, or it is "socialist," as exemplified by the Soviet Union. He does not allow "social democracy," as in Sweden, as a third type of system; rather he considers it to be a variant of capitalism with a generous distribution of capitalist output.

I propose a completely different model. Just as nature tends to abhor discontinuities, I am skeptical of either-or models. . . . My [alternative] model suggests that each fundamental element of an economy may be distributed along a scale. For the moment, following convention, let us place "pure socialism" on the left and "pure capitalism" on the right. Now we can list the elements of an economy and show that they may be found at any position on the scale, to the left or right of center, but hardly ever at the extremes, as Berger's either-or model suggests: (1) Who may own property? (2) Is there freedom of enterprise for producers and of choice for consumers? (3) Is self-interest the dominant motive? (4) Does competition prevail in the economy? (5) Is price used as the allocation mechanism? (6) Does government have a role in the economy?

Second, the assumptions. Berger tends to assert what remains to be proved. Implicit throughout his article, and explicit in several places, he asserts that capitalism is a superior system to socialism. He even asserts that "capitalism appears to be a precondition for democracy." Even allowing for his use of a faulty model for this kind of analysis, Berger gives us not a "warts and all" portrait of capitalism, but a kindly portrait that conceals its more egregious flaws. Pure capitalism, at root, is an amoral system. Its amorality tends to produce results that even the most committed individualists find intolerable. Adam Smith, a capitalist icon, warned in 1776 in *The Wealth of Nations* against the invidious accumulation of power by monopolists and encouraged government to take action to preclude such accumulations. . . .

Capitalism can easily result in a caste system, and I would argue that such a system has been created in the United States. Chief executive officers of large U.S. corporations receive obscenely high compensation, both while they are on the job and in the form of "golden parachutes" when they leave. Studies have shown that executive compensation often rises when company profits fall. Top executives have few qualms about laying off employees "as a business decision" while raising their own salaries at the same time. Regardless of how hard an employee works, despite the hazards of the job, regardless of one's loyalty, the worker will not break through to the upper caste. And regardless of the incompetence of top executives, they will not take jobs on the assembly line (another wart of capitalism), nor will they be found in the unemployment lines. The system perpetuates the inequities by permitting the amassing of large fortunes, which are used to buy the best educations and other prerequisites to entry to the top positions, and are then left in wills to persons who had no part in earning the wealth.

Finally, the conclusion. After constructing a straw-man either-or model, and happily ignoring the faults of capitalism, Berger concludes that capitalism is a "continuing revolution." His principal evidence, carefully selected to prove his point, is what amounts to the fall of the Communist Party structure in Europe. On this evidence, he builds his case. I would suggest that the story has yet to be told in Europe, whether the economy in question is that of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia or

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Germany. My own forecast is not that nations throughout the world will rush via revolution to U.S.-style capitalism, but that both industrialized and developing nations will make more gradual changes that will position them more in the center of the scale.

Good government is that which responds to the will of the majority while respecting minority rights. Many people in other countries look at the U.S. and see a government that responds to the will of the wealthy and tramples minority rights. They see an economy in which the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer. They see a system that is dominated by what Dwight Eisenhower aptly called a "military-industrial complex," a leadership that allocated $300 billion to arms but cuts funds for schools and libraries. They see one of the highest rates of infant mortality in the developed world with little effort to improve prenatal and neonatal care. They see a wealthy nation in which one's medical care is not a natural right, as it is in nearly every nation in the world, but depends on the size of one's employer. They see our fearful crime rates and AIDS pandemic, and increasing numbers of men, women, and children without homes. And they see a Supreme Court that is changing from a progressive body to which minorities may appeal for relief from an oppressive central government power to one that is increasingly embracing the values of that power.

Capitalism, as exemplified by the U.S., is hardly a paradigm for the economic choices of other nations. Rather, those other nations will attempt to build their own systems based on their own values, not on our perception of those values. They will no doubt use many of the tools of an open market. But they will not, as Berger concludes, throw out one set of tyrants for another.

Edward R. Raupp
Department of Economics
Augsburg College
Minneapolis, MN

The PLEASURE Principle

I appreciated Phillip E. Johnson's brief piece on "Presbyterians for GLARF" (August/September). GLARF, of course, stands for "Gay Liberation and Radical Feminism."

Following Johnson's lead, I'd like to offer another acronym that seems especially apropos to help us understand the driving impulse behind GLARF-type sexuality. I call it the PLEASURE Principle, that is to say, The Practically Limitless Expression of Any Sexual Urge is a Right of Everyone.

For those who have bought into the PLEASURE Principle, can the GLARF mentality be far behind?

Fr. Germain Kopaczynski
Granby, MA

More on Atheism and Citizenship

Because I admire FIRST THINGS, I was deeply disappointed by Richard John Neuhaus' "Can Atheists Be Good Citizens?" (August/September). Rather than confronting the best arguments that Freud and other atheists have made, Fr. Neuhaus rails yet again against the familiar bogeymen: third-world PC, deconstruction, moral relativism. Indeed, by focusing on these annoying sideshows, Fr. Neuhaus suggests that he doesn't understand what most atheists believe. His essay certainly does not describe what I believe.

Fr. Neuhaus revives the old charge that atheists are motivated by "truncated and mechanical contrivance of calculated self-interest." He provides the lamest evidence to support this claim, which is amply refuted by the serious and varied commitments atheists have made. I am especially struck by the certitude with which he states his case. My own reading is that religious authorities and individual believers have generally proved neither better nor worse participants in liberal democracy than the militant atheists Fr. Neuhaus so despises.

He wonders whether atheists can be good citizens. Given his lack of civility, I wonder about Fr. Neuhaus himself. I suggest he contemplate the wisdom of Luke 6:42 before launching another broadside against atheists, liberal theologians, deconstructionists, homosexuals, feminists, Richard Rorty, or the long list of others whose capacities and values he would call into question.

Harold Pollack
Boston, MA

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RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS
Editor-in-Chief

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FIRST THINGS
DECEMBER 1991

Euthanasia: Final Exit, Final Excuse

At year's end the eyes of the world turn again to an infant who is, so Christians believe, the revelation of God to man and of man to himself. In the words of John's gospel, "In him was life, and the life was the light of man. The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has not overcome it." It is not for the lack of trying that the darkness has not overcome it.

This year, like all years, has witnessed myriad stratagems of the darkness. Readers can readily draw up their own list of events and trends that have contributed to the fading of the light in our public life. High on our list are the ominous advances made by the campaign for euthanasia. In the media and in state legislatures, it is called assisted suicide or aid in dying or the right to choose death with dignity. By whatever name, it is a further social permission to terminate life and extinguish the light.

Derek Humphry's *Final Exit* became a best seller this year. The book is a "how to" manual for killing oneself and helping others to do likewise. Drugs are the lethal means of choice, but Mr. Humphry has helpful advice also for those whose taste may turn to guns, plastic bags, or asphyxiation by automobile exhaust. Putting out the light has never seemed easier. Perhaps it should not bear too strongly on our thinking, but Humphry, founder of the Hemlock Society, boasts of having helped "euthanize" his first wife, and he divorced his second after she was discovered to have cancer. In October of this year she committed suicide. Humphry says he only wants to make death a "rational choice." Rationality has seldom seemed so chilling.

Final Exit has reportedly sold over 300,000 copies. The book, the author, and the Hemlock Society are hardly marginal phenomena. They are driving forces in a number of initiatives to change state laws against homicide and assisted suicide in order to allow physicians to give drug overdoses or lethal injections to their patients. Proponents have orchestrated highly successful publicity blitzes around instances in which family members or physicians killed severely ill, sometimes terminally ill, persons or helped them to kill themselves. The euthanasia campaign is assuming the appearance of another juggernaut of Progress—an idea, as they say, whose time has come. In fact, the campaign is motored by a set of ideas that civilized people have long since consigned to a barbaric past. *Final Exit* is the final excuse for not caring for the burdensome. It is the renewal of a long-cancelled license to kill. All of civilization and all of religion, Peter Berger has written, is humanity waving its little flags of defiance in the face of death. *Final Exit* is the lowering of the flags.

Yet we must try to understand the enormous appeal of the euthanasia campaign. The campaign's success is in large part the product of a naked and cruel exploitation of understandable fear. The National Conference of Catholic Bishops recently declared: "Those who advocate euthanasia have capitalized on people's confusion, ambivalence, and even fear about the use of modern life-prolonging technologies. Further, borrowing language from the abortion debate, they insist that the 'right to choose' must prevail over all other considerations. Being able to choose the time and manner of one's death, without regard to *what* is chosen, is presented as the ultimate freedom. A decision to take one's life or to allow a physician to kill a suffering patient, however, is very different from a decision to refuse extraordinary or disproportionately burdensome treatment."

The understandable fear has to do with connections—being connected to burdensome technology and disconnected from a community of caring. With respect to the ending of life, the proponents of the license to kill typically present the extraordinary and most harrowing circumstance as the normal. The reality is that most Americans spend their last days in their own homes, in the company of family and friends, fully aware of their surroundings, often in control of their bodily functions, and without pain. About one-third actually die at home, while others transfer to a hospital a few days before dying. The National Institute on Aging studied 4,000 deaths of people over sixty-five years old. The day before they died, 51 percent had no difficulty with orientation or recognizing their families, 61 percent had no pain,

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90 percent had no diarrhea, 87 percent had no nausea. Just over half, 52 percent, could breathe freely, and 69 percent needed no pain medication. Nine out of ten saw their family and friends within the last three days of life.

The point is not that death is easy. Death remains, in the words of Saint Paul, the last enemy. All the chatter about "death with dignity" ignores the fact that death is the final indignity of losing all that commanded respect in this life. In dying we know that, as Martin Luther put it in the last words he wrote, "We are all beggars, that is for sure." The point, rather, is that, for the overwhelming majority of people, dying is not the medical-technological horror show routinely portrayed by the euthanasia enthusiasts in order to panic people, especially older people, into supporting the license to kill.

The purveyors of hemlock claim that the legal changes they propose are carefully crafted to address the hard cases of those who have been called "the biologically persistent"—those who go on living after they have lost their "quality of life" and are therefore, we are told, dead. We know from hard experience, however, that the license to kill, no matter how carefully crafted at first, cannot be contained. In law, in habits of mind, and in everyday behavior, killing is socially contagious. Also in the hard cases, there are alternatives to the legal injection or overdose. The chief alternative is a communal context in which caring is not contingent upon the qualities of those cared for. More specifically, the euthanasia campaign has deliberately and effectively distracted attention from a growing hospice movement that allows people to die at home or in some other caring environment, and without pain. The hospice approach carefully respects the fundamental rule of civilization that *it is always wrong to directly intend to terminate an innocent human life*. We have not understood the radicality of the current euthanasia campaign until we see that it is precisely that civilizational rule that is under attack.

All civilized societies sharply restrict the permissions given for one person to kill another. They do not recognize private agreements for one person to take the life of another in order to serve the interests of one party or both. In the law of our society, the license to kill is limited to four circumstances: self-defense or the protection of another life; killing in a just war; the punishment of those guilty of capital offenses: and, only in recent years, the killing of unborn children. Few dispute the first permission. Pacifists have always disputed the second. Most advanced societies have now banned capital punishment. In this society, the abortion license is, just maybe, in the process of being restricted or withdrawn. To the first two and apparently secure permissions to kill, the euthanasia campaign would add another. The permission is incoherent in its logic, unlimited in its scope, and almost certainly devastating in its social and moral consequences.

There is an analogy between life and freedom. In his essay, *On Liberty*, John Stuart Mill wrote that societies cannot grant individuals a legal right to sell themselves into slavery, even though that limits their self-determination. "The principle of freedom," he wrote, "cannot require that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate his freedom." To that observation Daniel Callahan adds, "The absolute power that is put into the hands of another—the right to be a slaveholder—is not compatible with respect for our human dignity. Both the slaveholder and the enslaved are corrupted by the relationship, even if both have the good of the other as their motive."

In a society obsessed as ours is by the self-determination of the autonomous and sovereign self, the "right to be killed" attacks the heart of secular liberal theory. Callahan writes, "A sovereignty that can legally and morally be given away is fragile and contingent, not sovereignty at all. To allow another person to kill us is the most radical relinquishment of sovereignty imaginable, not just one more way of exercising it. Our life belongs no longer to us, but to the person into whose power we give it. . . . No defender of civil liberties and the right of self-determination should want to see that possibility made available." Or think about it this way: If the right to life itself can be surrendered in exchange for the "good" of death, why cannot other rights be exchanged for other goods? Rights then become fungible. They are no longer moral claims to be recognized by law but "things" to be traded in the marketplace. Rights, far from being trump (Ronald Dworkin), are reduced to the status of baseball cards.

There is a yet more radical incoherence in the proposal that one party can give to another the right to kill him. The right is presumably given in exchange for a benefit, namely death. *But there can be no benefit without a beneficiary.* Death eliminates the beneficiary. It may be objected that in the hard cases, when bodies are riddled by disease and racked with pain, surely the "owners" of such bodies, the "persons" in the bodies, can demand to be released. The redoubtable Leon Kass has considered that argument. "However sympathetically we listen to such requests," he writes, "we must see them as incoherent. Such person-body dualism cannot be sustained. 'Personhood' is manifest on earth only in living bodies; our highest mental functions are held up by, and are inseparable from, lowly metabolism, respiration, circulation, excretion. There may be blood without consciousness, but there is never consciousness without blood. Thus one who calls for death in the service of personhood is like a tree seeking to cut its roots for the sake of growing its highest fruit. No physician, devoted to the benefit of the sick, can serve the patient as person by denying and thwarting his personal embodiment. To say it

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plainly, to bring nothingness is incompatible with serving wholeness: one cannot heal—or comfort—by making nil. The healer cannot annihilate if he is to heal. The physician-euthanizer is a deadly self-contradiction."

In the biblical view, the person—or soul, if you will—continues to live beyond bodily death. In that view, it is also true, however, that a person does not "own" his body or his self. He is owned, body and soul, by God—or, in more biblical language, he is created by and destined for God. That tradition leaves no doubt that committing suicide or helping someone to commit suicide is prohibited. It is doubtfully the business of the state to entrench this biblical understanding in law. The state deals with temporal, not eternal, life; and in *this* life body and person are inseparable. The philosophy undergirding our constitutional order is incompatible with the notion of a right to be killed.

The inalienable rights to life and liberty cannot be alienated by a putatively free act that destroys life and liberty alike. A society whose overriding value is the freedom to choose, without reference to what is chosen, unravels the very reasons for protecting the freedom to choose. A person's right to choose is respected because each person is endowed with the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. A person does not have the right to choose to deprive himself of the rights that are the foundation of his right to choose. In other words, the arguments for the "right to death" have no grounding apart from the right to life, and are therefore self-contradictory. It is not true, as the euthanizers claim, that "death is a normal part of life." In the terms appropriate to the temporal order, death is the end of life, death is the opposite of life.

This may seem like a painfully esoteric set of philosophical disputes, until we see that they drive to the heart of the moral and legal justifications of our constitutional order. The convoluted illogic of certain ways of thinking is evident in, for example, "wrongful life" suits that have been successfully prosecuted. Thus parents sue a doctor on behalf of a baby who, because of some abnormality, "should have been aborted." Because the doctor did not do appropriate tests or did not advise abortion, the baby and the parents, it is claimed, are burdened with a wrongful life. Perhaps because of the manifest philosophical and legal problems posed by such reasoning, wrongful life litigation seems to have subsided in the last few years. But the same problems are inescapably present in the argument for the right to be killed.

Beyond the philosophical, it takes no great imagination to see the practical consequences of a legalization of the right to be killed. Measures currently being proposed place great emphasis upon the importance of free choice and voluntary request for euthanasia. The reality of the law in America, however, makes it certain that provisions for mercy killing will be challenged under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Why should the comatose or demented be denied the benefit of deliverance from life through euthanasia? There is clear precedent for the court appointment of proxies and others who exercise "substituted judgment" in terminating treatment for those who cannot speak for themselves. There is exquisite irony in our present situation. In the case of the unborn, the right to life is deemed to depend upon the unborn's ability to effectively assert that right. Which, of course, the unborn cannot do. When it comes to the right to death, however, people are allowed to assert that right on behalf of others. And, of course, it is not difficult to find people who are prepared to assert that other people would be better off dead.

Leon Kass writes: "Euthanasia, once legalized, will not remain confined to those who freely and knowingly elect it—and the most energetic backers of euthanasia do not really want it thus restricted. Why? Because the vast majority of candidates who merit mercy killing cannot request it for themselves: adults with persistent vegetative state or severe depression or senility or aphasia or mental illness or Alzheimer's disease; infants who are deformed; and children who are retarded or dying." None of these is capable of requesting death and would therefore be denied "assistance in dying," except that those who claim to have their best interests at heart will assuredly secure for them the equal protection of being killed. Ours is a society firmly opposed to discrimination against the handicapped, the aged, and the mentally ill. The law will see to it that death does not discriminate.

In addition to emphasizing free choice, measures currently proposed stress that mercy killing or assisted suicide will be limited to those who experience severe suffering. But this too cannot be controlled, in significant part because suffering cannot be defined. Suffering, as numerous medical authorities attest, is a subjective state. There are two people with identical medical indicators; one suffers severely and the other very little or not at all. It is generally acknowledged that there are no objective medical measurements of suffering. And what about psychological suffering? In the experience of the one suffering, the loss of a job, a broken marriage, a disappointed romance, or the death of a family member can produce suffering every bit as acute as the most fearful cancer. The law cannot discriminate between sufferings. The number of people who would be legally entitled to assistance in suicide would be very large indeed.

Experts in suicide prevention say that there are five million Americans alive today who at one time attempted suicide. Suicide is the second leading cause of death among teenagers. This is the situation when the law does not recognize a right to death and makes it a criminal offense to help someone else to commit

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suicide. The law has a powerful pedagogical effect. Until now, it has been weighted on the side of life. Again, it takes little imagination to recognize what would happen if the severely depressed knew that they had a right to kill themselves and obtain help in doing so. Today, if someone is really determined to commit suicide, he can almost certainly find a way. Bridges, guns, drugs, and a three-inch turn of the wheel that sends a speeding car over the cliff—these are readily available. Millions of people who have contemplated suicide or have halfheartedly attempted suicide are alive today because the voice of law reinforced the voice of conscience in favor of choosing life.

The advocates of mercy killing and assisted suicide typically focus on the cases of wonderfully competent and articulate people who have rationally decided that they want to control their deaths as they think they have controlled their lives. No doubt there are such people and, if they are set upon making a *Final Exit*, they will find a way to do so. Most people who think about ending their lives, however, are in a state of acute distress. Especially for older people, that distress includes the thought, perhaps confirmed by others, that their lives are useless and an inexcusable burden upon their families and upon the scarce medical resources of society. If being killed or getting help in killing themselves is viewed as a perfectly legal and morally acceptable option, that distress cannot help but be compounded.

Yale Kamisar puts the matter forcefully: "Is this the kind of choice, assuming that it can be made in a fixed and rational manner, that we want to offer a gravely ill person? Will we not sweep up, in the process, some who are not really tired of life, but think others are tired of them; some who do not really want to die, but who feel that they should not live on, because to do so when there looms the legal alternative of euthanasia is to do a selfish or cowardly act? Will not some feel an obligation to have themselves 'eliminated' in order that funds allocated for their terminal care might be better used by their families or, financial worries aside, in order to relieve their families of the emotional strain involved?"

Today when someone dies after a prolonged and painful illness, family and friends frequently say, "She is better off this way." If the euthanasia campaign has its way, people will decide that she *would be* better off dead. And, at least in many cases, that would mean that *we* would be better off with her out of the way. The burden of proof would be on continued life. Once we have abandoned, in law and social habit, the presumption in favor of life itself, it is very difficult to make the case for sustaining burdensome lives. It takes no imagination at all to recognize the consequences of such a change, for we have at hand a valuable case study in the experience of the Netherlands.

On this question *Regulating Death: The Case of the Netherlands* (The Free Press) by Dr. Carlos Gomez is must reading. Unlike current proposals here, the Netherlands has not formally legalized euthanasia; it has simply decided not to prosecute doctors who kill their patients. Euthanasia or assisted suicide is protected by a notion of privacy and it is left to the medical profession to regulate itself. As might be expected, there is little regulation. The Dutch medical establishment estimates—and Gomez thinks it is an unrealistically low estimate—that 2,400 to 3,600 patients are "euthanized" by their physicians each year, many of them without their consent and against their will. In the United States that rate would mean 40,000 to 60,000 per year. Keep in mind that Holland is a democratic and generally humane society with universal health care and generous social services. There is no crisis of a medical system overloaded by excessive demands, and there is no "underclass" population of the socially nonfunctional.

Far from being progressive, the euthanasia campaign is a regression to a time when society had not devised protocols to check the human propensity to choose evil. Such a protocol is the Hippocratic Oath, dating from the fourth century B.C., and taken by physicians at the beginning of their practice. The oath imposes at least three limits on the physician: no breach of confidentiality; no sexual relations with patients; no dispensing of deadly drugs. Advocates of the license to kill argue that the Hippocratic Oath has in recent years been abandoned by many medical schools. Some argument. It is tantamount to saying that, since the protocols against the corruption of medicine have been abandoned, we are free to corrupt medicine further by endorsing the concept of the physician as healer-killer.

No one should dispute that this is the further and lethal corruption of medicine. Conscientious physicians have long lamented the fact that their vocation (to use a term that sounds increasingly quaint) is being turned from a profession into a mere technical skill. Technicians, as technicians, profess nothing. When their technique reaches the point where they can no longer cure, they have little reason to care. Indeed there is an understandable inclination to discard the lingering evidence of their "failure." Nobody likes to fail, and administered death is a convenient closure of the unhappy reminder of one's limitations. For the proponents of euthanasia, there is only a choice between healing and killing. This, too, is a regression, for in the long story of civilization it has been understood that our primary obligation to the suffering is simply to care for them. There is much chatter about new rules being required because of technological breakthroughs in medicine. The great change, however, is not in technique but in the hubris of the technical. It is the growing refusal of society and of medicine to recognize that, in a painfully unsatisfactory world, we are called to be the company

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of the caring—of which company physicians were once exemplars.

As appalling as this corruption must be for conscientious physicians, the consequence for the patient is at least as ominous. Kass again: "The patient's trust in the doctor's wholehearted devotion to the patient's best interests will be hard to sustain once doctors are licensed to kill. Imagine the scene: you are old, poor, in failing health, and alone in the world; you are brought to the city hospital with fractured ribs and pneumonia. The nurse or intern enters late at night with a syringe full of yellow stuff for your intravenous drip. How soundly will you sleep? It will not matter that your doctor has never yet put anyone to death; that he is legally entitled to do so will make a world of difference."

The medicalizing of death cannot be responsibly discussed without reference to the class factor. The autonomous, rational, self-directed patients portrayed by the hemlock faction are not the chief candidates for mercy killing. Financially secure, well educated, and accustomed to exercising control, they may feel unthreatened by legalized euthanasia. Although they, too, deceive themselves about the actual circumstances in which they would be making the final decision, or will have it made for them. Those most directly threatened, however, are the very poor. Along with the comatose, the retarded, the radically handicapped, and the senile, most of them have no "quality of life" that a euthanizing society would have any interest in preserving.

Final Exit is the final excuse, and both are related to something that might be called the final solution. This is not alarmist, but it is rightly alarming. Of course the United States is not Nazi Germany. Of course there will not be, next year or ten years from now, the systematic elimination of millions of the socially burdensome. We say "of course" because of our confidence in this constitutional order, in the basic goodness and common sense of most Americans, and, above all, in God's care for the American experiment in ordered liberty. But, if we accept the logic of the euthanasia campaign, there is no "of course" whatever. On the contrary, the logic of that campaign—like the eugenics ideology from which it emerged and with which it is closely associated--drives directly and relentlessly toward a brave new world of the rationalized elimination of the unfit. When the distinction between life and death is deliberately blurred, when death is declared to be a benefit bestowed, all but the morally comatose know that great evil is afoot.

In his distinguished study, *The Nazi Doctors*, Robert Jay Lifton wrote that it all began with the medicalizing of death. "At the heart of the Nazi enterprise," wrote Lifton, "is the destruction of the boundary between healing and killing." In the United States of America in the Year 1991, that boundary is being destroyed. And that is why, in this season celebrating the light, we are compelled to draw attention to the encroaching darkness.

Opinion

A Rabbi's Christmas

Jakob J. Petuchowski

In order not to raise false hopes in the hearts of those who still have the expectation that one day all Jews will convert to Christianity, it might be best to begin with a few disclaimers. The writer of this article does *not* believe in the Trinity. He does *not* believe that Jesus of Nazareth was either a part of the Godhead or the Messiah expected by the Jews. In other words, the writer of these lines is *not* a Christian.

But the writer of these lines also dissociates himself completely from the annual battle waged each winter by various Jewish organizations against the festival of Christmas, or at least against the public observance of Christmas. For one thing, although he does not himself celebrate Christmas in his own home, he rather likes the sights, the sounds, the smells, and the tastes of Christmas. Nor is he beyond relishing such traditional German Christmas delicacies as *Lebkuchen* and *Stollen*—coming, as he does, from a German-Jewish background where those bakery goods figured prominently in the observance of the Jewish winter festival of Hanukkah. Colorfully decorated Christmas trees and crèches, in the homes of Christian friends and in public places, delight his eyes; the sound of Christmas carols is music to his ears; and he avidly follows the rubrics and the pageantry of the Papal Midnight Mass on his TV screen.

Still, all of that is a matter of mere externals. What really intrigues him is the fact that millions of his non-Jewish fellow human beings are celebrating the birthday of a *Jewish* child. And they are doing so by extolling the values of peace and good will. All the more misplaced, he thinks, are the efforts by some supposedly Jewish organizations to arouse, through their battles against Christmas symbols in public places, the ill will and resentment of Christians—at the very time when the Christian religion, more than at other times of the year, inspires its followers with irenic and philanthropic sentiments.

Suppose that one day half of the world, including the United States, were to take note of the contributions made to human thought by the seventeenth-century thinker of Jewish origin, Baruch Spinoza, by instituting an annual celebration of his birthday—including the public display of Spinoza's lens-grinding workshop. Would the various Jewish organizations now fighting public Christmas displays also fight the public observance of Spinoza's birthday? Hardly. In fact, they might even enthusiastically welcome it—in spite of the fact that Spinoza had severely criticized the faith of his Jewish ancestors, and had been

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excommunicated by the rabbinical authorities of Amsterdam.

Or what would happen if there were an annual International Sigmund Freud Day, including public displays of replicas of the couch which once stood in Freud's Vienna consulting room? Would Jewish organizations now fighting public Christmas displays fight that display, too? Hardly. In fact, they might even enthusiastically welcome it—in spite of the fact that Freud had proudly proclaimed his own atheism, and had included the religion of his Jewish ancestors among the rest of the world's religions, all of which he described as illusions.

What, then, is so different about celebrating the birthday of that Palestinian Jew through whose influence, as already noted by the great twelfth-century Jewish thinker, Moses Maimonides, the words of Israel's Torah have been spread to the far corners of the earth? Why does the public celebration of the birthday of Jesus of Nazareth, including the public display of replicas of the Bethlehem crèche, arouse such Jewish animosity?

The reasons are varied and complicated. Traditionally, in spite of its role in spreading major Jewish teachings throughout the world, Christianity, to put it mildly, has not been an unmixed blessing for Jews. Not only the words of the Torah were spread throughout the world in Jesus' name; that same name was also invoked when, throughout the centuries, Christians murdered Jews by the thousands, burned them alive, confiscated their goods, restricted the way in which they could earn their livelihoods, and confined them to overcrowded and unsanitary quarters. The Christian ideals of peace and good will did not extend beyond the entrance of the ghetto. This may no longer be the case today. But Jews have long memories. To many of them, the sign of the Cross is still a reminder of pogroms and persecutions. Their attitude toward Christianity and toward Christianity's founder is, therefore, a highly ambivalent one.

That is particularly true of those Jews—and they tend to be the most Orthodox followers of the faith—whose own personal and family background in Eastern Europe still approximated most closely the conditions of Jewish life in the Christian Middle Ages. Those Jews certainly cannot be expected to "enjoy" Christmas.

Yet, and here we come to an apparent paradox, these East European Orthodox Jews are *not* in the forefront of those who protest most vociferously against the public display of Christmas symbols or the public celebration of that festival. In fact, not only are they not in the forefront; most of them have nothing at all to do with the organizations that lead the battle against the public observance of Christmas in the name of *the* "Jewish Community."

That battle is led by a different type of Jew altogether. He or she is most likely to be a secularist of Jewish origin, who has no use for any kind of religion; and that includes the religion into which he or she was born. And in that battle, the secularist of Jewish origin is liable to be joined by a fellow Jew of the Reform Jewish denomination, which—in its increasingly radical departures from traditional Jewish belief and practice—is itself more and more becoming a wing of American secularism. Such Jews seek alliances with all the other secularist forces in the country that want to denude the "public square" of every last trace of religious influence. They keep insisting upon a strict enforcement of the separation of church and state—enforcement to a degree certainly never anticipated by the founders of the republic.

In other words, what we are really dealing with in this annual battle against public Christian observance is not so much a "Jewish" attack on that observance as it is a *secularist* one—with some of the prominent secularists identifying themselves as Jews. They are the same people who fight *non-denominational* prayers in public schools, the use of public school facilities for meetings of high school religious-interest groups, and state support of private schools. They fight with equal vigor the attempts by other Jewish groups to have Jewish religious symbols exhibited alongside the Christian ones, such as the efforts of the Chabad (Lubavitch) group of Orthodox Jews to place a Hanukkah candelabrum on the public square when a Christmas tree is put up there, which would be a fitting demonstration of America's religious pluralism. They are, in other words, not singling out Christianity. They are against the public manifestation of religion *per se*—even (or perhaps particularly) against the public manifestation of the religion of their own ancestors.

The invocation of the First Amendment as authority for the campaign against the public display of any and all religious symbols seems to involve the demand that the state "establish" the religion of Secularism as the official religion of the United States—which would, to say the least, be a rather curious use of the First Amendment. But even if one were to grant, for argument's sake, that the lawyers employed by the American Jewish Congress, the (Reform) Union of American Hebrew Congregations, and similar organizations have established the "true" meaning of the First Amendment, i.e., that the amendment really and truly rules out the public display of a crèche or a Hanukkah candelabrum, one would still be entitled to wonder what those organizations hope to gain by stirring up animosities every winter.

Traditional Jewish teaching includes the principle of *liphnim mishurat hadin* (cf. Babylonian Talmud *Baba Qamma* 100a and elsewhere), which means that, on occasion, it is preferable not to make use of the full extent to which the law, strictly interpreted, entitles one to go. For there is, after all,

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a "higher law," which is adumbrated in Deuteronomy 12:28, "You shall do what is good and right in the sight of the Lord your God." Several passages in Jesus' Sermon on the Mount seem to incorporate that principle. It is not a case of "abolishing" the law, but rather, if one so desires—and if one does so to one's own, and not the other person's, hurt—of not pressing the full extent of what the law provides. That, admittedly, may not be an everyday occurrence in traditional Jewish life (although the pious will always strive for it), but it is a manifestation of a higher degree of piety. Some of the ancient rabbis even sought to find biblical basis for such transcendence of biblical law.

It would seem to this writer that, even if the strict constructionists of the separation of church and state could demonstrate beyond a shadow of a doubt that the public display of Christmas symbols infringes upon that "separation," Jews might still prefer to abide by the principle of *liphnim mishurat hadin*, of *not* running to the courts in order to get the spontaneous expression of their neighbors' piety interfered with by the law. After all, what are we to think of a "Judaism" that is so weak that it feels threatened by the display of a crèche at City Hall, or by the sound of a Christmas carol at a public school assembly? Why, then, not show some generosity on the Jewish side at a season of the year when Christians celebrate the birth of the Jew in whose name they proclaim peace and good will to humankind?

And it is, to be quite honest, not *only* a matter of superior generosity. Life in the medieval Christian world—in which, by the way, we no longer happen to live—certainly was no bed of roses for the Jews. But Jews fared infinitely *worse* in those modern societies from which the God of Abraham and of Jesus had been banished. If Jews cannot forget the Middle Ages, they owe it to themselves to remember the most recent past, too. One could argue, therefore, that the very self-interest of the Jews is at stake in preventing the United States from becoming a totally godless society.

Jews may not accept the dogmas and the theology associated with the Christmas story. They would, in fact, cease to be Jews if they did. Nor would they be acting in good taste if, without accepting the Christian belief structure, they were to celebrate Christmas in their own homes. (And it does not help much if they try to justify the Christmas tree in their home by saying that it was originally a pagan, rather than a Christian, custom—as though Judaism approved of paganism!) But they can still recognize in the *Christian* observance of Christmas one of the factors that help maintain the religious character of our society—in which Jews, too, with their own beliefs and practices, and with their very lives, have a considerable stake.

That is why this writer will continue to wish his Christian friends a "Merry Christmas" at Yuletide, and rejoice in the fact that those friends join the angelic choir in proclaiming glory to God in the highest, and peace among humankind on earth. He will most certainly not object at all to the public display of his friends' symbols of religious faith. Indeed, he will continue to be moved by awe and wonder that, through the influence of one of his own remote cousins, some of the words of Judaism's Torah have been spread to the far corners of the earth.

JAKOB J. PETUCHOWSKI *is the Sol and Arlene Bronstein Professor of Judaeo-Christian Studies and the Research Professor of Jewish Theology and Liturgy at the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati; the Albert Plotkin Professor of Judaic Studies at Arizona State University in Tempe; and the part-time Rabbi of Temple B'nai Israel, Laredo, Texas.*

A Protestant Shtetl

Benjamin McArthur

Just east of Chattanooga, four miles north of the Georgia state line, and six miles up the road from where the Andrews raiders abandoned The General following their famous Civil War railroad hijacking, lies the village of Collegedale. Nestled in a valley alongside the Appalachian ridge known as White Oak Mountain, Collegedale is home to some 4,600 people, most of them Seventh-day Adventists. Collegedale's major gift to popular culture are the Little Debbie snack cakes shipped across America from its sprawling McKee Bakery. But as the town's name suggests, its true *raison d'être* is the local institution of higher learning, Southern College of Seventh-day Adventists.

To a degree seldom true in communities of even this modest size (at least outside of Utah), Collegedale presents a solid front of sectarian homogeneity. Friday nights and Saturdays find its tennis courts empty, post office closed, and McKee ovens cooled. A twentieth-century Protestant *shtetl*, Collegedale persists—even thrives—in its anachronistic ways.

Its obscurity to the world outside its own immediate region mirrors the more general invisibility of Seventh-day Adventism in American society. Though a worldwide church of nearly six million members, Adventists are frequently confused with Jehovah's Witnesses or Mormons (like Adventists, also creations of nineteenth-century American religious culture). The identification of Adventism with bizarre cultic practices formed the dramatic core of *A Cry in the Dark*, a film faithfully depicting the experience of Lindy Chamberlain, an Adventist pastor's wife in Australia who was accused of murdering her baby. Adventists suffer less acute forms of prejudice in the United States. The church's large hospital system—particularly the prominence of Loma Linda University's infant heart-transplant

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program—has provided some coveted public respectability. By and large, though, Adventists remain a people about whom you've heard but to your knowledge have never met.

This social distance is not accidental. From the church's beginnings in the 1830s and 1840s, Adventists have felt called apart as a prophetic voice, carrying the twin messages of Christ's imminent return to earth and the binding obligation of God's law, particularly the seventh-day Sabbath. Though their historical experience has precluded the kind of geographic clustering achieved by the Mormons, Adventists have nevertheless formed a distinctive subculture. This has been accomplished by an impressively extensive parochial school system reaching from first grade through college and even to graduate school. Moreover, in a land where the traditional Sunday day of rest has been redefined by football and the shopping mall, Adventists' sense of distinctiveness has also been nurtured by a commitment to careful Saturday observance. If less visible a cultural badge than the Amish horse and buggy, Sabbatarianism is nearly as thorough in setting Adventists apart from their neighbors. Few devout Adventists are found in the upper reaches of government or corporate America, where the fast track usually encourages the abandonment of an inconvenient and unstylish religion. Significantly, many of the most socially prominent Adventists are black, a group that tends to be less self-conscious about wedding piety and worldly success.

Adventism's uneasy relationship to secular culture is matched by its ambivalent standing within evangelicalism. This has been true from the movement's very beginnings, when the postmillenial reassurances of mainstream Protestantism were contradicted by the apocalyptic warnings of William Miller in the early 1840s that the world would soon be coming to an end. During the succeeding century and a half, Adventists have been suspected by the Protestant establishment of being, if not necessarily a cult, at least not part of the true Reformation ball team. The main sticking point has been the Adventists' allegiance to their prophet, Ellen G. White (1827-1915), whose enormous body of writings has been taken as normative for faith and practice. Evangelicals also grow impatient with their acceptance of the Old Testament Sabbath and with what they perceive as an unbalanced grasp of Law and Grace.

Probably more than any other Protestant denomination, Seventh-day Adventists feel an affinity with Jews. The Sabbath obviously feeds this. Abraham Heschel's wonderful meditations on the Sabbath make him a favorite among educated Adventist readers. More widely read is Chaim Potok, whose evocations of a devout, parochial community and its clash with modernity speak to an Adventist readership. His visit to the Southern College campus a few years back was a major cultural event. The sense of kinship to Jews also stems from the kind of self-identification as God's remnant people which had earlier nurtured a philo-Semitism in American Puritans. A recent sermon in the Collegedale Church took as its theme the evils of anti-Semitism. Of course one might hear a similar message from William Sloane Coffin. But for Adventists, who foresee one day the kind of religious persecution for themselves known historically to the Jews, the consequences of anti-Semitism strike closer to home.

This sense of the tenuousness of religious freedoms has led Seventh-day Adventists into the forefront of religious liberty advocacy. *Liberty* magazine is the premier journal of church-state relations, and the church's Religious Liberty Association frequently joins hands with the ACLU in challenging infringements on liberty of conscience issues. In their unease over Moral Majority attempts to rebuild a Protestant America (an effort seen as threatening to civil liberties), Adventists again stand outside the evangelical mainstream. The Collegedale Adventist community needs no reminders of the dangers of moral zealotry: firmly embedded in Southern College folklore is the month-long jailing of faculty early in the school's history during the 1890s, following arrests for violating Tennessee's Sunday Law.

But if in some important respects Adventists diverge from typical evangelicalism, in other regards they are indistinguishable. There is a similar conservatism of lifestyle. In fact, the list of vices officially eschewed by Adventists would probably surpass that of most other Christian groups. And though Jerry Falwell might consider them insufficiently political, Adventist loyalty to the Republican party rarely wavers. The Collegedale precinct consistently provides GOP candidates a comfortable margin of support; this in a district with a popular and conservative Democratic congresswoman, Marilyn Lloyd.

More significantly, Adventists share evangelicals' sense of living in a culture that pays them little heed and confers even less respect. The renewed prominence of the Christian Right during the past fifteen years tended to obscure a more fundamental fact: American culture has become more resolutely secular and (by a necessary corollary) less beholden to its Judeo-Christian roots. Though boycott-wielding evangelicals won some well-publicized victories in their battles with network programmers and the management of 7-Eleven convenience stores, and though hard-core pornography is perhaps less evident today than in the 1970s, still, the content of today's most broadly distributed products of popular culture—television, music videos, film (and now, it seems, even museums)—is more patently violent and more nakedly sexual than ever. Yes, perhaps Madonna and 2 Live Crew are only doing what Elvis Presley and Chuck Berry did three decades earlier: pushing at the edge of the cultural envelope. But to conservative Christians

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that is exactly the point. This apparently limitless broadening of the publicly acceptable has led both to a frantic pursuit of the outrageous and to the nearly complete hegemony of the profane over the holy.

Evangelicals respond with jeremiads and generally ineffectual attempts at political action. Apart from a few accepted intellectuals such as Peter Berger, Richard John Neuhaus, or Michael Novak (none of whom would comfortably wear the label evangelical), Christians have not won respectful hearings for their social criticism. Their (admittedly) shrill demands for individual and social regeneration elicit mainly dismissive caricature from the arbiters of culture, for whom H. L. Mencken's 1925 roast of the fundamentalists of Dayton, Tennessee, continues to influence "right" thinking toward the devout. There is within liberal capitalist culture a kind of inherent pressure to reduce all differences to matters of taste. Evangelical Christianity's failure to bow its knee to the secular bitch goddess casts it as an enemy of the people, to be responded to not with persecution but with ridicule—and, of course, charges of intolerance.

There was a time when White Oak Mountain symbolized the desired separation between Collegedale and the secular world beyond. Today, however, Chattanooga's suburbs climb up the mountain's ridge, and despite lingering efforts on the part of Southern College to remain *in loco parentis*, there seems little hope of keeping the world out of Collegedale or vice-versa. Student modes of dress are entirely up to date, and dormitory parking lots contain cars most faculty members couldn't afford. Increasingly, talented students pass over the traditional service professions of teaching and ministry in favor of snappy new majors like marketing or corporate wellness. The pride taken in a hometown girl's selection as Miss Tennessee a few years ago fed a craving for public recognition.

For all of that, the school remains a countercultural institution, striving to balance student careerism with a profound sense of the personal rewards and moral demands of the Christian life. The Student Missions Club, for example, whose prototypes thrived at Yale, Syracuse, and other mainstream campuses a century ago, is still prominent at Southern. Twenty to twenty-five students a year, primarily involved in English-language education, scatter to locations as remote as Korea, Truk, Iceland, and Israel. Locally as well, the College and community now seek a greater presence in the Chattanooga area through their classical radio station and extensive welfare projects.

With a student body ever more reflective of American Adventism's ethnic diversity, Southern College has nonetheless escaped the grotesque demands of multiculturalism heard on so many campuses. This is partly explained by an administration, faculty, and student body that is conservative and adheres to traditional notions of curriculum. But it also resides in the presence of a guiding religious philosophy, which inoculates against the recurring epidemics of educational fashion.

Not that, like most evangelical institutions, Southern College doesn't show a less appealing side on occasion. The school is marked by parochialism and a somewhat qualified embrace of academic freedom. Indeed, the worldwide resurgence of religious fundamentalism in the 1980s did not miss Collegedale. An attack on the college's religion department by area zealots left the school for a time divided and demoralized. But these are after all the vices of the community's virtues, of its seriousness, its vigilance against the erosion of moral standards, and its willingness to disregard secular public opinion when that interferes with the pursuit of its own vision.

In a society where pluralism has become the unofficial holy writ, one might think that communities like Collegedale would be valued for their very idiosyncrasy. Such, it need hardly be said, is not the case. Instead, evangelical centers are held to be vestiges of the bad old days, still redolent of Bible-thumping hypocrisy, of science bashing, of segregation, and of a patriarchal order. But one does not have to buy into Christian teaching or even to forgo every last suspicion of evangelicalism in order to appreciate the way it serves as a flywheel for a society badly in need of counterbalance.

In the best Madisonian spirit, liberals and conservatives both ought to accept—even champion—the existence of communities like Collegedale, communities that embody old-fashioned, but very far from shopworn, truths.

BENJAMIN MCARTHUR *is a Professor of History at Southern College of Seventh-day Adventists in Collegedale, Tennessee.*

Abortion on Second Thought

Stephanie D. Moussalli

I was a teenager and young adult in the late 1960s and early 1970s, before *Roe v. Wade* made legal abortions widely available in the United States. But if the occasion had arisen, and if it could have been managed safely, I would have aborted an illegitimate baby without a second thought.

My only emotional qualms would have arisen from the way an abortion would publicly declare that I was handling my life incompetently. As best I can remember, I had never heard anyone argue that it would be murder, and even if I had encountered the idea,

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I would have dismissed it immediately as one of those obscure and radical philosophical arguments of no real-life consequence.

I did not hold this opinion defiantly, or uneasily, or thoughtfully. It was just an unexamined assumption that there was no third person involved in early pregnancy.

My opinion began to change several years later, after I was married and my son was born. Somehow the change is connected with the feeling I had as I stared at him in his bassinet the first night we were home from the hospital. I couldn't believe he was outside my body. He was now separable from me, this child who had never even existed before he was inside me. It was a strange and unforgettable experience.

At any rate, in a paper I wrote a couple of years later in graduate school, I argued both the pro- and anti-abortion positions, and when another student—an anti-abortion activist, I think—angrily demanded to know my opinion, I said, honestly, that I didn't know.

Agnosticism on an issue that might involve infanticide being unacceptable, I had to figure out whether abortion is murder or not. Although emotion had led me to ask the question, the answer was too important to leave to instinct. Did I really believe the microscopic collection of cells or the barely visible tadpole-shaped thing of the first few weeks was a human being whose deliberate destruction would be intolerable? No.

On the other hand, what about the eight-and-a-half-month-old fetus, two weeks away from birth? My son might easily have been born that early; obviously, no decent person would condone killing such a baby with a lethal injection just before inducing labor. That definitely *is* murder. And not just any murder, but the most horrible kind imaginable, because of the moral innocence and absolute dependence of its victim. Unforgivable, in fact—except they say God can forgive anything.

At this point, it was clear to me that a time must be determined before which abortion is acceptable and after which it is murder. The Supreme Court used trimesters in its original *Roe v. Wade* decision, and decided that states might defend a baby's right to life at the expense of other rights in the third trimester of pregnancy, when the fetus is possibly viable. I realized I had to agree, even though it meant opposing almost all abortions in the last three months. A third-trimester baby can usually survive, with help, and certainly looks as human as most newborns.

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However, the arbitrariness of this deadline, depending as it does on the accident of how far medical technology happens to have advanced, might have appalling consequences for individual babies. Today's miscarriage will be tomorrow's extreme prematurity. Indeed, viability now extends into part of the second trimester.

No, to find a time when I could comfortably say, "This is a thing with no human rights," I had to go to the first part of the first trimester. Still, though, this would mean picking a date on one side of which I would acknowledge a human being whose helplessness and innocence compels all the protection society can provide, and on the other side of which would be a growth requiring no more attention than the nuisance of a minor medical procedure. The bottom line was that I couldn't find a date like that.

It would mean there would be some morning when a woman could be told that if she'd gone to a clinic the previous afternoon, it would have been all right to have an abortion, because the baby she now carries was not then a human being. Naturally any developmental category involves the drawing of similarly absurd dividing lines, but very few have such deadly consequences.

Finally, at the end of tediously extended efforts to avoid it, I was forced to accept the conclusion that life begins at conception. Any date after that compels one to agree to the killing of beings that are indistinguishable from the beings it would be murder to kill, under a legal deadline arrangement, in a few hours. How can you tell the difference, then, between infanticide and harmless medical procedure? In such a dilemma, if a mistake is going to be made, it must surely be made on the side of avoiding infanticide.

Speaking without the expertise of a theologian or medical doctor, there are to my mind only two reasonably clear natural divisions in prenatal life: its beginning, at conception, and its end, at birth. The radical pro-abortion position accepts the latter moment as the beginning of a person's right to life. In fact, the U.S. legal system also accepts this radical view. Post-*Roe v. Wade* cases established a constitutional right to abortion even after viability, and have actually forbidden states to require medical aid for viable aborted babies.

What this means is that in 1985, for example, something like *twelve thousand* babies were aborted during their sixth month of development or later. If their abortions had only been accidental instead of deliberate, so that neonatal care could have been provided, *many* of them—not a few, or a dozen, but many—would be living children today. I cannot even imagine myself or anyone I know participating in these late abortions, especially when they are done by the mother for convenience, and the medical workers for money. This is the stuff of Friday night horror shows.

Of course, the vast majority—more than 99 percent—of fetuses are aborted before the sixth month begins. That, however, is no comfort at all to the hundred and fifty thousand or so who are aborted in their fourth or fifth months every year. These are babies with working nervous and muscular systems, who are sensitive to pain, who can swallow, make a fist, and frown. All they need is a little more time. What they get is forcible birth, and sometimes lethal injections or even the vacuum and a scraping knife. And they feel it.

The only way a person more ethically advanced than Saddam Hussein can approve of this grotesquely evil practice is by assuming, as Southern leaders once did about slaves, that there is no human victim involved. This is very hard to do for late-term viable fetuses, who have to be poisoned just before birth in order to avoid the emergence of a breathing, squalling baby.

The people who actively and deliberately advocate these late-pregnancy deaths, from Supreme Court justices to ACLU attorneys to Planned Parenthood's Faye Wattleton, deserve criticism analogous to that Abraham Lincoln made of the supporters of slavery. "Although volume upon volume is written to prove slavery a very good thing," he said, "we never hear of the man who wishes to take the good of it, by being a slave himself." Indeed not. And I have yet to hear of an abortion advocate who has rectified, by suicide, his parents' decision not to abort him, or who even argues, in acknowledgement of the burdens his childhood imposed on his parents, that they *should* have aborted him.

Lincoln continued with one of his illuminating remarks about the American experiment in political liberty: while "most governments have been based, practically, on the denial of equal rights of men . . . ours began by affirming these rights." Immediately after that affirmation, the Declaration of Independence went on to claim an unalienable right to life, the protection of which is one of the main reasons that "governments are instituted among men." Slavery snatches equality, and abortion snatches life. Americans can only support these thefts by denying the humanity of their targets.

While accepting the latest possible moment—birth—as the cutoff for abortions involves obvious and gory murder, I must in all honesty admit to some lingering unease in accepting the earliest possible moment, i.e., conception. Although my analytical odyssey has forced me to reject even the earliest abortions and to acknowledge at the least a right to life in those strange little creatures of the first month of pregnancy, I still don't feel for them the degree of protectiveness and concern that a six-month-old fetus elicits. After all, a very large number of embryos die of natural causes in their first month without our ever knowing about them, much less grieving for them. Some fail even to implant themselves in the uterine wall; in my imagination, these little ones only a few days past the original combination of two cells seem

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like motes in the air, floating through dust and sunbeams, dying unnoticed by any but God.

Many people sympathize with this relative unconcern for very young embryos, and pro-abortion lobbyists therefore harp on the point. As prominent abortion advocate Garrett Hardin puts it, "Why should we call a fertilized egg or a tiny embryo a human being?" Nevertheless, the fact is that any abortion draws a mortal deadline, and this requires an arrogance and callousness to actual living beings that I believe we must recognize and reject, just as we have recognized and rejected the evil inherent in slavery.

I am writing about these ethical ruminations of mine because I suspect they are probably not very unusual. Only about 15 percent of Americans claim there is an unlimited right to abortion all the way up to birth minus a day, and I don't believe these people are all obsessive ideologues by any means. Surely many of them are just as insouciantly thoughtless as I used to be. Furthermore, a statistically over-represented group in the 15 percent are single young men.

If the argument against abortion were directed at the *end* of pregnancy instead of its beginning, people, it seems to me, would, as I did, see the whole thing more clearly. Everyone agrees that killing little one-day-old Joey is murder; they can hardly avoid agreeing it would also have been murder if he'd been killed a few hours before he began his birth. And if abortion at birth minus two hours is murder, what about birth minus two days? What about killing him a week earlier? What is the moment, in the abortion advocate's opinion, before which an abortion can take place? Ask him to name the mortal deadline.

True, even if abortion were eventually to be outlawed in the last trimester, fewer than one percent of the babies would be saved; and extending the ban to the last two trimesters would still only save 10 or 11 percent. That, however, is tens of thousands of fully formed infants per year. Widespread awareness that Planned Parenthood's Faye Wattleton is fighting for the unlimited right to abort *third-trimester* fetuses in Pennsylvania, and that the ACLU advertises its pro-abortion participation in *80 percent* of American abortion litigation, helps us to recognize the prochoice movement as the wildly radical creature it is.

Those who favor convenience abortions have attempted to desensitize the American people to infanticide, and the abortion explosion after *Roe v. Wade* shows they've had some success. On the other hand, the polls show that most people still think abortion is wrong, and, as Lincoln said of slavery, "Like every other wrong which some men will commit if left alone, it ought to be prohibited by law."

Is there any chance of that? I think there is, in as much as about 70 percent of Americans disapprove of convenience abortions even in the *first* trimester of pregnancy, and in as much as people like me, when they come to consider the question seriously, have sometimes changed their minds. After all, in this country's nineteenth-century moral crisis, the majority of the people repeatedly rejected slavery. A good example of this happened just a few years before the Civil War began, in the territory of Kansas, where pro-slavery forces made one of their biggest stands. Among other tactics, they rigged an election in order to claim the existence of a pro-slave majority in the territory. But when the balloting was repeated using fair electoral processes, slavery was voted down six-to-one.

There was no pro-slave majority in Kansas, just as there is no pro-abortion majority now. There was a small but very passionate pro-slave minority, and then a majority who recognized a right to freedom for blacks, but didn't want to fight over it. Today, if the courts step out of the way, I think we will find a majority who recognize a right to life for the unborn.

Abortion is founded, as Lincoln said of slavery, on the selfishness of man's nature; opposition to it, in his love of justice. If the love of justice could lead a world that had always known slavery, as mankind had through the nineteenth century, to abolish it, this love can lead America one day to choose life.

Stephanie D. Moussalli *teaches Political Science and History at Pensacola Junior College.*

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The Mindless Self: Freud Triumphant

Marjorie Rosenberg

In the heat of the anguished nineteenth-century debate over evolutionary theory, Samuel Butler declared that Darwin had banished mind from the universe. But it was in fact Freud, with his insistence on sex as the fundamental force in human development, who delivered the death blow to man's confidence in himself as a rational being. The act of thinking, distinguished by Aristotle as a peak of human experience, became in Freudian theory most notable as a neurotic exercise designed to inhibit awareness of instinctual needs. Excluded from this interpretation was, of course, the product of Freud's mind—psychoanalytic theory itself.

The defining need of human consciousness to understand nature and to gain what control it can over external circumstance, Freud relegated to the status of an offshoot of sexual curiosity. Following philologist Hans Sperber, he further decided that language, too, originally derived from sexual needs. But children ask not only, "Where did I come from?" but "Where will I go when I die?", encapsulating the rebuttal to Freud's strangely attenuated vision of the source of intellectual inquiry; and one imagines men being first impelled to speech by purposes that separated them from animal life, rather than in consequence of the evolutionary continuities.

Still, Freud's *idée fixe*, his sexual theory—the shibboleth by which he tested the loyalty of his followers—has penetrated as deeply into contemporary Western culture as have Darwin's views. By locating the central problem of existence in the struggle between the instincts of the individual and the restraints of society, Freud was positioned for an unremitting use of his intellectual faculties to denigrate mind in favor of sex.

The pre-scientific world saw man's struggle as primarily internal, and in the contest between body and soul, reason versus desire, higher and lower proclivities, there was no question as to what was most truly human. But nineteenth-century science, scuttling what was neither visible nor quantifiable, enrolled man firmly in the animal kingdom. With Darwin, the shift in perspective attained the authority of Holy Writ and Freud, deeply influenced by him, became, as Frank Sulloway has so carefully documented, a "Biologist of the Mind," relegating mental productions to elaborations or justifications of instinctual needs.

In *Totem and Taboo*, Freud borrowed Darwin's conception of the primal horde, consisting of a dominant male and dependent females with their offspring, as the earliest social grouping. Darwin's deductions, based on the habits of the higher apes, concluded that the sexual jealousy of the male resulted in the killing or driving out from the horde of rival males by the strongest, thus preventing promiscuity in a state of nature and determining the structure of the group.

Resonating to the idea of sexual jealousy as the decisive, organizing social factor, Freud brought to it his own peculiar intensity of experience as the adored first child of a beautiful young mother, with a father old enough to be his grandfather and half-brothers his mother's age. The inventor of the Oedipus complex, having elaborated his preoccupations into a worldview, now combined his personal myth with the biological formulations of Darwin and others, and was ready with his own primal theory. In the beginning was a violent, jealous father who kept all the females for himself and drove away the growing sons.

> One day the expelled brothers joined forces, slew and ate the father, and thus put an end to the father horde. Perhaps some advance in culture, like the use of a new weapon, had given them the feeling of superiority. Of course these can-

MARJORIE ROSENBERG *is a psychotherapist in private practice whose articles have appeared in* Commentary *and other journals.*

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> nibalistic savages ate their victim. This violent, primal father had surely been the envied and feared model for the brothers. Now they accomplished their identification with him by devouring him and each acquired part of his strength.

Freud assures us that with this "memorable criminal act" began social organization, moral restrictions, and religion. It is, accordingly, the "sense of guilt of the son," corresponding with the now-repressed wishes of the Oedipus complex, that forms the basis of society—thus grounding ordered social behavior in sex and violence. Dressed up with references to anthropological observations of the time and seriously offered as science, Freud's tale takes no cognizance whatever of the gifts of the human mind, which he transforms into a servant of the body, its adaptive qualities ignored in favor of biological simplifications encouraging predictability.

That man is unique in the animal kingdom in his consciousness of the inevitability of his own extinction, and that it is this consciousness, not guilty repression of instinctual aims, which directs his attempts at order and meaning, was what Freud could never confront. Preoccupied with his reputation as a scientist, he sought to build his theory on Darwin's truths, to make it an extension and enhancement of, but not a departure from, evolutionary theory. Thus was born Freud's great paradox: a system of thought designed to destroy the conception of mind as the central expression of human existence.

Freud's myth of creation included original sin—the murder of the father—but it provided no possibility for regeneration. In his view of the life stages of the individual—a biological catalogue of oral, anal, and genital—the highest stage involves neither the intellect nor the spirit, but rather the ability to seek a sexual object outside the self. This remarkably meager assessment of human potential certainly bore no relation to Freud's own ambitions. His unceasing intellectual speculations and a consuming desire for influence and recognition, the latter captured in his reference to himself as a "conquistador," marked his adult life. As an intellectual of his time and as a Jew in predominantly Catholic Vienna, he was almost virulently anti-religious while transferring his feelings of credulity, his capacity for veneration, and his need for orthodoxy to the dogmas of nineteenth-century science. As he went about his work of squeezing his psychological conception of man into a biogenetic framework, he apparently took no notice of his own failure to fit his model.

But all accepted models of human behavior produce, in varying degrees, what they describe. Freud's theory of the primary importance of sex has changed society, and nowhere more conspicuously than in the acceptance of the nineteenth-century invention of the homosexual—a creature defined by sexual preference alone.

Many nineteenth-century scientists and sexologists—most importantly, Wilhelm Fliess, Freud's longtime friend and associate, as well as Albert Moll, Havelock Ellis, and others—produced theories of infantile sexuality, complete with developmental stages. As Frank Sulloway has remarked, the conception of infantile sexuality was "a discovery in *theory* as much as a discovery of *facts*," meaning that long-observed behavior was now perceived in a different context. It was Freud's literary rather than scientific style of presentation, together with his gift for dramatizing and sensationalizing his material, that early gained him popular attention, as did his tireless cultivation of practitioner disciples for psychoanalysis. The latter was to him a "movement," a system to change social practice, as well as a treatment, and the control of this movement was his jealously guarded prerogative. Dominating psychoanalysis with the authority of a religious leader in his lifetime, he demanded from his followers, not the initiative appropriate to an intellectual endeavor, but faith; and the rock upon which his church was built was his sexual theory.

Carl Jung, to whom Freud wished to bequeath the leadership of the psychoanalytic movement, steadily attempted—without success—to widen the meaning of Freud's term "libido" to make it stand not just for the sexual drives, but for a general mental energy. In his autobiography, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung recounts how he soon began to see Freud, however brilliant, as "a tragic figure . . . a man in the grip of his daemon." He writes of a meeting in 1910 that foreshadowed their subsequent estrangement: "I can still recall vividly how Freud said to me, 'My dear Jung, promise me never to abandon the sexual theory. That is the most essential thing of all. You see, we must make a dogma of it, an unshakable bulwark.' He said this to me with great emotion, in the tone of a father saying, 'And promise me this one thing, my dear son, that you will go to church every Sunday.' "

But of their very first face-to-face encounter in 1907 Jung had noted: "Wherever in a person or in a work of art, an expression of spirituality (in the intellectual, not the supernatural sense) came to light, he suspected it and insinuated that it was repressed sexuality. . . . I protested that this hypothesis, carried to its logical conclusion, would lead to an annihilating judgment upon culture. Culture would then appear as a mere farce, the morbid consequence of repressed sexuality. 'Yes,' he assented, 'so it is, and that is just a curse of fate against which we are powerless to contend.' "

In fact, Freud appeared to enjoy presenting variations on this theme and prided himself on having delivered, in the name of science, the third great blow to what he regarded as "the universal narcissism of mankind." In this frequently quoted series, the

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cosmological blow came when Copernicus asserted that the earth was not the center of the universe. The biological blow was the insistence of Darwin and his supporters that man was not separate from the lower animals in the organic scheme of things. The psychological blow was, he thought, delivered by psychoanalysis with the revelation that "the ego is not master in its own house." But nineteenth-century science was very far from proclaiming that it was, and Freud's blow, energized by his combative misanthropy, owed far more to the prevailing intellectual ambiance than to his personal "discoveries."

Darwin's *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex* (1871) was an explication of how sexual selection acts independently of natural selection: making, for example, cumbersome physiological characteristics, such as the giant tail fan of the peacock, serve purposes either of courtship or battle among males for possession of the females. Thus the survival of the fittest is mitigated by sex, and Darwin lays the foundation for his theoretical premise that love and hunger—these two instincts and no others—are the basis of all animal behavior. Writing in 1939, Havelock Ellis observed: "The immense importance of sex is indeed implicit in the biological conception of life as it began to take shape in the middle of the last century and the ancient dictum that hunger and love are the pillars of life became developed in all the human sciences."

In this biological enterprise, Freud followed the "fundamental biogenetic law" as advanced by Ernest Haeckel and other late-nineteenth-century evolutionary thinkers, basing his developmental schema on the principle that "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny"; that is, in man, the development from conception to birth (ontogeny) recapitulates all of evolutionary history (phylogeny). Thus, in his psychoanalytic approximation of this principle, Freud pronounces that human psychological development recapitulates the biologically determined experience of earlier animal forms. In his *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, Freud comments: "Consider how in one class of animals the genital apparatus is brought into the closest relation to the mouth, while in another it cannot be distinguished from the excretory apparatus, and yet in others it is linked to the motor organs. . . . Among animals one can find, so to speak in petrified form, every species of perversion of the (human) sexual organization."

Here is the basis for Freud's theory of infantile erogenous zones and his absolute insistence on the sexual nature of the oral and anal phases. What might be granted to be sensual pleasure must for Freud be acknowledged as directly sexual, to allow him to fit his psychoanalytic theory into what he regarded as immutable evolutionary law. His commitment to a narrow and rigid extension of biogenetic principles to human psychological development was coupled with a never-abandoned belief in the now long-discredited Lamarckian doctrine of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Thus in solving the puzzles he set for himself, Freud was focused not primarily on the past of individual patients, but on the past of the race and of the animal kingdom, with which he constantly associated the human past.

He remarked in 1919, summing up this approach, that through the study of dreams and neuroses, one ultimately perceived "a phylogenetic child—a picture of the development of the human race, of which the individual's development is in fact an abbreviated recapitulation influenced by the chance circumstances of life."

The *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*—hailed by James Strachey, the English translator of the standard edition of Freud's works, as being, beside the *Interpretation of Dreams*, his "most momentous and original contribution to human knowledge"—contains Freud's fundamental unification of biology with psychology and normality with neurosis and perversion. The *Three Essays* owes a very great debt to the sexual biology of Freud's friend, Wilhelm Fliess, but the smooth flow of intellectual theorizing about the developmental phases of infancy and childhood as set forth in essays two and three was at no point impeded by direct observation. Although Fliess kept a daily record of his firstborn son's every activity, with particular emphasis on the sexual, and though such close observation and preserving of data in regard to their offspring was not unusual among intellectuals, Frau Freud once remarked: "Psychoanalysis stops at the door of the children's room." Jung recalled how surprised he was in 1907 to discover that Freud's wife knew "absolutely nothing" about her husband's work. Freud himself, in correspondence with Fliess, excused his inability to answer a question on early childhood attitudes toward excrement by saying that his work day gave him no time for such researches, adding that "the womenfolk do not back me in my investigations."

Freud began a psychoanalysis of his youngest child, Anna, only when she had reached the age of twenty-three, declared her intention of becoming a psychoanalyst like her father, and, having read many of his works and attended psychoanalytic seminars, was already thoroughly indoctrinated with his formulations. And, of course, Freud's practice was with adults; "Little Hans," his only published case of the psychoanalysis of a child, was carried on through the boy's father.

The completely speculative nature of Freud's developmental theory partakes of the paradox at the center of his work. How is one to account for his own intellectual efflorescence using only the limited mechanical model he so insistently propagated? Most frequently the problem has been solved by attributing to Freud philosophical and psychological intentions that broaden his scope, deepen his meaning, and allow

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for the kind of systematic hermeneutics and exegesis reserved, prior to the advent of psychoanalysis, for religious texts. No matter that Freud's fervid insistence on the scientific nature of his theory makes plain that he would not have thanked his admirers for their efforts: such justificatory reinterpretation has become a major scholarly activity since his death.

Thus Ernest Becker, in *The Denial of Death*, endorses Norman O. Brown's "existential" recasting of Freud's idea of anality, and himself observes:

> . . . the basic key to the problem of anality is that it reflects the dualism of men's condition. . . . Nature's values are bodily values, human values are mental values, and though they take the loftiest flights, they are built upon excrement, impossible without it, always brought back to it. The anus and its incomprehensible, repulsive product represents not only physical determinism and boundness [sic], but the fate as well of all that is physical: decay and death. . . . We now understand that what psychoanalysts have called "anality" or anal character traits are really forms of the universal protest against accident and death. . . . Nature mocks us and poets live in torture.

And indeed Swift declared baldly in one of his poems:

> *Nor wonder how I lost my Wits;*
> *Oh! Caelia, Caelia, Caelia shits!*

But it is Swift and Brown and Becker who are confronting the paradox of human existence, not Freud. For him anality is an aspect of the biogenetic law that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny: it is a demonstration of man's animal nature and thus a blow to "the universal narcissism" of mankind; it is a scientific "discovery" of psychoanalysis. It would have enraged him to learn of the philosophical attenuation of his assault on "the human values [that] are mental values" invoked by Becker.

Again, attributing to Freud attempts to answer the questions that preoccupied them, Brown and Becker recast in similar ways Freud's precise formulations as to the source and meaning of castration anxiety, penis envy, and the Oedipus complex. Thus Becker, following Brown, sees castration anxiety as resulting from the child's fear of dependence on the mother, a fear that becomes focused on sexual differentiation. But, according to Becker, the process of differentiation is a means of combat: it is now possible to deny the mother her primary place in creation. The "horror at the mutilated creature" and the "castrated mother" that Freud so dramatically presented become for Brown and Becker the genesis of an adaptive measure in the child's struggle for independence.

Further continuing his version of what Freud *really* meant, Becker declares that the mother's genitals

> are used as a convenient focus for the child's obsession with the problem of physicalness. . . . He sees her tie to the earth, her secret bodily processes that bind her to nature: the breast with its mysterious sticky milk, the menstrual odors and blood, the almost continual immersion of the productive mother in her corporeality. . . . And so we understand not only the boy's preference for masculinity, but also the girl's "penis envy." Both boys and girls succumb to the desire to flee the sex represented by the mother; they need little coaxing to identify with the father and his world. He seems more neutral physically, more cleanly powerful, . . . represents the vast world outside of the home, the social world with its organized triumph over nature, the very escape from contingency that the child seeks.

Plausible perhaps, but most certainly not what Freud had in mind: castration anxiety loses the quality of instinctive animal fear that was fundamental for Freud and is separated from another of its definitive aspects—Freud's belief that it constituted a "phylogenetic endowment." Expounded in his *Introductory Lectures* (1916-1917) and reflecting his refusal to give up the Lamarckian doctrine of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, this phylogenetic endowment was viewed by Freud as a result of castrations that were "once real occurrences in the primeval times of the human family." Castration and Oedipal anxieties, he insisted until the end of his life, derived their terrifying force from phylogenetic residues of actual deeds. And intellectual adaptation to these biologically transmitted anxieties is almost invariably represented by Freud as a neurotic overlay, exacerbating rather than mitigating the inherited burden of man's primitive past. The feeble hope he offers through psychoanalysis is based, not on the use of reason, which is contemptuously dismissed as "intellectualizing," but on the transference of emotion to the person of the analyst, with a subsequent emotional "working through." In this process, mind is relegated to a strictly subservient position; necessary for the recall of experiences, it is not to be used for the seeking of solutions. Freudian theory envisions neurotic defense mechanisms—rationalization, displacement, projection, denial, and more—as the likeliest result of intellectual efforts to come to grips with life's problems.

The Oedipus complex, the critical formulation for both Freud's developmental theory and his theory of neurosis, is again an attempt to fit human psychology into the straitjacket of nineteenth-century evolutionary biology, albeit with Lamarckian and mythic undertones. Resulting, as Freud saw it, from the incestuous desire for the sexual possession of the mother on the part of primitive man, it produced, as described in *Totem and Taboo*, the murder of the

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primal father and a consequent inherited endowment of guilt for the persisting, biologically determined desire for the mother. Still, the male gives up hope of possessing the mother in Freudian lore because the sight of her "mutilated genitals" gives rise to the castration anxiety that generates identification with the father.

And for Freud, sharing the perspective of the Spanish biologist, Marañon, who compared woman to a male organism arrested in its development, female genitals were not an acceptable fact of nature. The clitoris was an inferior "phallic" organ, productive of much difficulty in the unfolding of female sexuality. The little girl, he felt assured, wished to possess her mother erotically in just the same way as did the male. But whereas castration anxiety terminates the Oedipus complex for the boy, leaving him with the gratification of ownership of a penis, the little girl's development is much more difficult and perilous of outcome. She must give up the mother only to recapitulate the process of desire and loss with the father, at the same time bearing the burden of her "castration" and the necessity of transferring her interest from the "phallic" clitoris to the vagina. Assuming such complications resulting from inferior physical endowment, Freud was ready to assert that the Oedipus complex was "all too often not surmounted by the female at all," and even that the level of what is "ethically normal" differed for the sexes—women of course being less ethically normal than men.

But Robert Stoller, a psychiatrist who has specialized in working with gender disturbances, propounds a theory that accounts for the far greater frequency of such disturbances observed in males. His view is that it is the female whose sexuality is more firmly grounded, since the normal mother-infant symbiosis can only augment a girl's identity, while it is the male who requires an extra, difficult step: he must "disidentify" from the mother to whom he is equally bound in infancy. It is also the case that contemporary research refutes Freud's view that maleness is the firmer, more natural biological state. The human embryo starts as female in fetal life and maleness is the result of the production, at the critical perinatal period, of the masculinizing hormone, androgen.

Further, Stoller distinguishes, as Freud does not, between sexual development and sense of gender, the latter being taught to the child by the adults in his life and apparently established a little after the beginning of the child's second year. Manifesting itself with infinite variety historically and geographically, sense of gender is a peculiarly human aspect of sex—a product of mind and culture—whereas the Oedipus complex as imagined by Freud is an instinctually based universal experience in which fear is the primary element for males and envy the chief female component. A joyless, preordained script with none of the delightful particularities of culture, its processes are triggered by inevitable, always disturbing, life experiences.

But, ignoring Freud's mythic biologizing, his misanthropy, and his lifelong focus on process rather than meaning, Brown in *Life Against Death* grandiloquently credits Freud with deep philosophical import: "The Oedipus project is not as Freud's earlier formulations suggest, a natural love of the mother. . . . The essence of the Oedipal complex is the project of becoming God . . . it plainly exhibits infantile narcissism perverted by the flight from death."

In the same vein, Becker asserts: "The Oedipal project is the flight from passivity, from obliteration, from contingency: the child wants to conquer death by becoming the creator and sustainer of his own life."

Matters of the greatest significance certainly, but nothing to do with Freud, who surely did not envision the Oedipus complex as a coming to grips with the existential problems that his formulations assiduously avoided. Confronting death only by constructing it as an *instinct* needed to explain aggressive impulses, Freud firmly ignored the effects on the psyche of the uniquely human foreknowledge of the end of existence. Schopenhauer's remark that the problem of death stands at the beginning of every philosophy tells us more about the nature of human motivation than all of Freud's sexual theories. It is the awareness of the finite number of our days that awes, terrifies, and prods us into efforts that transcend the quotidian.

But Freud could imagine only a mechanical model for man with stasis as the goal and pleasure construed as the easing of physiological tension—a chilling vision that his enormous influence has helped to bring closer to reality. As for a theory of mind, it is represented chiefly in the conception of defense mechanisms: mind for Freud is the vehicle for denying or distorting instinctual aims. Uninterested in investigating the powers of reasoning, about which he has no theory at all, and lacking any positive conception of creativity, Freud treated all mental products essentially alike, as emanations of the unconscious. As such, they lack validity for the outside world: interpretation must take the place of discrimination. Art, says Philip Rieff, is retracted by Freud into neurosis, but the theory is far more encompassing, far more destructive: thought is retracted into maneuvers against the unconscious.

Unremitting conflict is the condition of mental life as posited by Freud—the id and superego forever at war with the ego, which, vaporously and metaphorically, eludes us. We know that the id represents our animal nature, the powerful forces of instinct, that the superego is the internalized voice of social exhortation and prohibition. But the ego is a center that will not hold, a slippery negotiator of the compromises between nature and society. Unable to conceptualize the seat of reason, Freud could assign to the ego nothing more than tactical maneuver—encouraging a view of the use of intellect as synonymous with manipulation. The process of this manipulation

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acting on unconscious motivation constitutes Freud's highly truncated theory of mental life. And motive is always base, discovered over and over again to exemplify his nihilistic vision of the "universal narcissism of mankind" in the service of animal nature.

Historically and logically, Rieff has pointed out, it is the imputation of variety that is connected with optimism. Theologians found God's creation good and beautiful in part because of its fascinating variety, a stimulus to both mind and spirit. But, grounded in Freudian hermeneutics, contemporary culture is omnivorously engaged in annihilating the intellectual discrimination through which the existence of variety is perceived. Dominant theories of literary criticism, adopting Freud's approach to content as no more than a code to be deciphered, go on to insist that pulp fiction, daily newspapers, rock video, clinical case studies, and imaginative literature belong on the same level; and arguments over university curricula increasingly reflect this view.

Art, for Freud primarily meaningful as a road to the unconscious, has in this century been connected neither with apprenticeship—and thus the acquisition of skills—nor with values or purposes beyond self-expression. Every man's unconscious is as good as his neighbor's, leading to the corollary that intellectual discrimination as to its product is unwarranted and oppressive. Indeed, the very word "discrimination" has been robbed of its meaning and made to resound negatively in our ears. Careful observation of distinctions is subversive of Freud's universal interpretations.

The cherished self-image underlying these interpretations is Freud's hubristic vision of himself as speaker of the unspeakable, truth-teller to self-deluding mankind. Classifying as "occult" any view that separated man from the animal kingdom, he was not able to comprehend either reason or genius, nor did he wish to do so. His aptitude was for the leveling of achievement, a *Weltanschauung* peculiarly appealing to the mass society that developed during his lifetime. Freud's sexual theory—the essence of democratic reductionism—provides a uniform system for decoding all behavior and mental productions through a starkly limited number of mechanisms.

Repression, the chief among these and thus basic to the system, is generally thought to be a purely psychological phenomenon. But, like all of Freudian theory, it derived from his nineteenth-century biogenetic vision of human evolution. Thus, in 1909 in a major statement to the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, Freud declared:

> We assume that there is no repression that does not have an organic core; this organic repression consists of the substitution of unpleasurable sensations for pleasurable ones. Probably man's detachment from the soil is one of the basic conditions for a neurosis; the olfactory sense is prone, as a consequence of this detachment, toward repression, since it has become useless.

Civilization and Its Discontents (1930) links organic repression with early man's assumption of upright posture. The historical sequence as imagined by Freud assumes that primal man's sexual appetite was aroused principally by olfactory stimuli connected to the periodicity of menstruation; that is, to the time of estrus. With the evolutionary achievement of upright posture, Freud posits that the relationship between the sexes changed dramatically—continuous visual stimuli now replacing the intermittent olfactory ones that had previously governed man's sexual life. Freud's speculations as to the consequences of this change stress organic olfactory repression as the basis of shame and disgust, the drive toward cleanliness and "the deepest root of the sexual repression that marches with culture." Both his evolutionary saga and his theory of neurosis are built upon this conception of "organic repression consequent upon man's adoption of the erect posture and lowering in value of the sense of smell." And through these conjectures Freud once again asserts that all repression has its origins in sexual repression.

But Ernest Becker, crediting Freud with having no illusions about man's "basic creatureliness," nonetheless concludes that the dogma was incorrect: the sexual theory has proved to be wrong. "Consciousness of death is the primary repression, not sexuality," says Becker. "This is the repression on which culture is built, a repression unique to the self-conscious animal."

Freud's inability to deal with the consciousness of death is nowhere more evident than in the conception of a death instinct that emerged in his later writings. And Becker has brilliantly discussed the tortuous formulations that Freud produced to keep intact his earlier instinct theory. By holding that there was an instinctual urge toward death, as well as life, Freud could now explain violent human aggression, hate, and evil with a biological theory. Becker summarizes: "The death instinct represents the organism's desire to die, but the organism can save itself from its own impulsion toward death by redirecting it outward. The desire to die, then, is replaced by the desire to kill, and man defeats his own death instinct by killing others."

This ultimate fiction, in the Grimm's fairy tale world of Freud, transforms death from the primary human problem to a desired instinctual goal. Having substituted sexual fear for anxiety as to all the problems of mastery faced by developing human creatures, Freud now explicitly denied the meaning of the consciousness of death. Source of terror and of achievement, it is not, as Becker suggests, the primary repression: it is, as Schopenhauer said, the beginning of philosophy.

The use of our intellectual faculties, so denigrated in Freudian theory, finds its origins in the challenge of our brief lives. Searching for meaning in the face

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of death, man has accomplished amazing feats through the use of his intellect, has been capable of valuing his systems of law and justice, his ideas of virtue and the good life, above his individual existence.

But contemporary culture, Freudian in its basic assumptions about the nature of humanity, has altered expectations to confirm Freud's vision. Regarding sex and aggression as the fundamental human drives, imbued with the conviction of the universal narcissism of mankind, profoundly distrusting intellect except in its manipulative aspects, and viewing death as a technological issue: this is the Freudian man we have manufactured. Denying the meaning of death, Freud confined himself to the biological, sexual self and bequeathed a heritage of nihilism that is the basic intellectual mode of our time. FT

In A Field Of Weeds

"Man is but a reed, the weakest in nature, but he is a thinking reed."
— Pascal, *Pensées*

Five degrees. Rough, shifting winds. Sunlight crashing
Almost audibly, sky to snow-pack, snow-pack to sky.
Eyes shrink hard to their smallest stop, but winter drills in.
Brilliant splinters of ice in the air blow up and down.

In a polished field stiff weeds poke through like rusty wire.
Stems and branches, anchored in ice, shake hard with gusts,
Knock stalk on stalk and litter the snow with broken reeds.
Detritus lifts in a whirl of air, then lies back down.

Hollow weeds rattle bone on bone, and the man who listens
Slowly turns to scan the rim of an icy zero. Acres of snow
Reach every way. Sunlight fills the blinding page.
He has come out here to read what it says, and he thinks he knows.

He walks back home and remembers everything;
Everything holds in his icy mirror. When words arrive
He chooses those which fabricate nothing, take nothing away.
I read the words on the snowy page, and they stick like burrs.

They name the terror and make it flower. We stand together.

Robert Schultz

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Education and the Mind Redeemed

John F. Crosby

I

The early Church father Tertullian asked a famous question, one that has been asked again and again in the history of the Church, and that I would like to ask again: "What does Athens have to do with Jerusalem?" By Athens he means intellectual culture, the life of the mind, the study of philosophy, literature, history, and theology, and by Jerusalem he means redemption through the blood of Jesus, faith, hope, and charity. And he is asking rhetorically: if you are a new creature in Christ, why do you need intellectual culture? You have found the pearl of great price; how can you still have any heart for the heritage of the Greeks and for the liberal arts? You will not be judged on the Last Day by how much pagan wisdom you have assimilated; why should it be any concern of yours now, when you are supposed to be living a life in preparation for the Last Judgment? Leave the pagan wisdom to the pagans; you are supposed to lead a life hidden with Christ in God. Feed the hungry, preach the Gospel to the poor, rescue those whose lives are endangered—but intellectual refinement, vast knowledge, well-developed powers of criticism and analysis, what is all this but a kind of luxury, an intellectual and not a material luxury indeed, but a luxury all the same? If you insist on leading the life of the mind, are you not just "fiddling while Rome burns"?

To see how alive the question of Tertullian still is, consider the words of C. S. Lewis in his essay "Christianity and Culture":

> At an early age I came to believe that the life of culture (that is, of intellectual and aesthetic activity) was very good for its own sake, or even that it was the good for man. After my conversion, which occurred in my later twenties, I continued to hold this belief without consciously asking how it could be reconciled with my new belief that the end of human life was salvation in Christ and the glorifying of God. I was awakened from this confused state of mind by finding that the friends of culture seemed to me to be exaggerating. In my reaction against what seemed exaggerated I was driven to the other extreme, and began, in my own mind, to belittle the claims of culture. As soon as I did this I was faced with the question, "If it is a thing of so little value, how are you justified in spending so much of your life on it?"

This is, of course, nothing other than Tertullian's question. I might add that in this essay, C. S. Lewis quite struggles with it, and is in my opinion not very successful in defending intellectual culture against the Christian radicalism of Tertullian.

But we need not look to C. S. Lewis; it is enough to look to ourselves in order to see how much this ancient question is still with us. Sometimes I hear students at certain religiously fervent universities saying that being at their schools is more like making a long retreat than studying at a university. Are they not saying in effect that, as they see it, Jerusalem has swallowed up Athens, and that they are pleased with the result? Or when one of the leaders of Operation Rescue, while recruiting at a Catholic university for Rescue last year, said that the rescuers represent the Church militant, whereas the rest of the students and faculty represent only "the Church academic," was he not holding the intellectual life in contempt just as Tertullian did? But even if we do not have this contempt, we may be so taken up with our discovery of the Lord, of His Church, so eager to enter more intimately into the life of prayer, that we have little heart for Athens.

JOHN F. CROSBY *is Professor of Philosophy at the Franciscan University of Steubenville.*

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Of course we can always find some utilitarian value in our studies; St. Paul says that he who does not work should not eat, and in this day and age you need to know something in order to do most kinds of work. We can also find, without any great effort, some religious utility in our studies. If you study law, for example, you may thereby become a more effective instrument in the fight against certain social evils. But such utilitarian considerations remain entirely within the perspective symbolized by the famous utterance of Tertullian.

And if we examine the historical experience of Christian universities in this country we seem to find just what Tertullian would expect. In his "The Decline and Fall of the Christian College" (FIRST THINGS, April and May), Fr. James Burtchaell presents empirical evidence showing that Christian universities in this country were usually mediocre universities as long as they had a strong Christian inspiration, and that as soon as they became more serious as universities, they usually drifted away from their Christianity. Indeed, Burtchaell does not offer a single example of a Christian university in which Jerusalem thrived as Athens grew stronger and asserted its claims. Tertullian would not be surprised; as soon as you stop treating intellectual formation as a mere instrument and try to take it more seriously, then, he would say, intellect becomes a rival to faith, and there is no stopping the conflict between them.

And yet the mainstream teaching of the Christian, and certainly of the Catholic, tradition is firmly *against* Tertullian. Of course the tradition agrees with him in this, that it is better to enter heaven with one eye, and an ill-formed mind, and all kinds of prejudices, than to enter hell with a well-formed mind. But the hostility that he expresses towards the life of the mind is entirely un-Christian. Otherwise, why did John Paul II, in the very first line of his recent Apostolic Constitution on Catholic Universities, say that the Catholic university is "born from the heart of the Church"? What does this mean if not that Athens must have a great deal to do with Jerusalem, and must be more than just an instrument in the hands of Jerusalem? Let us try to understand a little better this piece of our Christian heritage, which is entrusted in a special way to our Christian universities, and is sure to be lost if they do not transmit it, enriched with the reflections of each generation.

II

I propose to begin my response to Tertullian by drawing on the greatest and most original Catholic mind since the Reformation, John Henry Newman. In what follows, Newman speaks not only as a Catholic, but as one of the great Christian humanists. In a sermon preached in 1855 to a university congregation, a congregation composed of men and women not so different from ourselves, Newman distinguishes between intellectual and moral excellence, and then deplores the fact that these two excellences so often get in the way of each other:

> And it is our great misfortune here, and our trial, that where right, and goodness, and moral greatness are, there need not be talent [that is, intellectual excellence]. It was not so in the beginning. . . .

Newman means that the various excellences of the human soul formed a natural unity before the fall, and that it was only as a result of the fall that they began to exclude each other.

> . . . the grace is gone; the soul cannot hold together; it falls to pieces; its elements strive with each other. . . .

He goes on to say bluntly:

> I grant, that, from the disorder and confusion into which the human mind has fallen, too often good men are not attractive, and bad men are; too often cleverness, or wit, or taste, or richness of fancy, or keenness of intellect, or depth, or knowledge . . . is on the side of error and not on the side of virtue . . . and in matter of fact, in particular cases, persons may be found, correct and virtuous, who are heavy, narrow-minded, and unintellectual, and again, unprincipled men, who are brilliant and amusing.

And here are Newman's well-known words on the task of Catholic universities to overcome this unnatural separation:

> Here, then, I conceive, is the object of the . . . Catholic Church in setting up Universities; it is to reunite things which were in the beginning joined together by God, and have been put asunder by man. . . . I wish the intellect to range with the utmost freedom, and religion to enjoy an equal freedom; but what I am stipulating for is, that they should be found in one and the same place, and exemplified in the same persons. I want to destroy that diversity of centres, which puts everything into confusion by creating a contrariety of influences. I wish the same spots and the same individuals to be at once oracles of philosophy and shrines of devotion. . . . I want the intellectual layman to be religious, and the devout ecclesiastic to be intellectual.

Notice that Newman says not a word here about the religious usefulness of intellectual culture. He does not say that the believer needs intellectual culture in order to be an effective apostle, nor does he say that the life of the mind is a means for making the believer

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better and more devout. Newman's idea in this sermon is simply that, by cultivating not only moral and religious but also intellectual excellence, we recover the integrity of our being, we undo the fragmentation of ourselves that comes from the fall, we restore the image of God in ourselves, and we redeem not just our souls but our whole spiritual being with its various powers.

But we will not understand Newman unless we recall the following point in his teaching. The purpose of a university education is not simply to impart information, not even important information about our relation to God; its purpose is first of all to impart a formation of mind, to communicate intellectual culture. In one place, Newman asks us to imagine what it would be like for a person born blind to have his sight suddenly restored: such a person would at first see only a chaos of lights and colors and lines, and be unable to discriminate a thing from its background, between one thing and another thing, between closer and farther away, and so on. He would see the world, Newman says, "without order or principle, without drift or meaning, and like the wrong side of a piece of tapestry." Now this confusion, Newman says, is just like the confusion in which the unformed mind finds itself in relation to things of the mind; it does not yet know how to distinguish the more from the less important, the primary from the secondary; it does not discern the main lines of meaning, and principles of unity, and of contrast. Only slowly would the person born blind learn to perceive an ordered world of things and relations and proportions. And it is only through the slow work of a liberal education, Newman says, that the mind develops "the power of referring every thing to its true place in the universal system . . . [so that the mind] makes every thing lead to every thing else; it communicates the image of the whole body to every separate member, till the whole becomes in imagination like a spirit, everywhere pervading and penetrating its component parts, and giving them their one definite meaning."

We see, then, why he says that a university does not just stock the minds of its students with information, but *forms* them, developing in them new powers of seeing and understanding. And we see why we do not just gain a useful tool when our mind is formed, but rather perfect our spiritual nature, and develop the image of God in ourselves. And, finally, we see why, according to Newman, it is a shame when the religious development of a believer interferes with his intellectual development. It is of course a greater shame if his intellectual development interferes with his religious development (and Newman knew as well as anyone how great a danger this is), but it is also a serious failure when the interference occurs the other way around.

III

Now some may still wish to respond to Newman in the spirit of Tertullian and say: I grant you that intellectual formation is a fine thing, but still you cannot get around the fact that it is not necessary for salvation, that not all the saints possessed it, and that there are even religious dangers in leading the intellectual life; I still do not see why an institution that exists for the sake of the intellectual life can be said to be born from the heart of the Church, and can have any importance for the Church, except, of course, for the utilitarian importance mentioned above.

In order to respond to this objection and defend the attempt to make Christian sense of the intellectual life, we need to enlarge the perspective of our reflections. I propose to do this by using a distinction made by the American Catholic theologian, John Courtney Murray. Murray contrasts what he calls "eschatological humanism" with "incarnational humanism." The former humanism, he says, is typified by some of the early hermits who would weave a basket one day and unweave it the next.

> The basket itself did not matter; but the weaving and unweaving of it served as a means of spending an interval, necessary to the frail human spirit, between periods of performance of the only task that did matter, the contemplation of heavenly things. Only the making of a soul was the true human value. For the rest, what did it matter whether one wove baskets or wrought whole civilizations?

This is humanism in the spirit of Tertullian; all goods other than the ultimate good of God and our union with Him pale into insignificance. "Incarnational humanism," on the other hand, we might describe as taking the saying of the Roman poet, "Nothing which is human do I regard as foreign to me," and giving it a new Christian meaning. Murray characterizes this humanism as follows:

> [The Church] carries on the mission of Christ: "to save that which perished." And that which perished was not only a soul, but man in his composite unity, and the material universe too. . . . The Church . . . is catholic in her redemptive scope; all men are to be saved, all that is human is to be saved. . . . The Christian heart must cultivate a contempt for the world, but diligently cherish its reverence for the work of the Creator, who is Creator not only of heaven but of the earth, of the visible as well as the invisible. . . . In the perspectives of an incarnational humanism there is a place for all that is natural, human, terrestrial. The heavens and the earth are not destined for an eternal dust-heap, but

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for a transformation. There will be a new heaven and a new earth; and those who knew them once will recognize them, for all their newness.

Those who know the documents of Vatican II will know that at this Council the Catholic Church committed herself to just this incarnational humanism. Look at chapters 3 and 4 of Part I of *Gaudium et spes*; here the Council affirms and sometimes even seems to celebrate this humanism. Consider this sentence: "The Lord [Jesus] is the goal of human history, the focal point of the desires of history and civilization, the center of mankind, the joy of all hearts, and the fulfillment of all aspirations" (#45). But this means that human civilization, though it is something less than the ultimate good of union with God, is not simply irrelevant to our Christian faith; if the God-man is willing to be the goal of human civilization, then we His followers had better take it seriously; we should be concerned to develop civilization and culture in such a way as to reveal Him as its real fulfillment. The Council in this document even goes so far as to say that many of the "fruits of our enterprise" in this life will be preserved in the new heavens and the new earth; "we will find them once again, cleansed this time from the stain of sin, illuminated and transfigured, when Christ presents to his Father an eternal and universal kingdom. . . ." (#39) The fruit of our earthly labor is not simply to be blotted out in eternity and replaced by God, as the eschatological humanism would have it, but is rather destined to remain, transfigured.

It is perhaps worth observing that there are certain theological traditions that have a particular reason to make their own the incarnational humanism taught by the Council. Even before the Blessed John Duns Scotus, the great medieval Franciscan theologian of the fourteenth century, but especially after him, the doctrine of what is called the "absolute primacy of Christ" has been dear to many theologians, including, I believe, certain Protestants, among them Karl Barth. They disagree with those who say that the incarnation of the Son in Jesus Christ belongs only to the order of redemption and not to the order of creation, and that, apart from the fall of man, there would have been no incarnation. They hold instead that Jesus Christ belongs to the order of creation no less than to the order of redemption, that God in His original plan of creation, and not just as a response to human sin, created the world for the God-man, and destined it to be subject to His kingship (as St. Paul seems to teach in Col. 1:15-18 and elsewhere). And it should be especially clear why everything human is ordered to Jesus Christ and can be fulfilled only in Him: for His kingship over creation is rooted not only in the economy of our salvation, but in the original plan of creation. And it should be especially clear why for Christians life in Christ should not compete with our love of His creation, but should rather support our commitment to "build up the earth" in and with and through Him.

IV

But however one develops the theological foundations of incarnational humanism, it seems to imply that there is a difference between the minimum necessary for saving our souls and the fullness of redemption, which includes the redemption of our bodies, our minds, our tastes, our ways of judging, our cultural life, and which even includes, as St. Paul teaches, the redemption of the whole of creation in and through the glory of our liberty as sons and daughters of God. Of course Christians pursue in the first place, as the one thing needful, the salvation of their souls, which is pure grace and no work of their own, and certainly no natural result of some earthly development; but they also have reasons, sprung from the heart of their faith in the Incarnation, to take earthly development very seriously, and to commit themselves to the work of drawing all the parts of human nature and all regions of human existence to Christ, of making them share in the redemption, and in this way, if I might express myself boldly, of "helping" Him to exercise His primacy in creation. When, then, we who are believers lead the intellectual life, and receive intellectual formation, thereby restoring in ourselves the unity of faith and understanding that was lost through the fall, what we are beginning is nothing less than the work of redeeming our whole being, and we begin a work that will last into eternity.

In the new document on Catholic universities, John Paul II says that these universities, by "the united endeavour of intelligence and faith will enable people *to come to the full measure of their humanity [which has been] . . . renewed . . . marvelously . . . in Christ*" (#5, emphasis added). This implies that there is a fullness of redeemed humanity that a believer does not have simply by believing, but that requires also the development of his intelligence.

This is also exactly the teaching of Newman in his great sermon, "Faith and Bigotry as Contrasted with Wisdom," in which he contrasts faith and wisdom as follows: "Faith, then, and Wisdom are distinct, or even opposite gifts. Wisdom belongs to the perfect, and more especially to the preachers of the Gospel; and Faith is the elementary grace which is required of all, especially of hearers." And why is wisdom the greater gift? Because the possessor of wisdom has faith, but has more besides; he also has, as Newman proceeds to explain, intellectual formation, he has that sense of the totality which enables him to "communicate the image of the whole body to every separate member." In other words, under the name of wisdom Newman recognizes a surpassing spiritual excellence that contains intellectual formation as part of itself, and

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that cannot exist without intellectual formation. This is why intellectual culture is more than just an instrument in the hands of faith, but is incorporated into faith in such a way that there results a unified spiritual excellence that surpasses faith considered by itself.

And there is more to be said about making Christian sense of the intellectual life. God set man over the whole world to serve Him by ruling it in justice. And how do we rule over the world, which God has subjected to us? Not merely by means of technology. In knowing the truth about the world, in understanding the natures of the beings in it, in seeing the reflection of God in them, we also exercise a certain spiritual dominion over them. This is what John Paul II implies when he comments on the passage in Genesis about Adam naming the animals: he says that the naming ought to be interpreted as *Adam understanding the truth about creatures*, and that Adam thereby asserts his lordship over them. In his famous utterance, "the philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways, but the important thing is to change it," Marx precisely fails to understand this; he fails to see the power and dominion that is exercised in knowing. When, then, we try to understand the truth about the world through philosophy and history and literature and the sciences, we are not just fiddling while Rome burns, we are rather taking our God-given place in the world, and exercising our God-given lordship over it. And if we put this idea together with the previous one about the primacy of Christ in creation, we can perhaps even say that, through this lordship of ours in visible creation, we share somehow in His lordship over all of creation.

V

The Tertullians in our midst recognize no work of evangelization proper to a university, otherwise they could not say that Athens has nothing to do with Jerusalem. They are right in that the direct proclamation of the Gospel is not the main way in which a Christian university evangelizes, but they are wrong in thinking that there is no other way to evangelize. There is a certain "incarnational" way of evangelizing, which Pope Paul VI, speaking not just for Catholics but for many other Christians, described in this way:

> It is a question not only of preaching the Gospel in ever wider geographic areas or to ever greater numbers of people, but also of affecting and, as it were, upsetting, through the power of the Gospel, humanity's criteria of judgment, dominant values, points of interest, lines of thought, sources of inspiration and models of life, which are in contrast with the Word of God. . . . (*Evangelii nuntiandi*, #18)

In testing all aspects of human culture in the light of the Christ, we do not bring in a standard which is foreign to culture. Rather, we use *the* most appropriate standard, for as we saw, Jesus Christ is the goal of all human culture. Now here is the mode of evangelizing proper to a university: letting the light of the Gospel shine into every corner of human culture, and showing forth Christ as the redeemer of everything human. This is how the Christian university helps the Church make an integral proclamation of Christ, or a catholic, universal proclamation of Him. This means among other things that for her work of evangelization the Church needs St. Thomas Aquinas and Blessed Duns Scotus and Venerable John Henry Newman no less than she needs St. Francis Xavier and Mother Theresa.

And so when we consecrate ourselves to the life of the mind, we do not have to feel guilty, as if we were just sitting on the sidelines, gratifying our intellectual curiosity, while the missionaries in the field or the prolife activists bear the whole burden of evangelization and prophetic witness. This way of thinking about the work of the university is nothing but a temptation; it is a way of thinking that knows nothing of that "universal humanism" which is rooted in the kingship of Christ over all the regions and realms of creation.

It may be useful to offer a concrete example of the evangelization proper to a Christian university. There has occurred in modern thought what is called "the discovery of subjectivity." Man has come to be investigated, not just as an objective being of a certain nature, but also subjectively, as he experiences himself from within. The first reaction of many Christian thinkers is to reject entirely this turn to subjectivity; they can see in it nothing but a subjectivism that dissolves objective truth and reality into our experiencing. But other Christians, and foremost among them John Paul II, think that this turn to subjectivity need not involve subjectivism, but is part of a greater awareness of man as person, and that the Christian proclamation can gain much from the discovery of subjectivity. He thinks that the Church stands before the extremely challenging task of discriminating between the authentic subjectivity of the person and the destructive kind of subjectivism. This work of discrimination, if it is carried out well, will enable the Church to perfect her proclamation of Christ, to adapt it to our time, and to show Christ as the fulfillment of all that is legitimate in the turn to subjectivity.

It is of course understandable if zealous young converts to the faith can see in this painstaking work of discrimination and discernment nothing more than "intellectualism," far removed from the life of faith. And indeed this work is not strictly necessary for every believer, and not everyone is called to it. But it is necessary for the life of the Church; it is necessary for the dialogue that the Church wants to have with

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the world, it is necessary for the evangelization of the world, it is necessary for the ever-deepening self-understanding of the Church. And so there will therefore always be some in the Church who are called to it—and who should these "some" be if not the professors and students in our Christian universities?

VI

Finally, then, the danger is not so much failing to appreciate fully the life of the mind, but failing to appreciate precisely *the deep Christian significance* of the life of the mind, failing to understand adequately what it means to say that the university is born from the heart of the Church. We are all still caught up in a certain dualism of faith here, and study over there. We try indeed to connect them by saying, for example, that we should study conscientiously because this is our station in life, or because we owe this in justice to our parents who are paying the bills, or because we need to prepare for our future careers. This is all true, but it does not overcome the dualism. If there is any merit in these reflections, it follows that there is a whole spirituality of the intellectual life waiting to be developed. This is the spirituality that knows how to integrate our intellectual work into the mystery of Christ, and of His Kingship in creation, and of His Church. If only we can learn to incorporate this integration within ourselves, then we can be more radically committed to our studies, then we will develop a passion for understanding and an abhorrence for intellectual mediocrity. Not that we will expect salvation from our intellectual work: we will not stop believing that we are saved not by our own works but by grace; but we will let this grace become fruitful for the redemption of our minds. Then we will evangelize, not only in the way of direct proclamation, but also in the way especially appropriate to a university. Athens will grow strong as well as Jerusalem, and instead of being jealous of each other, they will perfect each other.

It may even be that if Jerusalem refuses to have anything to do with Athens, and if she in general fails to do justice to the incarnational significance of revelation and encloses herself in a onesidedly eschatological self-understanding, she will remain underdeveloped precisely as Jerusalem. That is, if there really is an incarnational humanism in the sense explained above, then it will surely not be related only extrinsically to Christian faith. No, it will spring from the doctrine of the Incarnation, so that the Christian faith which refuses to expand and to differentiate itself incarnationally will remain in a certain sense abstract and empty. Here we see anew why Athens has indeed much to do with Jerusalem, and why the complete separation of the two is un-Christian.

And what shall we say of the historical experience of an antagonism between faith and intellect? Does our theological reflection not ring hollow when we think, for instance, of the hard empirical facts marshaled by Fr. Burtchaell? If Athens and Jerusalem really belong together, whence this chronic antagonism between the Christian commitment of universities and their commitment to intellectual excellence and seriousness?

This painful contrast between theological truth and empirical fact is after all not so different from the painful contrast between the theology of marriage and the empirical condition of the average Christian marriage, or from the painful contrast between the theology of the mystical body of Christ and the sociology of the average American parish. We Christians live by faith, and thereby overcome the world, and this overcoming means, among other things, not being demoralized by the empirical conditions that often obscure rather than disclose what we know in faith. Besides, we know that faith and intellect only tend to be antagonistic in a fallen world in which the soul has suffered fragmentation. In the words of Newman, "The grace is gone; the soul cannot hold together; it falls to pieces; its elements strive with each other."

But what supports us most of all as we reach out towards a spirituality of the intellectual life are the occasional institutions and above all the individuals who convincingly unite in themselves Athens and Jerusalem, to the enrichment of each. In them the fragmentation is healed, or is on the way to being healed. They fulfill the ideal of Newman: "I wish the same spots and the same individuals to be at once oracles of philosophy and shrines of devotion." They bear witness to the truth of the Incarnation by the fullness of their redeemed humanity, and no empirical history of Christian university education in the United States, disappointing as it may in part be, can keep them from fascinating us, and from challenging us. FT

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Science Within the Limits of Truth

Paul H. Liben

The October 1990 issue of this publication featured a lively and occasionally fierce debate on the subject of evolution. Initiated by Phillip E. Johnson of the University of California Law School at Berkeley, the debate included responses by a history of science professor (William B. Provine), a museum curator (Gareth Nelson), a biophysics professor (Thomas H. Jukes), and two editors (Irving Kristol and Matthew Berke). Of these participants, it was Berke who especially attempted to draw serious attention to the philosophical dimensions of the issue. Berke's principal point was that "philosophy, rather than science, is the final battleground in the evolution debate . . . insofar as that debate becomes a struggle between naturalism and supernaturalism to have the final say on man's status." The point is well taken, and points to the larger truth that the evolution debate is itself a microcosm of a much broader philosophical struggle, a struggle over the very definition, boundaries, direction, integrity, and even validity of the entire scientific enterprise.

The manner in which this debate has been carried on, if it is truly indicative of the thinking of the participants in it, should trouble—even alarm—those who are concerned for the continued success of the scientific enterprise.

For as has been made vivid by the argument about evolution, two tendencies of thought are between them posing a serious threat to the continued health of scientific endeavor. First, there is the increasing prevalence within the scientific community of naturalistic philosophical beliefs which, if carried to their logical conclusion, would seem to imply a complete debunking of the enterprise. Second, there is a tendency on the part of both naturalistic and theistic scientists to impose their respective worldviews onto the realm of science and hence to distort the logical boundaries of that realm.

PAUL H. LIBEN *is a new contributor to* FIRST THINGS.

The first threat, that from naturalism, directly challenges the presuppositions upon which science as we know it was originally based—presuppositions which, though undoubtedly absent from the consciousness of many contemporary scientists, were quite clearly on the minds of those who pioneered modern science. These presuppositions concern both nature the observed and man the observer. Nature was assumed to "occur" in regular patterns. Earlier scientists such as Isaac Newton premised this assumption on a prior one that nature was created by an "orderly" God closely resembling if not identical to the God of the Bible, who, having a fixed character, was presumed to have created nature with the same kind of essential order or stability. From this premise, it was concluded that nature was worthy of being observed seriously.

Having been deemed worthy of such observation, can an object, in fact, be observed? Is the observer capable of observing it? That depends on his relationship to the object. When the object is nature, it would appear that man must be sufficiently detached or removed from it to be able to discover genuine truths about its operations. Hence the second major presupposition that would seem necessary in order for scientists to proceed with well-grounded confidence is this: man the observer is not entirely immersed in nature the observed. Though long out of vogue within the philosophy departments of major universities, this presupposition of an existent subject/object relationship has for its detractors an especially annoying habit of regularly rearing its unwanted but formidable head in the real world. Words like "objective" and "objectivity" are inescapably premised upon the existence of such a relationship. When, for example, we deem a judge to be "objective," we mean that he, the subject, is sufficiently detached from the parties and their respective interests, the object. If his interests lie with either side, if he stands insufficiently outside of the parties' respective interests, it is understandably

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assumed that he may not handle the case in a manner conducive to the emergence or discovery of truth. Similarly, if man is intrinsically incapable of standing sufficiently outside of or transcending nature, logic would appear to dictate that the validity of his assertions concerning it could be called into question.

Absent this assumption of an existing subject/object relationship, it would seem that science cannot be ultimately practiced with a great degree of confidence. But on what grounds may we properly assume that a part of man can, in fact, transcend nature? The traditional answer has been that the same Deity who had created nature the observed and hence transcended it had placed in man the observer a similar kind of transcendence. It is no mere coincidence that science as we know it today began in the Judeo-Christian West and not the pantheistic East. Man's confidence in his ability to transcend nature and hence discover truths concerning it ultimately depends upon his rejection not only of dogmatic naturalism but of pantheism's attribution to Deity of complete immanence, in favor of a Western attribution to Deity of a transcendent character.

Thus far, it has been shown that a philosophical case can readily be made for the assertion that the validity as well as origins of science derive from the assumption of the validity of Western theistic premises. Nonetheless, as Phillip Johnson and many others have noted, most evolutionary biologists appear to have accepted uncritically the worldview of naturalism. If it is indeed the case that absent theistic assumptions, the scientific enterprise can ultimately be called into question, then by embracing naturalism, these biologists are effectually sawing off the branch upon which they are currently sitting. If naturalism is true, then all branches of the sciences, evolutionary biology included, could in the long run be in serious trouble.

Science, however, has faced, is facing, and will continue to face a far more obvious threat than that posed by the particular philosophical beliefs of scientists. It comes from a particular vocal group of naturalists on one side and a much smaller but equally noisy lot of creationists on the other, both of whom have increasingly been declaring their respective philosophical views not merely to be true but to be true in a specifically scientific sense. Those who have incurred the bulk of the media's wrath, or more commonly, ridicule, have of course been the creationists. Though it is entirely legitimate for a scientist, or anyone else, to present philosophical or theological arguments against naturalistic evolution, it cannot properly be claimed that such arguments are themselves scientific ones. Here we have the blind spot of creationism, for if we define science as the study of nature, then to offer an opinion concerning what lies outside of it is to step entirely outside of the scientific realm.

Even if all scientists declared evolution to be entirely errant, creationism could be taught as a science only in terms of what it denies, namely, that there is sufficient evidence for evolution. What it affirms—specifically, the creation of nature by a Supreme Being who transcends it—cannot represent itself as science. A creationist may argue eloquently and persuasively for the existence of a transcendent God. He may argue, as I have attempted to do, that the presuppositions behind science are ultimately theistic. But when he does so argue, he is speaking not the language of science, but rather of logic, philosophy, or theology. This is said, to be sure, not in denigration of these fields: for if Western theists are correct, then such fields are arguably of greater importance than science. But for the sake both of truth and continued human progress, the integrity and independence of science ought to be preserved against those who would compel it to state, as *scientific fact*, that something exists outside of its sole field of study, which is nature.

Equally dangerous to science, however, if not more so, are those naturalistic scientists who play essentially the same game as the creationists, i.e., seek to lend credibility to their particular worldview by attempting to clothe it in scientific garb. It must be emphasized that even if what they believe is true and we theists are wrong, it is no more affirmable as science than creationism. The naturalists' assertion that nature encompasses all that exists can be neither verified nor falsified through its study. In other words, science by definition has boundaries, and when they speak *as* scientists, people simply cannot address the question of whether or not anything exists outside of nature.

Every scientist, then, be he a pantheist like Fritjof Capra, a naturalist like Carl Sagan, or a Western theist like Robert Jastrow, has an ethical and professional duty to guard the scientific realm from being infiltrated by philosophy or theology and to restrain it in turn from infiltrating these and other fields. In recognition of the boundaries derived logically from its very definition, science must both defend itself from invasion by, and at the same time resist the temptation to invade, other fields.

In centuries past, science's boundaries were continually threatened with invasion by the forces of institutionalized religion. One of the most egregious examples of this was the persecution of Galileo at the hands of the seventeenth-century Roman Catholic Church, which imprisoned him for his apparent sympathy for the heliocentric theories of Copernicus. For students of the history of science, this shameful incident is etched indelibly in their minds as an example of the bullying of science by those having an apparent stake in the upholding of a particular religious worldview.

In contrast, the past hundred years have witnessed an exactly opposite phenomenon, the effort at imperial expansion by certain naturalistic scientists. Buoyed by a self-confidence that, paradoxically, can

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only be justified by the theistic premise of man's capacity to transcend nature, these scientists began subjecting man himself to an increasing amount of scientific study. In light of the fact that man is located within nature, it is not in retrospect surprising that many of the results have been extraordinarily beneficial. We have come a very long way from the not-so-distant past when physical life on earth was for humanity as a whole "nasty, brutish, and short," as Hobbes succinctly put it. The findings resulting from the scientific study of man have ushered in a period of unparalleled progress, especially in the form of enhanced physical health and material abundance for hundreds of millions of people. But as man became increasingly the object of this kind of study, science eventually arrived at a crossroads. As man was indeed a part of nature, scientific study of him was, as we said, legitimate. But the question inevitably arises, is *all* of man located within nature? And science is by definition unable even to address this question.

Unfortunately, all too many advocates of science, both professionals and amateurs, presumed that science knew the answer. Naturalism came to be affirmed as axiomatic, and metaphysical or theological premises concerning man contemptuously dismissed as obsolete and hence irrelevant. In short, man came to be seen in his entirety as a creature of nature, and all assertions with respect to his transcendent capacities were peremptorily denied.

The effects on Western civilization of this imperialistic expansion have been both far-reaching and calamitous. So far-reaching have they been that it is no exaggeration to assert that the modern age can be most easily characterized as the time in which the penetration of virtually all fields of human endeavor has been accomplished on science's purported behalf by naturalists. And so calamitous have they been that despite recent worldwide successes in the political realm, Western civilization has yet to reverse or even stem the tide of cultural decay attendant on them.

The effects of the venturing of science beyond its borders come under the categories of determinism and relativism. As for determinism, naturalism's widespread acceptance in both the natural and social sciences implied that man, seen as a being completely subject to the chain of cause-and-effect that runs throughout nature, possesses no free will. The resultant denial of personal responsibility for thoughts, attitudes, and conduct has in a variety of ways affected the intellectual and academic disciplines from sociology, psychology, and criminology to political science, history, and the humanities. Even a cursory comparison, for example, of works of history written in this century with those written in centuries past provides an astonishing contrast, particularly with respect to discussions on the causes of various wars. In seeking to explain the commencement of armed conflicts among nations, writings from our century are far more likely to emphasize "environmental" causes, such as, of course, economics, than the free-will decisions of various leaders or the power of ideas. The implicit premise behind this "environmental," i.e., deterministic, analysis is that man is entirely submerged in the cause-and-effect processes of nature.

That such analysis is, to say the least, incomplete, can easily be demonstrated by even the most elementary critical scrutiny. If, for example, it is asserted that World War I was in large part caused by the economic rivalry between Great Britain and a newly emergent Germany, the question immediately arises as to why a divergence of economic interest between two nations would in itself result inexorably in their proceeding to fight each other, thus tearing apart both their respective societies and economies. Without turning to basic assumptions concerning the limitations of human nature, the power of ideas and attitudes, and, ultimately, the existence of free will, any explanation of the causes of war will ultimately be unsatisfactory.

The prevalence of determinism is even more evident in the field of psychology. In earlier decades, both Freudian psychoanalysis and Skinnerian behaviorism were examples of the widespread embrace of determinism on the part of psychologists. Though Skinner is the most obvious example of adherence to a particularly "hard" determinism, the ideas of Freud and many others had deterministic implications as well. The comparatively recent popularity of cognitive behaviorism, with its implicit nod to free will in its emphasis on the importance of beliefs, concepts, and ideas as well as environment in influencing human attitudes and conduct, shows that in some circles determinism is being somewhat moderated. Nevertheless it remains true that, with the exception of sociology, psychology has been more influenced by naturalistic (and hence deterministic) presuppositions than any other field in the social sciences and humanities. The result, especially where psychotherapy is involved, has been a serious deemphasis on personal responsibility. Moreover, for some years now a "pop" version of psychological determinism has been spreading throughout our culture, making a large contribution toward the undermining of an ethic of personal responsibility.

Which is to say, the adverse effects of determinism have in no sense been confined to the academy. The increase in virtually every form of social pathology throughout the West, especially in the latter part of this century, may in no small part be attributable to the steady erosion of the belief in free will. The characterization of criminals as primarily victims of their environment, a notion that has become increasingly popular among public policy analysts and social critics since the 1950s, is the clearest example of the erosion of this belief. Though the idea of criminal as victim does seem to be falling somewhat out of fashion—possibly because certain policy analysts and

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social critics have themselves experienced some of the increasingly widespread criminal behavior—it is interesting to note that more and more offenders have become conversant with and adept at the rationalizing language of determinism. Prison rehabilitation experts have duly noted the difficulty of breaking through the numerous rationalizations of inmates who refuse to accept any kind of responsibility for what they have inflicted upon themselves or others.

As we have seen, free will is not the only thing denied by naturalism. As naturalism is affirmed, transcendence is denied, and with it the existence of absolute or objective standards. Affirmed is a thoroughgoing relativism that has come to pervade virtually every area of life. Nothing seems immune from this onslaught. Even defining the nature of a given field of study has become an increasingly difficult and frustrating endeavor. Western culture has been plunged into seemingly endless debates about what is art, or what is philosophy, or what is theology, and over and over again those who stirred such debates arrived at the answer that there are no answers. That such an idea is self-contradictory seemed only to confirm it.

The process of draining logic and meaning from everything came to full fruition in the 1960s and 1970s, when it began to be felt profoundly in the daily lives of many Americans, with such things as the proliferation of "alternative lifestyles," the diluting or jettisoning of academic standards at every level, the increasing inability of the legal system to make in practice sufficient or consistent distinctions between victim and victimizer—among many others too familiar to all of us us to need spelling out. Determinism and relativism have together made a lethal contribution to the cultural decay.

It is no coincidence, then, that creation science and the emergence of the Religious Right as a social force should have come together in the 1970s and early 1980s. Both were essentially a backlash against the crisis of decadence wrought by naturalism's legacies of determinism and relativism. While the Religious Right sought in various ways to combat these legacies, creationists specifically attacked the root of the problem, naturalism itself.

Unfortunately, both employed the wrong kinds of arguments for the respective areas in which they engaged their opponents. As Richard John Neuhaus emphasized in *The Naked Public Square*, the Religious Right improperly employed essentially private arguments and language of special Revelation in the public realm. With equal impropriety, the creationists often employed the thought and language of religion and philosophy in their area of concern, the study of nature. Thus while they have, as have the Religious Right, usefully called into question the harmful influence of the naturalists, when it comes to the well-being of science they are probably as much a hindrance as a help. They appear to be no more respectful of science's proper boundaries than are their naturalistic opponents. While all too many naturalists seek, as we have seen, to expand these boundaries, the creationists, knowingly or not, advocate their shrinkage.

The inherently necessary borders of science could best be protected in the future if all scientists were to agree to draw a clear, careful, and inviolable line between scientific and philosophical/religious truth—that is, if they would conscientiously seek to avoid making purportedly scientific statements concerning questions whose answers lie beyond the scope of scientific inquiry. How scientists ultimately handle the evolution controversy in all its aspects may provide a clue as to whether they are authentically concerned about scientific integrity or whether they merely wish to advance their respective philosophical agendas, be they naturalistic or theistic. It would certainly be welcome, not only with respect to the interests of science, but to those of society in general, if scientists of all stripes began truly to respect the limits of their own enterprise.

By now, however, even this would not by itself be enough. For it would still be the case that a disproportionate number of scientists remain dogmatic naturalists, and their denial of human transcendence would still threaten the very basis of confidence in the efficacy of the scientific enterprise. This issue would so far no doubt appear to most scientists and scientific devotees to be a rarified one addressed chiefly by people of an incorrigibly philosophical bent. But it is simply a matter of time before others, especially those naturalists who insist upon unflinching and brutal intellectual honesty with themselves, carry the logic of naturalism to its inevitable end and ask the perhaps unconsciously dreaded questions: How can we be objective if as naturalists we have rejected the very basis upon which to believe in objectivity? And if we cannot in fact be truly objective, then who is to say what is science or, for that matter, anything else?

What will happen then? Facing these questions, will naturalists undergo a serious change of worldview? It is, naturally, quite impossible to predict. But if they do not recognize the consequences, in both thought and practice, of the present state of their beliefs, we whose bent is philosophical rather than scientific may be forgiven for worrying about what the scientific future holds. FT

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The Grammar of Baptism

Alvin F. Kimel, Jr.

Feminism has become a truly significant force within American culture. Its presence and power is felt in all areas of our common life, and perhaps nowhere more keenly than in our use of language. We have all become sensitized to the need to be "inclusive" in our speech. Certain usages, conventionally accepted for generations, are alleged to express and undergird a patriarchal politico-economic system and thus to serve the exclusion of women from public life. This demand for linguistic inclusivity has now penetrated into the heart of American Christianity. It goes far beyond the language with which we speak of ourselves; for now the traditional language in which Christians speak of the deity—and specifically the triune name, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—is claimed to be inherently oppressive of women. Our language for God, we are told, must be made inclusive.

In only ten to fifteen years, a revolution has occurred in churchly discourse. The inherited naming of divinity, previously understood to be sanctioned by Scripture and tradition, is now widely questioned and criticized. Throughout the mainline Protestant churches the triune name is subtly suppressed, while baptisms are administered in the names of various politically correct substitutes. Liturgies are composed that expunge all masculine imagery for the deity and omit references to God as Father or Jesus as the Son. Prayer directly addressed to God as Mother and other feminine titles is increasingly common. These changes are supported and advanced by both seminary theologians and denominational bureaucracies. While it is probably true that the new language has yet to penetrate deeply into the speech and piety of the laity, we may expect it soon to take hold as Sunday School and catechetical programs inculcate the proper habits.

Feminist theologians generally understand these changes as part and parcel of a radical reconstruction of our understanding of deity; clergy and bureaucrats, however, usually explain them along the more modest line of linguistic reform: what is being accomplished is the removal of offensive androcentric features of church language in order to proclaim the gospel more effectively in a society now sensitized to sexism. As Prayer Book Studies 30 of the Episcopal Church puts it, "We are challenged with being faithful to the credal tradition of the church, while, at the same time, naming the God who is 'One in Three and Three in One' in non-gender-specific terms." Thus it is claimed that the ecumenical trinitarian faith will continue to be preached and believed within the framework of the new language.

The claim that linguistic innovation will not affect belief is one that must be vigorously challenged. The triune name is essential to belief in God the Holy Trinity. It forms the identity of the Christian church and structures the grammar of catholic belief and practice. Christians cannot be *Christian* if they refrain from speaking the trinitarian language. By our baptism we are charged and authorized to name God by his revealed name: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

I

Lex orandi, lex credendi: the law of prayer, the law of belief. From the early church to today, Christian theologians have argued endlessly about the relationship between the worship and doctrine of the church. Which has priority? How do we specify and regulate the traffic between them? In the fourth century, Basil the Great added a twist of his own that is of particular relevance to the contemporary debate on God-language. He enunciated the following grammatical rule for Christian faith and worship:

> For we are bound to be baptized in the terms we have received and to profess belief in the terms in which we are baptized, and as we have pro-

Alvin E Kimel, Jr., *a new contributor to* First Things, *is Rector of St. Mark's Episcopal Church in Highland, MD.*

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fessed belief in, so to give glory to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

Basil's assertion is that the *lex orandi, lex credendi* must be governed by our common baptism into the name of the Holy Trinity. Baptism is the ground of creed and liturgy; it structures both our profession of faith and offering of praise. The God to whom we pray is to be the same God confessed in the creeds of the church; the God in whom we declare our communal belief is to be the same God into whom we are baptized.

Holy baptism thus functions to shape the language of faith, and it does so with divine authority: "Therefore go and make disciples of all nations," our Lord enjoins his followers, "baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit" (Matt. 28:19). The baptismal mandate, mediated to us by the canonical Scriptures, is explicitly indited as a command of the risen Lord. In that it is presented in that layer of tradition that is both primitive and canonical—there is no other, more authoritative tradition over against which to appeal—it exercises a normative authority, an authority dominical and apostolic. By the decree of Christ, the church is sent into the world and instructed to initiate believers into the triune name of God. We either obey this command or we simply cease to be the church. The baptismal institution, therefore, is properly construed as foundational and constitutive of ecclesial life. From baptism flows our discourse and prayer, formed by that verbally identified reality into which we are sacramentally incorporated.

Theological reflection on the question of how to name God must begin with the public reality of our baptism. Each Christian has been bathed in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and we share this one baptism with millions of believers both around the world and down the centuries. Throughout the history of the church, the triune name of God has been dogmatically required in the celebration of holy baptism, whether by declarative formula or confession of faith. If St. Basil is correct in his interpretation of the dogma, a specific use of language is thereby prescribed by the canonical institution: God is to be named Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

The baptismal mandate, in other words, may be compared to a rule of grammar. Grammatical rules inform us how we may speak a given language in meaningful fashion. They tell us how a language works; they describe its structure and internal logic. In English, for example, subjects precede verbs, pronouns agree with their antecedents in number and case, transitive verbs must be completed by a direct object. When we violate these rules, we create confusion and nonsense; the language is abased. If we would communicate effectively, we must conform ourselves to the syntax and semantical patterns of the language. We must speak grammatically. The grammar of our native tongue is learned and assimilated long before we can explicitly state its rules. The rules come later as we reflect on our language's inherent constitution and attempt to communicate more clearly, more cogently, more gracefully.

Contemporary theologians such as Paul Holmer and George Lindbeck have asserted that Christianity is appropriately understood as a language—a communal way of life and discourse comprehending a distinctive vocabulary and interior logic. Its ritual, rhetoric, and theology are ruled by its constitutive structure; it possesses its own linguistic and grammatical integrity. Christianity is as different from the competing languages of secular culture, philosophy, ideology, or religion as English is from Spanish or Chinese. As Christians participate in the corporate life of the church, as we share in the ecclesial discourse and experience the sacraments, as we learn the doctrinal norms and become proficient in the Scriptures, liturgy, and ascetical disciplines, we appropriate to ourselves the apostolic idiom. We internalize its grammar. We become fluent in the language of faith. To be a mature Christian is to be a person who, with competence and facility, speaks and lives that gospel ruled by the grammar of Christ.

Baptism into the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit presents us with the fundamental grammatical principle of Christian speech: to properly speak the Christian God is to speak to and of him by those terms into which we are baptized. Consequently, Basil is emphatic on the precise wording of the baptismal naming. "It is enough for us," he declares, "to confess those names which we have received from Holy Scripture, and to shun all innovations about them."

II

"The church," writes George Lindbeck, "is fundamentally identified and characterized by its story." Perhaps every community has a certain story it tells in order to be the community it is, but in any case certainly the Christian church has its own distinctive story. The church is that unique assembly which proclaims the narrative of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as the redemption and eschatological consummation of the world. Christians speak not of deity-in-general but of the God who is self-revealed in the biblical drama: three actors—Father, Son, Spirit—who together, in essential unity, accomplish the salvation of mankind. By this story of the triune God, the baptized are indissolubly bound together; by this story we are constituted as Christian. Our preaching, therefore, has distinct trinitarian form as we expound to the world the God of the gospel.

Christians tell the story of the God of Israel, whom Jesus names Father. This God creates the universe by speaking it into existence *ex nihilo* and now rules it by his providential care. He is the God who calls

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Abraham to leave his home and travel into the far land of Canaan, promising to make him and his heirs into a great nation. He is the God who confronts Moses in the burning bush and commissions him to lead the chosen people out of slavery into the freedom of the promised land. It is this God who forms his people by Torah and sacrifice, who dwells with them in tabernacle and temple, who guides and admonishes them by prophet, priest, and king. And it is this God who pledges to send a savior, the Messiah, to deliver his people from oppression and establish his kingdom on earth.

Christians tell the story of Jesus of Nazareth, the Son and Messiah of this God. Born of the Virgin Mary, raised in Nazareth, this Jesus startles, delights, disappoints, and angers the people of Israel. To his followers, he speaks and acts with an authority that can only be called divine; to his enemies, he is heretic, blasphemer, charlatan, false prophet. To sinners and outcasts, he is the gracious embodiment of the future kingdom; to the religious professionals, he is betrayer of the traditions of Moses. To the Roman occupiers, messianic pretender and revolutionary threat; to the Palestinian zealots, a wild-eyed religious fanatic who undermines political action. No wonder all seem to conspire to put him out of the picture. He is forsaken, tried, and convicted on trumped-up charges, crucified. But the Father vindicates his Son on Easter morning by raising him from the dead, exalting him as Lord and Savior. This Jesus will return in glory to judge both the quick and the dead.

Christians tell the story of the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of the Father and the Son. The Spirit anoints the prophets to speak God's mighty Word. He fills Jesus with omnipotent power to heal the sick, exorcise evil, raise the dead. It is this same Spirit who on the day of Pentecost is poured out on the church in tongues of flame, filling the disciples with joy and praise. By the Spirit, the church is driven into the world to proclaim the gospel and bring sinners into the new creation of the kingdom. Into this Spirit each believer is baptized and reborn.

It is the evangelical story of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit that identifies the church of Jesus Christ. By this narrative, Godhead is faithfully revealed and his loving intentions for the world made known. The narrative functions as the imaginative paradigm through which both deity and creation are interpreted. In it the community of faith discovers its purpose, its mission, its final hope and destiny. It is this narrative that is recapitulated in the triune name. The threefold appellation may thus be said to identify the church, for it encompasses that story which the church tells, and must tell, in order to be the church. When Christians are baptized into this name, we are baptized into a way of life, being, and speaking constituted by the biblical story of the trinitarian God. When baptized into this name, we are baptized into the *proper name* of our Lord and Savior. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit denominates the deity of the church's baptizing.

Proper names refer us to distinct objects rather than classes of objects. In common American parlance, *God* functions as a proper name, but not a very helpful one since it is usually divorced from concrete descriptions of the deity's historical activity; consequently, anyone can mean just about anything by the word *God*. The Gallup Poll tells us that the overwhelming majority of Americans believe in God, but the crucial question is, which one?

In the resurrection of Jesus, as Robert Jenson argues persuasively, God publishes his personal name of the new covenant: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This name accomplishes that which "God" cannot do on its own. It identifies the deity as being precisely the deity of the biblical narrative. Each term within the triune name binds us irrevocably to the story we proclaim as gospel; each term denotes the Lord of salvation history. By this name, the holy creator introduces himself to the world. The Gospel accounts of the baptism of Jesus succinctly articulate the content of the name and the mutual relationships of the terms. Who is the Father but the One who pours out his Spirit on the Nazarene. "You are my Son, whom I love," he tells Jesus; "with you I am well pleased" (Mark 1:11). And who is the Son but the Galilean rabbi who obediently submits to the baptism of John that the righteousness of his Father might be fulfilled (Matt. 3:15). And who is the Spirit but the Spirit of the coming kingdom who is poured out on Jesus to empower him for his messianic ministry, the Spirit who is the love, life, futurity of the Father and the Son. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—these names signify the three agents of salvation who are God the Holy Trinity; together they form one name proper and personal to the Christian God.

III

Recent scholars have emphasized that the experience of deity is defined by, and thus inseparable from, the language in which it is expressed. As Garrett Green observes, language is the mother of our experience. We do not first have a religious experience and then seek appropriate forms in which to symbolize it; rather, we receive the experience in the exercise of the language. By our immersion in a religious tradition and our appropriation of its speech and practical habits, we are enabled to experience the world—and deity—religiously. The alleged prelinguistic encounter with God, which founds the intellectual efforts of virtually all liberal-expressivist and feminist theologians, is chimerical. The deity is known within the context of the discourse and ritual of a living community. The communal language functions as the interpretive grid through which and by which the divine is apprehended. Green writes:

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> Religious language is . . . speech arising out of commitment to specific religious paradigms. People with different paradigmatic commitments characteristically have different experiences.

Through our participation in the imaginative and linguistic paradigm of a given tradition, our encounter with God is figured. To put it in scientific jargon, all sacred experience is "theory-laden." Christianity above all, which knows deity as word, as the Word, should understand the primacy of language in our experience of God.

By the revealed name of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the church's experience of deity is linguistically defined. This name is sealed into the very being of ecclesial existence. Christians live within this name, by this name, from this name. When we gather as community, whether to celebrate Eucharist, ordain to office, anoint for healing, offer divine blessing, we invoke the proper name of our God. Christians are the people of the Trinity, fashioned, disciplined, molded by the divine appellation. The threefold name, therefore, structures each believer's experience of God. It functions as the linguistic paradigm through which the deity is known and apprehended.

The trinitarian experience of God occurs definitively and paradigmatically in the liturgy. Christians are commanded by the Lord Jesus Christ to address his Father as their Father. "Pray then like this," he instructs his disciples: "Our Father, who art in heaven, Hallowed be thy Name" (Matt. 6:9). Contrary to feminist assertions, "Father" is not just one of the many optional metaphors by which Christians symbolize their religious experience. It is a naming and filial term of address *revealed* in the person of the eternal Son. Throughout the New Testament, Jesus is portrayed as invoking the holy God of Israel as his Father. By this naming, our Lord expresses the intimate inner communion between them, a consubstantial relationship of knowing and love constitutive of the Godhead. "No one knows the Son except the Father," Jesus says, "and no one knows the Father except the Son and those to whom the Son chooses to reveal him" (Matt. 11:27).

When Christians name God "Father," therefore, we are naming him in and through and by the divine Son. The filial invocation is both a privilege of adoption in Christ Jesus and a duty of discipleship. By baptism we are incorporated into the humanity of our Lord and his eternal relationship with the Father in the power of the Spirit. The Apostle Paul declares:

> For you did not receive a spirit that makes you a slave again to fear, but you received the Spirit of sonship. And by him we cry, "*Abba*, Father" (Rom. 8:15). But when the time had fully come, God sent his Son, born of a woman, born under law, to redeem those under law, that we might receive the full rights of sons. Because you are sons, God sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, the Spirit who calls out, "*Abba*, Father" (Gal. 4:4-6).

By the gift of the Spirit, Christians are given to share in the eternal sonship of the second person of the Trinity; we are drawn into his eternal conversation with his Father in the love who is Spirit. The prayer, praise, intercession, and filial address of the risen Christ are actualized and embodied in the lives of his adopted brothers and sisters. Thus we boldly call God, Father. The worship of the church must be interpreted, not as the work we do over against the deity, but as participation in the deity, as participation, by grace, in the triune society of the Godhead. Apart from the revealed name, Christianity necessarily collapses into some form of unitarian or pagan religion.

IV

The law of baptism is the law of belief and worship. The great Anglican divine Richard Hooker saw this quite clearly in the sixteenth century. In defending the Anglican form of the Gloria Patri against Puritan objections, he wrote:

> Baptizing we use the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; confessing the Christian faith we declare our belief in the Father, and in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost; ascribing glory unto God we give it to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost. It is . . . "the token of a true and sound understanding" for matter of doctrine about the Trinity, when in ministering baptism, and making confession, and giving glory, there is a conjunction of all three, and no one of the three severed from the other two.

Baptism, creed, liturgy—all three interweave to form a language of faith. To alter or replace the trinitarian formula is thus to attack the basic grammar of catholic belief and practice.

Let us examine three recently proposed linguistic substitutions. First, the increasingly popular "Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier." This formula does not and cannot function as a proper name, for it does not identify; it does not indicate directly to which deity it is referring. Presumably, creating, redeeming, sanctifying are activities in which most, if not all, ostensible deities engage. In traditional theology, the Christian God *becomes* creator, redeemer, sanctifier by his contingent decision to create, redeem, and sanctify; but he *is eternally* Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in his inner relational life.

Second, "God, eternal Word, Holy Spirit." This formula may be quickly dismissed because of its overt subordinationism. That is to say, its wording suggests that only the first person of the Trinity is truly God,

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and the Word and Spirit are less so. The word *God* is a problematic substitute for the vocative "Father." Each person of the Godhead, according to orthodox doctrine, is fully and completely divine; each is God. Within Christian discourse, therefore, *God* must be understood not as a proper name but as a predicate. The Father is God. Jesus is God. The Holy Spirit is God. "When I say God," St. Gregory of Nazianzus explained, "I mean Father, Son, and Holy Spirit."

Of course, do we not often begin our prayers by saying "O God" or some such equivalent? Within the trinitarian grammar, this common practice is at least ambiguous. When we Christians name God "God," we are naming him by way of our creaturehood and acknowledging him as supreme being and creator. When we name God "Father," on the other hand, we are naming him from within the Godhead, naming him by that name which properly belongs to God as the Father of Jesus Christ.

Finally, "Mother, Lover, Friend." This truly feminist alternative sharply poses the issue before us. Whereas Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is manifestly grounded in the biblical narrative, explicitly identifying the three agents of salvation history, Mother, Lover, Friend has only a tenuous relationship (at best) to the same narrative. (In the Scriptures, for example, deity is occasionally *compared* to a mother but is never *named* Mother.) What story are we telling when we name divinity thus, and what are its warrants? And if by this naming we are telling a different story, are we not creating a new religion? Moreover, each of the terms of the formula appears to refer, not to the triad, but to divinity conceived as monad or unitarian being; each refers to the one deity's external relationship to her creation. In contrast, as noted above, the triune name refers us to the three persons of the Godhead in their inner relational life. The two formulas are not in any way commensurate.

V

The very logic of the triune appellation, then, impels Christians to speak and pray in trinitarian fashion. Our discourse is ruled by the grammar of the proper name of our God. This is why current feminist proposals to change, alter, or eliminate the triune name are of such serious theological import. These proposals represent nothing less than a fundamental, and in my opinion, heretical reconstruction of Christian belief. If American Christianity would be faithful to that catholic trinitarian faith articulated in the Nicene Creed, then it must clearly and decisively confess the true and proper name of its God—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. FT

Near Dawn

Tugged out of bed by a dream,
he enters the world, confronts
cats stalking the hallway,
aghast at this early walker.
The moon, almost full, glows
on the crust of old snow.

Back in the bedroom, his wife
dreams in a world that is his
to return to. Perhaps.
But for now he's here
by the window, moonlight
glazing the earth.

He is watching five foxes
drift through the yard, gather
for a moment by the pear tree,
sniffing the air, inquisitors
out in the cold. They turn to what
beckons higher up on the ridge.

Eric Trethewey

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Review Essay

Reagan's America, America's Reagan

James Nuechterlein

AN AMERICAN LIFE. By RONALD REAGAN. *Simon and Schuster. 748 pp. $24.95.*

PRESIDENT REAGAN: THE ROLE OF A LIFETIME. By LOU CANNON. *Simon and Schuster. 948 pp. $24.95.*

First, a confessional note. Like many other Americans, I originally became aware of Ronald Reagan as a political figure during the Barry Goldwater presidential campaign of 1964. Reagan's nationally televised speech near the end of the campaign was a cautionary moment. (Reagan had previously been known to those like me only as a secondary screen actor, and we knew so little about him that we thought his name was pronounced *Ree*gan.) His speech—The Speech, as it came to be known—filled me with political dread. To that time, the Goldwater movement, for all the sectarian enthusiasm it engendered, had seemed an ephemeral phenomenon, the candidate himself an unimposing and altogether lightweight figure. I never doubted that Lyndon Johnson would win the election, and I looked forward, in the wake of the anticipated landslide, to the early demise of "movement conservatism." (If I was not truly a liberal—and friends who were firmly insisted on the point—I was even less what Goldwater partisans defined as a conservative.)

But Reagan scared me. He was Goldwater with luminous intensity, with charismatic appeal. And he was, so far as I could see, equally simple-minded. The Speech—with its references to the threat of an American descent into "the ant heap of totalitarianism" and its anticipation, given further liberal successes, of "a thousand years of darkness"—seemed to me then (and now) so overinflated, so oblivious to the realities of American political life, as to be beneath serious notice. If attention needed to be paid, it was to the speaker's impact, not to the content of what he had to say.

Sixteen years later I voted, with some trepidation, for Ronald Reagan for President. Four years after that, with no reservation at all, I voted for his reelection. And now that he is well into retirement, I look back on his presidency as the most significant—and most successful—of any since that of Franklin Roosevelt.

One individual's changing of his mind about Ronald Reagan, and about the politics he represented, makes no particular difference. Its explanation could be entirely personal. But as the electoral history of our recent past suggests, millions of Americans went through a similar change of mind. That does make a difference, and it cannot be reduced to idiosyncratic terms. If we are to understand contemporary American political history, we need to understand how a figure and a movement very much on the margin of national politics wound up at its vital center. The appearance during the last year of Reagan's autobiography and of journalist Lou Cannon's detailed study of Reagan's presidency offers an occasion for just such an attempt at understanding.

JAMES NUECHTERLEIN *is Editor of* FIRST THINGS.

II

Of the two books, Reagan's is the thinner by any measure. It is a disappointment in many ways. It is not clear, to begin with, who actually wrote it. The book offers itself as an autobiography, and the tone is unmistakably Reagan's own, but the autobiographer himself notes in the acknowledgements that "Robert Lindsey, a talented writer, was with me every step of the way. Bob has a way with words that has rightly earned him a reputation as one of our country's most gifted authors." In translation that passage suggests that Reagan spent a lot of time sharing anecdotes and imparting impressions to his collaborator, and then left him to fill in the record of his life and career. That, at least, is the way the book reads. If it does not get us very far inside the personality of its subject, that, one suspects, is because the subject's interior is closed to virtually everyone, including the subject himself.

As for a public record of the Reagan presidency, the book is one step short of uselessness. Its record of political events skates along on the surface, offering little in the way of serious or detailed discussion. Its one ostensible value in that regard is to offer generous excerpts from the Reagan diaries, but these for the most part offer not much more than might be garnered from Associated Press summaries of any given day's highlights, except that that they reflect an Administration slant. Particularly disappointing—and tedious—are the accounts of relationships with the Soviet Union. Here we get long, undigested, and largely uninterpreted exchanges of formal (and pseudo-informal) letters between Washington and Moscow, the presence of which is presumably meant to compensate the reader for the absence of informative analysis.

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Yet *An American Life* is not, for all that, entirely without value. For all Reagan's lack of introspection, the book offers suggestive clues to his personality (along with flashes of the political shrewdness that made him so successful a governor and President), and even about the public record, concerning which it is in so many ways disappointing, it occasionally yields insights (in part by what it skimps or passes over entirely). The book's very superficiality, in fact, is in odd ways instructive. Reagan's presidency was better—far better—than is Reagan's book, but around both there lingers a curious air of ambiguity. Enemies of Reagan were baffled and frustrated by his shrewd intuitive hold on the American psyche, even as his friends were confounded by his gaps in knowledge and sometimes appalling naiveté. There is, this book reminds us in its waverings between the beguiling and the soporific, nothing quite so complicated as a simple man.

Lou Cannon has made a heroic effort to penetrate the Reagan mystery. He has made a career, going back to Reagan's California years, of covering his subject, and for this, his third and most ambitious book on Reagan, he has done extensive research and conducted hundreds of interviews. The result is a very good bad book.

It is good because of its diligence, its seriousness of purpose, its dogged effort to be fair—at least in personal terms—to its subject. For Cannon, one gets the sense, Reagan is in political terms a man from Mars, but one to whom he is determined, however great the effort, to do justice.

But for all its show of evenhandedness, Cannon's book is essentially a brief for the political prosecution. He wants to understand his subject—and like everyone else, he can't help liking him—but he frequently betrays, in the guise of a presumed critique of political process under Reagan, an ideological disdain for Reaganism. The early reviews of the book revealed its bias. Opponents of Reagan loved it—precisely because its show of fairness gave it credibility—while Reaganites, even when conceding its effort to give their hero his due, recognized its essential air of condescension toward the former President. Cannon is not without admiration for Reagan or recognition of his accomplishments, but the net impression he leaves is of a President in over his head and an Administration that failed more than it succeeded. Cannon's conflicted views toward his subject produce odd strains in his analysis and prose. In summary judgment, he is reduced to vaguely disapproving gibberish.

> On January 20, 1989, after 2,923 days in the presidency, Reagan flew off without regrets into the California sunset. He left office with a higher public approval rating than any other modern president. Americans felt comfortable with him, if sometimes puzzled by the inconsistencies and paradoxes of the man and his administration. After he was gone, even Americans who had ardently supported Reagan began to wonder if they had understood him as well as they believed. As the Cold War ended and domestic prosperity faded, a debate began about Reagan's conflicting legacies. It is also a debate about the essence and direction of America.

Cannon's analysis is without ballast because it has no historical moorings. One learns from *The Role of a Lifetime* a great many particular things, but is provided no context within which to make more than random sense of those things. Readers will come away from the book unsatisfied because nothing in it gives them a way to render sensible judgment, one way or another, on the conclusions it reaches.

Both these books, in the end, are better on personality than policy. We learn from them far more—certainly more that is dependable—about Reagan the man than about Reagan the President. Best then, perhaps, to start there.

III

The most important fact about Ronald Reagan is that he had the healthiest ego of any President in memory. His only possible competitors on that point are Dwight Eisenhower and Franklin Roosevelt, and Reagan had neither Ike's volatile temper nor FDR's tendencies to deviousness for its own sake or flashes of cruelty toward those closest to him. Reagan's was a remarkably well-integrated personality. The nearest thing one finds to a psychological disability in him is his emotional reserve, the psychic distance he maintained toward those around him. As he himself concedes, discussing his childhood difficulty in making close friends, "I think this reluctance to get close to people never left me completely. I've never had trouble making friends, but I've been inclined to hold back a little of myself, reserving it for myself." One suspects that Reagan's difficulties with his children stemmed as much from that habit of reserve as anything else. He loved them, but he could not give as much of himself to them as their various testimonies indicate they so desperately desired. Cannon's interviews with Reagan's friends and associates turned up the same pattern. Those who loved and served him all ran up sooner or later against an impenetrable emotional barrier. He liked almost everyone, but gave of himself fully to virtually no one. He was loyal to his associates and stubbornly defended those under attack, but once they were gone from his daily circle of attention, it was as if they had dropped through a memory hole.

Yet Reagan's instinct to psychic withdrawal is a tendency so widely reported among leaders that it is likely essential to leadership itself. Those upon whom

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many depend need to husband their emotional reserves, not dissipate them in private encounters. Charismatic leadership often pays the price, and exacts the cost, of absence of personal intimacy.

And in any case Reagan, unlike, say, an FDR, did not withhold himself completely. He had, and has, Nancy. *An American Life* has to be the most uxorious memoir in American public letters. From the dedication onwards ("To Nancy. She will always be my First Lady. I cannot imagine life without her."), the book is full of encomiums to Nancy Reagan so frequent and so effusive they would embarrass except for their transparent sincerity. One envies both of the Reagans their manifest and quite extraordinary fulfillment in each other. (Though it is worth noting that even Nancy occasionally comes up against Reagan's emotional wall: "He lets me come closer than anyone else, but there are times when even I feel that barrier.") Reagan found in his wife a pre-feminist willingness to sacrifice her career to marriage and family as well as a fierce, almost obsessive, protectiveness toward what she perceived as his best interests. For his part, he tendered her total devotion and chivalric courtliness. It's all old-fashioned with a vengeance, and precisely on that count disarmingly charming. One is even tempted to the heretical thought that there are worse ways to construct a marriage.

Be that as it may, Reagan found in his marriage the intimate emotional connectedness otherwise lacking in him. It completed the circuit of his self-confidence (which by all accounts had been wounded in the trauma of his failed first marriage to Jane Wyman) and left him the most psychologically well-grounded of modern American leaders. Reagan's ego never got in the way of his policies. He did not personalize political differences and he did not bear grudges. He was so open and non-paranoid in personal relations that Nancy worried endlessly that his guilelessness would leave him defenseless against those who wished him ill or who simply wanted to use him for their own purposes. With the general public, his projection of strength and of non-egomaniacal self-confidence engendered an enormous sense of trust, even among a great many Americans skeptical or at least uncertain about his policies. People liked him despite themselves. They sensed that he was comfortable with himself and so they were comfortable with him.

Reagan's critics dismissed all this as an actor's tricks. It was all scripted, they said, from the speechwriters' elegant words to the engaging smile, self-deprecatory humor, and jaunty tilt of the head. And so, in some sense, no doubt it was. Reagan, who describes himself in his memoirs as the "Errol Flynn of the B pictures," did play the presidency as a role. All Presidents do that, some better or more believably than others. Ronald Reagan was among the very best. Indeed, recalling such moments as his speech commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the Allied landings at Normandy, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Reagan was unsurpassed at performing the public functions of the presidency. He brought to them an eloquence, emotion (Reagan's was, both for himself and his public, a most misty-eyed presidency), and charm that ennobled the office. His enemies understood that, however much it chagrined them. I recall watching a major Reagan speech on TV in the company of a woman who detested everything he stood for and who considered his presidency a disaster. "Damn him," she said, "he's good."

And he was good not primarily because of his Hollywood skills. He was the real thing, a man whose impression of integrity and grace under pressure held up under scrutiny. It went back to those scores of lives he had saved while a teenage life guard, but it did not end there. No one rehearses for death, and Reagan revealed in the wake of the assassination attempt in the spring of 1981 the depth of courage, character, and wit that lay behind the public persona. This was an authentic man, and Americans thereafter could not be persuaded, despite what his enemies said, that their President had no more substance than did the Wizard of Oz.

Not that he did not sometimes tempt them to the contrary. If his character was not suspect, much else about him was. What Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. famously said of Franklin Roosevelt—that his was a first-rate temperament but a second-rate intellect—fit Reagan in spades. He was in many ways appallingly ignorant and ill-informed, and he lacked FDR's saving grace of intellectual curiosity. There was much that he did not know, and much that he thought he did know that was not true. It was not wrong for him to hold an essentially simple ideology—most Presidents do—but it did not become him that he could, most of the time, only elaborate it in simplistic, often merely anecdotal, terms.

No one, furthermore, ever accused him of being a workaholic. Cannon's quip that "Reagan may have been the one President in the history of the republic who saw his election as a chance to get some rest" seems only mildly exaggerated. One of Reagan's favorite predecessors was Calvin Coolidge, and Reagan shared not only Coolidge's preference for low taxes and limited government but also his aversion to a long presidential work day.

One result of his less-than-heroic work ethic (which Reagan himself typically made jokes about) was that much of the work of his administration was not only conducted by others but conducted beyond his attention or even knowledge. Reagan offers a reasonable defense of his hands-off management style. Things work best, he suggests, when a leader sets general policy goals and then recruits able people to pursue those goals without excessive interference or second-guessing. And when one compares Reagan's record

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to that of such a compulsive micromanager as Jimmy Carter, one is inclined to grant Reagan his point. But then, of course, one thinks of a disaster like Iran/contra, where, according to Reagan's own account, his national security apparatus took major policy initiatives without bothering to inform the Commander-in-Chief. A President can't know or manage everything, but Reagan on occasion carried managerial aloofness to the point of abdication of responsibility.

As to Reagan's intellectual powers, Cannon, after endless worrying of the issue, comes to the plausible conclusion that Reagan, though intellectually lazy, was not unintelligent. His intellectual process was more intuitive than analytical, but it was not insufficient to the tasks he faced. Where Reagan failed, it was through inattention and ignorance, not lack of intellectual acuity.

In an odd way, Reagan's unprepossessing intellectual skills worked as much in his favor as against him. Because he was not conventionally bright, his opponents regularly underestimated him. They so delighted in depicting him as a hopelessly shallow and rigid ideologue that, on one public occasion after another, he needed little more than to demonstrate that he was not a bomb-throwing blockhead to win the day. What his critics never understood was that, whatever his limitations, Reagan had extraordinary political judgment. His qualities of character set him apart from his fellows—he was the strong, self-possessed man that most of them only dreamed of being—but he was fully in touch with them. He had Harry Truman's common touch without Truman's commonness. To speak of Reagan's political judgment is to suggest what William F. Buckley, Jr. had in mind when he remarked that he would rather be governed by the first 2,000 names in the Boston phone book than by the Harvard faculty. Ronald Reagan had an almost preternatural hold on the middle-American psyche, and most Americans therefore not only dismissed the intellectuals' dismissal of Reagan, but shared with him an amused tolerance for their incomprehension of his tremendous popularity.

Yet in accounting for that popularity, one has to account for the shift in attitudes that made Americans, who had been scared silly by Barry Goldwater, comfortable with Reagan. That shift did not happen overnight (many Americans in 1980 feared Reagan as Goldwater *redivivus*) and it had to do not only with Reagan's less-threatening persona (people always feared with Goldwater that he actually would, as he once jokingly suggested, "lob one into the men's room in the Kremlin"). It had to do as well with political developments between 1964 and 1980 that made Americans more inclined than they had been earlier to listen sympathetically to the Goldwater-Reagan message.

IV

The most important reason for the success of modern American conservatism is the failure of modern American liberalism. People turned to the right in the first place not out of ideological conversion but because after the failure of the left in the 1960s and beyond there was no place else for them to go. Richard Nixon in 1968 was the first beneficiary of the left's collapse, and he was on the edge of putting together a conservative hegemony when he blew it in Watergate. Jimmy Carter stole a moment of glory from Nixon's humiliation in 1976, but his own quasi-distancing from the liberal establishment could not prevent his administration from being other than an inept interlude in the nation's move to the right. Carter's problem, particular policy failures aside, was that he was too conservative for his party's activist wing and not conservative enough for a nation that, in the aftermath of the Great Society, had had enough of liberalism of any sort.

The Great Society, initially a great success, failed in two ways. Liberals intended the cascade of domestic reform in the several years following the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963 as the extension and perfection of what the New Deal had begun thirty years earlier, and indeed, the Congresses of the mid-1960s, prodded and orchestrated by Lyndon Johnson, produced major legislation at a rate unmatched in American history except possibly during FDR's first term. Yet what seemed liberalism's glorious culmination quickly turned sour. The problems at which the Great Society threw such enormous amounts of money did not go away; in a number of instances, they grew worse. Urban decay accelerated; race relations went from bad to incendiary (nothing so persuaded Americans that their society was out of control as the black riots that became for a time annual rites of summer); and while poverty rates declined for a period, they did so at the cost of many of the poor developing habits of dependency on a vast paternalistic bureaucracy, habits demoralizing in themselves and, in the long run, obstacles to the escape from poverty that the bureaucracy had been created to make possible in the first place. Reagan's homely summary of the Great Society's domestic record is not unfair: "The liberals had had their turn at bat in the 1960s and they had struck out."

And then there was Vietnam (about which Reagan surprisingly says very little), a war conducted by liberals according to liberal ground rules that not only failed to achieve its objectives but that tore the country—and especially the liberal community—apart. The war shattered the widespread consensus that had existed among Americans in the post-World War II era. Opponents of the war, persuaded that its follies could not be explained by failed good intentions or by mere errors in judgment, increasingly viewed it in

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broad ideological terms as the inevitable result of a hopelessly corrupted system. Behind the decadence of the war, they argued, lay the decadence of the American political economy.

Vietnam radicalized significant portions of American society. Prior to the war, virtually all Americans, whatever their differences, believed in the essential rightness and goodness of the American system. Afterwards, that was no longer true, and for years to come the most important political division in the nation was between those who believed that the American system of democratic capitalism was worth preserving without fundamental change and those who had become morally estranged from that system. Out of the war was born the adversary culture, and that culture—with its view of an America essentially racist, sexist, class-ridden, and militaristic—carried the increasingly dominant New Politics wing of the Democratic party, spasm by rhetorical spasm, beyond the ken of the American people.

Enter Ronald Reagan, and the conservative critique of American liberalism. In the wake of liberalism's drift into radicalism, the Goldwater/Reagan analysis, which had seemed so overheated and extravagant to most Americans in 1964, took on the air of sober common sense. Maybe it was true, after all, that America was overgoverned and its government overburdened, that the bureaucracy was out of control, that there was a genuine threat of the dynamism of the society being suffocated under the burden of controls from Washington. Maybe, even worse, liberals had lost sight of what America was all about, and that the traditional national ideal of equal individual opportunity was being replaced by notions of equal group outcome, in which advancement according to ability and effort was set aside and where an endless variety of non-complementary groups competed for marginal advantages in a perpetual zero-sum war.

Add to all this the dilemmas of the Carter Administration—stagflation amidst a mounting misery index (inflation plus unemployment) at home, and weakness and equivocation abroad (represented above all by the Iranian hostage crisis)—and it is not difficult to understand how a Ronald Reagan, so politically marginal in 1964, had by 1980 advanced through two highly successful terms as governor of California to the center of national politics.

V

Reagan's achievement was to transform an initially inchoate rebellion against liberalism into a conscious conservative counterrevolution. What began as a triumph of personality brought by the end of the eighties an ideological seachange. By the time Reagan left office, a solid plurality of Americans defined themselves as conservatives, and the substantial advantage Democrats had earlier held over Republicans in terms of party identification had virtually disappeared. Politicians of conservative persuasion eagerly advertised the fact, while those inclined to the left fled from the L-word as from the plague.

Those who minimize the national shift to the right in the 1980s—or even deny that it happened—lack historical perspective. For the last century it has been the dominant assumption of political thought everywhere in the West that ever-increasing government activity was both inexorable and beneficial. The movement from laissez-faire through the regulated welfare state to social democracy or some form of socialism took on the character of social inevitability. Programs of liberal activism were welcomed as fulfilling the mandate of history while periods of conservative retrenchment could only be seen as aberrant interludes, temporary detours along the great path of social progress. The blunderings of the Great Society first alerted Americans to the possibility that modern liberalism rested on a great fallacy: the assumption that since, under conditions of modernity, some increase in government activity was both inevitable and desirable, ever-greater doses of that necessary good thing must be even better. The conclusion followed neither in logic nor in practice, as the collapse of socialism has definitively demonstrated.

But well before the demise of socialism, Ronald Reagan had transformed the terms of debate of American politics. Thirty years ago, the historian Carl Degler labeled FDR's New Deal as the Third American Revolution (after 1776 and 1861-65). The New Deal was revolutionary, in Degler's view, because it transferred essential responsibility for the functioning of the economy from the private sector to the public and taught Americans to look to the federal government as guarantor of economic health and security. Reagan's counterrevolution returned the society to many of its pre-New Deal assumptions. It not only frustrated the left's long-nurtured ambition to expand the nation's modest welfare state into a social democratic redistributive state, it revitalized faith in such traditional and presumably outmoded American traits as individualism, private enterprise, voluntarism, the work ethic, and personal freedom and responsibility.

Put the matter differently. If one thinks of economic plenitude in terms of a great pie, attempts to improve the lot of the average American can take one of two different forms: either cut the slices of the existing pie more evenly, or find ways to expand the size of the pie so that, however unequal the slices, all (or at least most) will benefit. The former view implies a good deal of government involvement and control and focuses on equality of results, while the latter suggests a dominant role for the private and voluntary sector and defines equality in terms of fair opportunity.

Through most of the nation's history, Americans have focused on economic growth and dynamism (bake an ever-bigger pie) and have regarded as alien any

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preoccupation with equal economic shares. Beginning with the New Deal, however, and accelerating with a vengeance in the 1960s, liberalism became the party of egalitarianism, an egalitarianism defined, moreover, not in terms of the individualism that had always been at the heart of American political discourse but in terms of group outcome. Thus the significance of Lyndon Johnson's famous speech at Howard University in 1965, where he suggested that the traditional American reform goal of an end to discrimination so that individuals might have equal opportunity to advance according to personal effort and ability was insufficient, and that henceforth the goal must be equality "as fact and as a result," measurable, presumably, in terms of parity among racial (and other) groups. Contemporary liberalism's near-obsessive concern with distribution of income—a matter toward which most Americans have been mostly indifferent—reflects that perspective. Liberals give the impression that diminution of income ratios between top and bottom deciles of the population, and between groups defined by sex, race, ethnicity, or whatever, means more to them than growth in prosperity for the population as a whole.

The Reagan Administration rejected the new egalitarianism and the paternalistic mode of governing it presupposed and substituted for it the new (old) paradigm of America as a society of free and equal citizens working commonly in a competitive system that assumed economic progress for all—at least for all willing to work for it—but that had no predetermined notions as to how the shares in that progress ought to be distributed. Reagan's was a program of conservative restorationism: limited government, federalism, reduced government spending, lower tax rates. His rhetoric occasionally seemed to confirm his opponents' suspicions that he meant to do away with the welfare state altogether, but his real end was to rein it in, restrict its growth, and lessen its cultural influence. The safety net, he thought, should not become a crutch.

Even as FDR in the 1930s had attempted to lead the nation toward a more collective social democracy through the force of his personality and the power of his rhetoric, so Reagan used the same tools, and with the same brilliant effectiveness, in his countermarch in the 1980s. In the midst of a depression crisis, Roosevelt managed to transmit to the American people something of his own unquenchable confidence and optimism, and thus to help them regain faith in themselves and their society. He imparted a sense of direction to a rudderless nation, and fashioned a program to give expression to his vision.

So also with Reagan after 1980, with the not insignificant difference that his was a New Deal in reverse. Reagan, too, took a divided and dispirited nation (he had the accurate sense that by the end of the Carter years "America was losing faith in itself") and used his enormous charm and presence to persuade the public that a new beginning was possible. His program of action was far less detailed and comprehensive than that of the New Deal—as would be expected from one who wanted not more government but less—but he pushed his tax cut program through Congress with a flair and skill comparable to that with which FDR put forward his First New Deal. Reagan won the tax fight against heavy political odds and thereby set in motion a process of social and economic revival on the domestic scene that, for all the controversy that surrounded it, most Americans considered a resounding success. (Critics might argue that only the wealthy benefited from the unprecedentedly prolonged Reagan economic expansion, but poll data and election returns alike testify that that is not at all the way the public saw things. If the policies of the Reagan Administration worked against their interests, Americans in the 1980s were among the most self-deceived people in history.)

It may seem odd to emphasize the leadership qualities of a man who, as already noted, was so often disengaged from, and even ignorant of, the policies of his own Administration. On matters peripheral to his central concerns, Reagan was dependent on others and subject to management by them. But as Cannon notes, Reagan saved his energies for particular issues and big moments. And concerning the handful of things that mattered most to him, he believed intensely and could not be budged. Where his attention was focused, he was anything but a weak leader. His geniality covered a hard core of doctrinal insistence.

In substance, Reagan's was a program of middle-class populism, though one largely devoid of populism's characteristic rancorous temper, meanspiritedness, and mood of conspiratorial suspicion. Reagan rallied middle America against the New Class intellectual and bureaucratic elites and against a vision of America that paid scant attention to middle-class values or concerns and that focused instead on the paternalistic duty of the establishment to care for all those people at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder who presumably lacked the capacity to provide for themselves or manage their own affairs. The Reagan constituency wanted an America rooted in self-sufficiency, while the dominant social virtue of the left was *noblesse oblige*. Electoral patterns followed those conflicting social visions: middle Americans voted overwhelmingly for Reagan while as Michael Barone has pointed out in *Our Country: The Shaping of America from Roosevelt to Reagan*, Walter Mondale's best margins in 1984 "came in black ghettos and university towns."

Reagan's blend of personal warmth and ideological edge made him at once a unifying and polarizing political figure. He made a substantial majority of Americans feel better about themselves and their country. In that, he was like Dwight Eisenhower, the

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other greatly popular Republican President of the postwar era. But unlike Eisenhower, he was no genial moderate; or more accurately, while thoroughly genial, he was not really moderate at all. (He *was* often willing to compromise, but that was a matter of political strategy and personal style, not ideology.) Again, the comparison with Roosevelt suggests itself: in the 1930s, liberals looked on FDR with near reverence, while many conservatives were driven to rage by the very mention of his name; a half century later, Reagan reversed those patterns of appraisal.

Nowhere was Reagan less popular than in the black community, and on no issue more than race did the current differences between conservatives and liberals in America take on sharper relief. Reagan was outraged and hurt by the charge of racism so regularly raised against him. His parents instilled in him early on an abhorrence of racial or religious prejudice, and on that issue he never departed from the liberalism of his youth. But, as on other issues, the definition of what it meant to be a liberal on racial matters changed significantly. As already noted, the new egalitarianism of the 1960s focused on group rights and equal outcomes, and with respect to racial minorities that led in the direction of policies of racial preferences and quotas (always carefully camouflaged, of course, under the benign label of "affirmative action"). To Reagan and most Americans, the new system of racial weighting denied what America was most about—equal individual opportunity without regard to irrelevant group categories—but in liberal newspeak such attitudes became prima facie evidence of racial prejudice. To be racially colorblind, under the new dispensation, was to be suspect on questions of color. The left seemed to suggest that blacks could only advance in group terms and under government aegis, while Reagan conservatives continued to insist that the road to improvement for all Americans was better traveled under terms of individual freedom and individual responsibility.

There can be no reasonable doubt that on this and related matters Reagan captured the rhetorical advantage. He made appeals to traditional American values that, when Goldwater made them, had seemed reactionary and obscurantist, but that by the 1980s, given the intervening failure of liberal alternatives, seemed newly fresh and persuasive. It was FDR's flawed achievement, given the crisis opportunity of the Great Depression, to effect a transvaluation of American ideals, to turn American aspirations in a hitherto alien collectivist direction. Reagan brought Americans to a second naiveté, a rejuvenation of national pride and trust in American exceptionalism, an understanding that the special conditions of the 1930s were just that—a special condition—and not the model on which the nation's future should be fashioned.

Critics insisted that Reagan's vision of America was a hopeless—and probably cynical—excercise in nostalgia. In this view, the campaign ads of 1984 that spoke of "morning in America" invoked a nation that had likely never been and that certainly could not be reconstituted under modern conditions. That was, in some sense, true enough. But it missed the point. Reagan's model was meant not so much as a comprehensive image of reality but as a counterpart to the left's model of America as a social democratic collective. Reagan, after all, knew well enough the blemishes on his preferred America. He had grown up with them in a childhood household that for all his idealized, even idyllic, reconstruction of it, experienced economic insecurity, frequent moves, and the frightening uncertainties of his father's alcoholism. Reagan understood first-hand the shadow on the American ideal, but he also understood that the ideal, for all its shortcomings, was in essential terms preferable to imaginable alternatives and so worth defending against its enemies. He was, as all foreigners immediately recognized, the quintessential American, and Americans rallied to him for just that reason.

In no matter was Reagan more American, for better and for worse, than in the matter of religion. It is a mark of the obdurate secularism of America's intellectuals that the issue of Reagan's religious beliefs has received so little attention. Lou Cannon is entirely typical on this point. He is quite tone-deaf on the matter of Reagan's religious commitments, interested in them only as they treat on the (admittedly intriguing) question of Armageddon, the final confrontation of the faithful against the forces of the Antichrist. But that is but a bizarre footnote to Reagan's deep Christian faith, which readers of his autobiography can ignore only by willful intent or, as is more likely, by a habit of mind (revealed in the silences of most reviewers) that cannot take religious faith seriously on its own grounds.

An American Life is filled with religious references. Time and again Reagan mentions his deep trust in God and his frequent recourse to prayer. He has a powerful and immediate sense of God's providence, of a benign divine plan for his and the nation's life—Reagan's recurring reference to John Winthrop's vision of America as a unique and providential "city on a hill" was no throwaway line. (About his wife's dependence on astrologers, Reagan is discreetly silent.) He suggests that an ulcer developed while he was governor was cured by the power of prayer—his own and that of others for him. Moving excerpts from his diary refer to his concern over the agnosticism of his father-in-law, Dr. Loyal Davis. When Dr. Davis entered the hospital with a terminal illness in 1982, Reagan wrote him a long letter urging him to make peace with God, and he records with relief that just before his death Dr. Davis called for the hospital chaplain.

There are a number of typical American strains in Reagan's religious faith. He appears unconcerned with doctrinal precision, focusing instead on faith-in-action. His beliefs, while deeply fatalistic, are essen-

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tially confident and optimistic. He is generally Protestant, but with no strong ecclesiastical attachments. Indeed, in the wake of the assassination attempt and reported further plots on his life, he largely ceased attending church altogether. Like so many of his countrymen, he seemed to find in nature an acceptable substitute for formal worship.

> The one thing I missed during our weekends at Camp David was a chance to go to church. But I prayed that God would realize that when I was out in the beautiful forest I felt as if I was in His temple.

As in many other areas, Reagan in religion is a kind of throwback. He displays that vivid providential sense of America as a redeemer nation that most secular historians would imagine to have died early in this century. But in Reagan, and in much of the American heartland, it clearly has not.

VI

Reagan carried his program of "idealistic nationalism" (the phrase is Cannon's) into foreign policy. Because he assumed without argument the justice of the American cause, he was not given to the agonizing over the nation's role in the world that liberals have subjected themselves to ever since Vietnam. That simplified things enormously. Not only did he declare his immunity to the "post-Vietnam syndrome," he displayed it in such enterprises as the Grenada operation of October 1983, an action that no conceivable Democratic Administration would have undertaken.

Liberals have had a good deal of trouble with Reagan's record in foreign and defense policy. During most of his presidency, they looked on that record as his Achilles' heel. They considered his visceral anti-Communism—learned in his days with the Screen Actors Guild—and his talk of the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" to be gauche and unnuanced. They nagged at him for his lack of enthusiasm over arms control negotiations and his apparent willingness to spend the USSR into the ground on military weaponry. They berated him for his doctrine of peace through strength, his dismissive attitude toward the nuclear freeze movement, his insistence on the "zero-option" on intermediate nuclear force (INF) weapons in Europe. They thought his opposition to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua likely to lead to U.S. intervention and the making of a Central American quagmire. Talk of the President as Dr. Strangelove was common. After all, for a man who dabbled in speculation about Armageddon . . .

And then came the end of history—or at least the end of the Cold War. And on terms of an American victory. The collapse of the Berlin Wall and of the Communist empire in Eastern Europe came after Reagan had left office, but it was his Administration that had sapped the foundations of both. Some reassessment seemed necessary.

Liberal revisionists have sought refuge in the argument that the collapse of Communism occurred independently of Ronald Reagan, that it was almost entirely the work of Mikhail Gorbachev, who presumably decided quite on his own, and without reference to any external factors, to let go of the Soviet empire and to install *glasnost* and *perestroika* at home. One need not deny the influence of Communism's internal contradictions or of the heroic resistance of dissidents in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to dismiss such arguments as the bad faith of those whose intricately rationalized anti-anti-Communism placed them—delicious irony—on the wrong side of history. It really was, it turns out, an evil empire and there truly were captive nations. And those who doubt Reagan's role in the collapse of the former and the liberation of the latter need only travel to Eastern Europe, where he is regarded with something akin to reverence.

Not, one must hasten to add, that Reagan is beyond criticism in these matters. He got some things wrong and on others he was right for the wrong reason. He never appreciated the value of nuclear deterrence in keeping the peace, and he appears to have come close at the Reykjavik summit in 1986 to agreeing to a utopian scheme to do away with all nuclear weapons, an agreement that could well have torn the Western Alliance apart. What prevented that agreement was Gorbachev's refusal to go along with further development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). By all accounts, SDI was critical to Gorbachev's assessment of his inability to keep up with the U.S. in military capability, but Reagan's faith in SDI as a near-absolute nuclear shield seems to have been misplaced. Yet if Reagan never got the uses of SDI precisely right, he was quite correct in pushing its development. (SDI, incidentally, is one of those issues that disprove the view of Reagan as no more than the malleable subject of his managers; as even many liberals concede, on SDI he went stubbornly against the weight of expert opinion.)

Arguable matters aside, Reagan had his share of foreign policy fiascos. There was the embarrassment over his visit to a Bitburg military cemetery in 1985 that contained the graves of Waffen SS troops (an incident to which Cannon gives disproportionate attention and emphasis), the horror of the Beirut bombing in 1983 that cost the lives of 241 marines (which Reagan calls "my greatest regret and my greatest sorrow as President"), and above all, of course, the Iran/contra humiliation.

Both *An American Life* and *The Role of a Lifetime* dwell at length on Iran/contra, but neither offers much illumination. It seems clear that Reagan allowed his emotional concern over the plight of American

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hostages to lead him into egregious policy blunders (against, once again, the weight of expert opinion, including in this case that of his Secretaries of State and Defense). About the great unresolved question of Iran/contra—did Reagan know of the diversion of funds from the sale of arms to the Iranians to the contras?—things remain uncertain. Reagan insists that he did not, and offers an entry from his diary for November 24, 1986 that seems to confirm his innocence.

> After the meeting in the Situation Room, Ed M[eese] and Don R[egan] told me of a smoking gun. On one of the arms shipments the Iranians had paid Israel a higher purchase price than we were getting. The Israelis put the difference in a secret bank account. Then our Col. North (N.S.C.) gave the money to the "Contras.". . . North didn't tell me about this. Worst of all, John P[oindexter] found out about it and didn't tell me. This may call for resignations.

Cannon does not accuse Reagan of lying, but he does offer the suggestion that Reagan was informed of the diversion but forgot about it. In any case, he argues that those who extended aid to the Nicaraguan rebels were undoubtedly carrying out the President's wishes. And on that he is surely correct.

In the end, whatever one thinks of Iran/contra (my own guess is that sober historical analysis will regard it as neither crime nor disaster but simply as political blunder), the overall Reagan record in foreign policy must be regarded as a great success. After Reagan, and in not insignificant part because of Reagan, the Berlin Wall fell. Everything else is footnote.

VII

The ambiguities surrounding the Reagan Administration cannot easily be resolved. The President at his best was a commanding figure: eloquent, decisive, winning, persuasive, and with an almost perfect sense of political pitch. At other times, however, he was utterly the reverse: disengaged, ignorant, confused, seemingly outside the loop in his own Administration—in short, the "amiable dunce" his opponents took him to be. So also with the Administration's overall performance. During the first term especially, it was for the most part unobtrusively efficient—shrewd in strategy, surefooted in tactics. Its most unremarked achievement was to restore—after Watergate and the stumblings of the Ford and Carter Administrations—faith in presidential leadership of any sort. People forget how pervasive prior to Reagan was the notion that America had become ungovernable. Yet on other occasions—Iran/contra of course the most notable—the Administration performed like the gang that couldn't shoot straight. Reagan made a major personnel error in allowing his first term Chief of Staff James Baker to switch jobs with Treasury Secretary Donald Regan early in 1985. Regan was a failure in the White House, and not only or even mainly because of his highly publicized inability to get along with Nancy Reagan. What had been a tight ship under Baker took on alarming quantities of water under Regan.

Reagan's autobiography manifests ambiguities of another sort. Conservatives have spent a lot of time in recent years arguing among themselves as to the relative priority to be given to individual freedom as over against inculcation of moral virtue. Reagan was among those identified with a moderate, or "fusionist," position, one that would absolutize neither libertarianism nor social conservatism but would tack between the two as appropriate in particular circumstances. Many social conservatives suspect that Reagan's heart was always with the libertarians, and on the evidence of *An American Life* they are entirely correct. It is nothing short of astonishing that the issue of abortion—*the* great moral controversy of our time—rates not a single mention in the autobiography. Not one word. One inevitably concludes that Reagan's often eloquent defense of the prolife cause was nothing more than lip service: it could not genuinely have mattered to him. Indeed, on one social issue after another—gay rights, feminism, crime and punishment, pornography, family values—Reagan's book has little or nothing to say, while on the glories of individualism and the curse of government he is endlessly effusive.

A fully adequate conservatism will have to go beyond government-bashing and exaltation of the individual to a richer social vision. It is necessary to point out the follies of Great Society liberalism, but it is not, as social philosophy, sufficient. George Bush's emphasis on voluntarism and his encouragement of the Burkean little platoons that form a buffer and create social space between the solitary individual and the cumbersome state—his much-derided "thousand points of light"—suggest the proper direction. (Would that Bush had, in support of his vision, his predecessor's eloquence.)

But it does not seem right to conclude an evaluation of the Reagan presidency on a negative note. Ronald Reagan did, after all, accomplish the prodigious task of cleaning out the stables, and it is no doubt churlish to complain that he did not make them fully habitable again. The great story line of American history had gone badly awry in the 1960s and beyond; it had lost touch with much of the best that preceded it. Reagan got the narrative back on track, back in conversation with its founding dreams and principles. For that, whatever his flaws, we may be grateful. Thanks to him, we can once again indulge the hope, however unconservative the sentiment might seem, of the story finding a happy ending. FT

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Books In Review

The One and the Many

THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS. By ISAIAH BERLIN. *Alfred A. Knopf. 277 pp. $22.*

Reviewed by **Gilbert Meilaender**

HENRY HARDY, the editor of this book, describes it as "in effect the fifth of four volumes" of Isaiah Berlin's collected essays. Like one of its predecessor volumes (*Against the Current*, 1979), this collection includes essays in the history of ideas. In one sense we might judge this one volume too many, since these are somewhat repetitive essays which, while ranging very widely, have one basic theme. But there is another perspective from which we are surely the richer for this collection, since the reader has the pleasure of watching a truly great essayist develop a theme in rich detail.

The topics of these essays range from Joseph de Maistre (the development of whose thought is traced in a long essay, "Joseph de Maistre and the Origins of Fascism") to the rise of nationalism. Two titles, however, point to the central concern underlying the volume—"The Pursuit of the Ideal" and "The Apotheosis of the Romantic Will: The Revolt against the Myth of an Ideal World." What concerns Berlin is the very old problem of the One and the Many. Only very recently in our cultural history—since "the second third of the eighteenth century," by Berlin's reckoning—have we developed a true appreciation of the claims of the "Many," of diversity and pluralism in the realm of values. "Who in the ancient world or the middle ages," he writes, "even spoke of the virtues of diversity in life or thought?" "But when a modern thinker like Auguste Comte wondered why, when we do not allow freedom of opinion in mathematics, we should allow it in morals and politics, his very question shocked J. S. Mill and other liberals."

The idea that there must be a perfect society, some form of the "good life" binding on all of us—the myth of an ideal world—only really begins to lose its hold on us in the thought of men such as Vico and Herder. And this shift, though "a deep and radical revolt against the central tradition of western thought which affirmed the existence of eternal values," is, in Berlin's eyes, a very good thing. It is an affirmation of human freedom.

HIS objections to the myth of a perfect society are both theoretical and practical. At the level of theory, he believes that "this vast Platonic assumption, sometimes in its baptized, Christian form," which affirms a single version of the good life for all, is internally incoherent. In "The Pursuit of the Ideal," this volume's opening essay, Berlin recounts autobiographically how his reading of Machiavelli first formed in his mind the theoretical problem. In Machiavelli he found one who revered and sought to revive the virtues of republican Rome. But alongside those virtues he set certain Christian virtues: "humility, acceptance of suffering, unworldliness, the hope of salvation in an afterlife." Without condemning them, Machiavelli simply notes that they will not foster the type of citizen and state he favors. "He merely points out that the two moralities are incompatible, and he does not recognize any overarching criterion whereby we are enabled to decide the right life for men." This recognition—that certain ideals may be incompatible—was, Berlin notes in a later essay, "quietly ignored" until the eighteenth century.

Gradually, however, the theoretical difficulty became clear. There could be no society that would combine the excellences of republican Rome and the Christian virtues, no single form of the good life that could hold together these two quite different visions of human excellence. More generally, the Muslim paradise is not a paradise for Christians, and "a society in which a Frenchman would attain to harmonious fulfillment is a society which to a German might prove suffocating." There is no one "common good" for all humans; there are only the many different cultural visions of human fulfillment. We may sympathetically inhabit as many of them as we can, but there is no criterion that will enable us to decide among them. Faced with such irreconcilable conflict among the ends of life, we must simply choose which we prefer. Or, if that formulation makes it sound too much like a fate to which we must resign ourselves, we are free (within the limits of our time and place) to choose authentically the ends of life to which we will commit ourselves.

Very occasionally, Berlin will add a significant qualification to this theoretical objection, as in the following sentence: "The notion of a perfect society in which all that men have striven for finds total fulfillment is consequently perceived to be incoherent, at any rate in terrestrial terms." Most of the time, however, he writes as if what is incoherent on earth is likely to be incoherent in heaven as well.

AT least as important are the practical dangers he sees in any commitment to a perfect society. If one believes a "final solution" to the clash of human commitments is possible, one may be willing to pay a very high price (or ask others to do so) in order to achieve that goal. Berlin fears the ancient faith in and search for a perfect and harmonious society, "an ideal for which more human beings have, in our time, sacrificed themselves and others than, perhaps, any other cause in

GILBERT MEILAENDER, *a regular contributor to* FIRST THINGS, *is Professor of Religion at Oberlin College.*

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human history."

That his concern is legitimate few will deny, and wholly apart from the theoretical issue noted above, this concern constitutes a strong practical argument for a liberal polity (which does no more than promote "some kind of equilibrium, necessarily unstable, between the different aspirations of different groups of human beings"). Whether such political wisdom is also moral wisdom is, however, a question worth pondering.

Berlin comes closest to addressing this question in an essay titled, "Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought." There he takes up the concern, which might well occur to a reader, that his view leads straight to moral relativism. Indeed, his own language sometimes has seemed to point in that direction. For example, after recounting autobiographically his own discovery in Machiavelli of incompatible and incommensurable moralities—each capable of attracting us—he writes that Machiavelli simply leaves us "to choose."

> The idea that this planted in my mind was the realization, which came as something of a shock, that not all the supreme values pursued by mankind now and in the past were necessarily compatible with one another. It undermined my earlier assumption . . . that there could be no conflict between true ends, true answers to the central problems of life.

But if we must simply choose among several "true" moralities, it is no longer clear what it means to call them all true—unless, of course, it means simply "true for you" and "true for me," unless, that is, we end in relativism.

NEVERTHELESS, Berlin argues that his view is best described by a different term: pluralism. Following his reading of Vico and Herder, he does not wish to claim that there are no objective values—or, indeed, that ours might not be objectively true because they are simply the product of our time and place. No, it may be the case that our values are objectively true and so are theirs—but that these two visions of life are incommensurable and incompatible. They cannot be lived together; nor can they be hierarchically ordered in such a way that one must be preferred. (There are limits to the pluralism he posits. If, he notes, different cultures had nothing in common, communication between them would be impossible. "Ends, moral principles, are many. But not infinitely many; they must be within the human horizon.") We may value both freedom and equality. We may be able to enter sympathetically into cultures that give one or the other of these primacy. But we will not be able to live in a world in which these two values do not conflict and in which we do not have to choose which shall have pride of place. We must learn to think of life "as affording a plurality of values, equally genuine, equally ultimate, above all equally objective: incapable, therefore, of being ordered in a timeless hierarchy, or judged in terms of some one absolute standard."

I, at least, am willing to grant that *political* wisdom lies somewhere in the direction Berlin points. But perhaps not *moral* wisdom. On his view, pluralism seems necessitated not by (in Kant's phrase) "the crooked timber of humanity" but by a crooked, tormenting universe with which we must come to terms. Not all of us will, of course. Some of us, Berlin supposes, unwilling to settle for "an unstable equilibrium in need of constant attention and repair," will crave something more—that perfect society. We will not be able to resist the myth's lure, perhaps because "men cannot face too much reality, or an open future, without a guarantee of a happy ending."

But it is one thing to crave a guarantee and another to hope. Is the hope, which he calls craving, so foolish? After all, Berlin's favorite thinkers teach us that what matters is "self-expression for the individual spirit" and "authenticity," that "what alone counts [is] my respect for myself as a free being." But this is a cramped and narrow world indeed, imprisoned within the confines of oneself. To many it might seem a rather shriveled universe. Do we really have nothing to fear from such a self—especially when Berlin's own essays have shown in intricate ways how such advocates of the "romantic will" in all its diverse manifestations may themselves become tyrants?

The truth is that the timber of humanity is crooked both in those who desire a perfect society and those who do not. Pluralism is politically wise, but it offers no salvation for the human condition. To desire more, even to think one has religious grounds to hope for more, while postponing the political realization of one's hopes—that may yet turn out to offer a richer and more humane vision of our common life.

The Personal Niebuhr

REMEMBERING REINHOLD NIEBUHR: LETTERS OF REINHOLD AND URSULA NIEBUHR. Edited by URSULA M. NIEBUHR. *HarperCollins. 432 pp. $29.95.*

Reviewed by **William J. Weston**

IN a perverse way, we have Richard W. Fox to thank for this most interesting volume of letters of the late Reinhold Niebuhr and illustrious correspondents. Fox's *Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography* (1985) portrays its subject as a midwestern boy come to the big eastern city in search of the Main Chance, in his case through religious influence. This so irritated some of Niebuhr's friends (see, for example, Langdon Gilkey's review in *The Journal of Religion*, April 1988) that Nie-

WILLIAM J. WESTON *is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Centre College in Danville, Kentucky.*

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buhr's wife thought a response was required to show Reinhold Niebuhr to be a decent, caring, and genuinely Christian man.

In that task, the book succeeds. Niebuhr emerges as a devoted husband, an affectionate (if distracted) father and friend, and as consistently and pervasively Christian. The book consists mostly of ordinary, comfortable travel letters from Niebuhr to his wife, from their engagement in 1931 until a stroke ended most of his relentless speaking trips in 1952. The picture is filled in considerably by several memoirs of specific events by Ursula Niebuhr, as well as more diffuse domestic reminiscences in the form of "letters to a dear but departed spouse." The last third of the book consists of correspondence with Felix Frankfurter, Lewis Mumford, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., British politician John Strachey, former student (and Dietrich Bonhoeffer's cousin) Hans Christoph von Hase, and, most delightfully, W. H. Auden.

There are a few additional things, though, that students and fans of Reinhold Niebuhr could wish for from this volume. Few of the exchanges are complete, which is especially unfortunate in the Auden section, though it is usually possible to follow the flow of ideas. There is also nothing from Reinhold Niebuhr's first forty years, before he met his wife, the years in which his thought went through its most profound transformation. In fact, none of the relationships he established before 1930 appears directly in the text, including any exchanges with one of his closest and most enduring friends, William Scarlett, Episcopal Bishop of Missouri.

Most surprising, though, is the absence of any correspondence with—or even many references to—any member of Reinhold Niebuhr's family. There is not a trace, for example, of the weekly letters from his mother, which continued into the 1960s. Missing, too, are any reminders of Reinhold Niebuhr's clear display of his Christian character in helping his brother Walter, or communications from his sister, McCormick Theological Seminary professor Hulda Niebuhr, who shared in the family's theological dialogue.

The most puzzling omissions are the letters from Reinhold's younger brother, eminent Yale Divinity School professor H. Richard Niebuhr. One of the objections to Richard Fox's account is his suggestion that Reinhold Niebuhr owed the critical breakthrough in his thinking to his brother's ideas, a claim Fox supports with excerpts from H. Richard Niebuhr's letters to his older brother. Since all the crucial letters are still held by Ursula Niebuhr and not yet available even in the Library of Congress, it is most perplexing, given the controversy on this point, that these letters were not included in this book. Perhaps we may look forward to their appearance in another volume of Niebuhr letters.

Always Among Us

The Urban Underclass. Edited by Christopher Jencks and Paul E. Peterson. *Brookings Institution Publications. 490 pp. $34.95 cloth, $14.95 paper.*

Inner-City Poverty in the United States. Edited by Lawrence E. Lynn, Jr. and Michael H. McGeary. *National Academy Press. 280 pp. $29.95.*

Reviewed by **Lawrence M. Mead**

The presence of entrenched poverty and welfarism in America's cities, in both bad times and good, is the nation's leading social dilemma. Neither liberal nor conservative administrations have made much dent on the problems in the last twenty years. That effort, however, has generated some of the most advanced social research ever produced. Studies of poverty and dependency, many funded by government, have had great influence on both public policy and the social sciences. It is less clear whether this influence has been salutary.

These two books are of the sort that regularly publicize the latest results from the poverty network. Both come from esteemed institutions—the Brookings Institution, a leading Washington think tank, and the National Research Council. The editors and most of the contributors are recognized experts. The studies assess various social and economic factors, such as racial bias or unemployment, that might help to explain persistent poverty or dependency. They do this very capably, making use of census and other data on urban areas as well as the most advanced statistical methods. Several decades of this sort of inquiry explain why poverty and dependency are better understood in the U.S. than in any other country.

At the same time, however, this tradition of research has created serious problems for social science and social policymaking. Highly quantified studies of this sort have, in fact, revealed little about the *causes* of poverty. The research is very good at describing the social and economic conditions of the poor, much less good at explaining how they got that way. Long-term poverty among the working-aged, the most controversial kind, is due largely to the fact that parents in poor families seldom work regularly. Typically, the mothers go on welfare, and the fathers live off them or by street hustling, without steady employment. Researchers have failed to find any simple explanation for these patterns.

A number of "barriers" have been thought to explain nonwork, but none of them does so satisfactorily. Racial discrimination does not seem to keep many nonwhites out of all employment unless they are thoroughly incompetent. The wages available to the unskilled are generally enough to keep families

Lawrence M. Mead *is Associate Professor of Politics at New York University and author of the forthcoming* The New Politics of Poverty.

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out of poverty if both parents work, as is now usual for the society. At least low-paid jobs appear to be available to most job seekers most of the time. Contrary to claims by advocates, child care is generally available and affordable. That is one reason why most single mothers are already working; welfare mothers are the exception.

BARRIERS and inequities still exist in America, but they mainly explain differing success among people who are already employed; most notably, those with more education do better than those with less. But barriers seldom explain a failure to work at all, which is the main problem among the poor. Nonpoor Americans, who are working at the highest levels in history, realize the rewards of employment. So do immigrants, who flock here from all over the world mainly because work is available. Only the poor seem not to do so, for reasons that remain largely unknown.

My own view is that nonwork is mostly due to ethnicity and weak public institutions. Most of the long-term poor are black or Hispanic. These groups seem prone to poverty, not because of any lack of potential, but because harsh memories of when they were denied opportunity cause many members not to study or work hard. At the same time, government has failed to uphold mainstream mores among the poor in the last twenty-five years. In ghetto areas, typically, the criminal law is weakly enforced, the schools do not expect children to learn, and welfare has not required adult recipients to work. The most effective social strategy to appear recently is tougher work requirements in welfare; these raise work levels among the dependent as nothing else has.

Neither attitudes nor institutions, however, are much studied by today's poverty researchers. The first generation of poverty experts in the 1960s spoke of a "culture of poverty," but that approach became too sensitive following the notorious controversy in 1965 over the "Moynihan report," a government study by now-Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, which pointed out the family problems of blacks. Poverty research and policy development has since been dominated by economists, who attribute the same maximizing psychology to the poor as they do to stockbrokers on Wall Street, thus obfuscating the distinctive, defeated mentality of the ghetto. Public institutions also get little attention because one cannot analyze them quantitatively as easily as social and economic variables. The study of what used to be called "public administration" thus commands little prestige in the public policy graduate schools, which employ many of the authors represented in these and similar volumes.

THE researchers also have come to stand between government and an effective social policy. The experts have such prestige that Washington can hardly imagine inaugurating any social policy that does not reflect their agenda. Government cannot simply proceed against the misbehaviors, such as crime or nonwork, that are the initial causes of most poverty today. Policy must be justified by "studies," which typically focus on determinants that are more impersonal, particularly adverse economic conditions and insufficient government training programs, support services, or income benefits. Poverty researchers are seldom guilty of overt political bias, though most of them are liberals who would like a more generous policy toward the poor. The slant appears, rather, in the questions addressed by research, which has persistently focused on "structural" determinants of poverty lying outside the poor themselves.

Unfortunately, this approach has achieved little. In the 1960s, experts designed special education and training programs intended to enhance the skills of the poor, but evaluations found that they had only limited impact. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, economists devoted enormous energy to measuring and reducing the "disincentives" that welfare regulations created against employment, since recipients could not take jobs without having their grants reduced. But studies—including massive government experiments in guaranteed income—showed the effects on work effort to be remarkably slight. Government income transfers such as Social Security have reduced poverty, but mainly among the elderly. To give more cash to younger adults and families is politically unacceptable as long as the parents do not work more steadily.

More recently, most antipoverty research has been oriented to verifying the theories of William Julius Wilson, a prominent sociologist, that the ghetto is poor because it is cut off from mainstream society. Wilson believes that there is a "mismatch" between the jobs offered by the economy and the jobless poor. Supposedly, the former exist mostly in the suburbs and demand advanced education; the latter dwell mostly in the inner city and are unskilled. Secondarily, there are "concentration effects," a tendency for aberrant behaviors such as crime and illegitimacy to flourish in the ghetto because of its isolation from mainstream society. Unfortunately, as several papers in the current volumes report, there is more evidence for the second of those ideas than the first. The inner city is not barred from the economy, but to some extent its problems are feeding on themselves.

POVERTY research also tends to isolate policy deliberations from politics by wrapping them in a cocoon of statistical methods that only trained social scientists can fathom. Government analysts have to translate the research for the elected and appointed leaders who make policy, which sometimes makes those officials the puppets of their advisors. Policymaking based on research takes on an elitist cast, removed from the perceptions and desires of ordinary people and

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those who represent them. It tends also to be irresolute, because experts seldom agree about how to interpret the evidence.

On all these counts, the technical sort of research reported in these books, impressive though it is, should have less influence than it does. Social science needs more inquiry into poverty culture and institutions, even though they cannot be studied as rigorously as social conditions. Government needs a more practical, less academic social policy aimed at the deficiencies of public authority—law enforcement, school standards, and work requirements—that the research itself suggests are central to poverty today.

Before the age of quantified research began about 1960, government knew far less about poverty than it does today but was probably more effective in dealing with it. The focus was not on curing adverse social conditions but on ensuring—through education and employment—that all Americans made use of the opportunities available to them. Thirty years of poverty research have taught us much, but have not improved on that prescription.

The Reluctant Skeptic

Chapter and Verse: A Skeptic Revisits Christianity. By Mike Bryan. *Random House. 324 pp. $22.*

Reviewed by **Phillip E. Johnson**

Mike Bryan is an atheist, raised a Methodist, who wanted to write a book about "Christians who actually believe the Bible versus all the other kinds." So he spent time in residence at Criswell College in Dallas, an institution dedicated to producing crusaders for the cause of biblical inerrancy.

Phillip E. Johnson *is a Professor in the School of Law at the University of California, Berkeley. His most recent contribution to* First Things *was "Presbyterians for GLARF" (August/September).*

Bryan has provided an absorbing account of what he found there and how it affected him. The book is of particular interest because so many professors in the secular universities are talking about the pressure to be "politically correct" on subjects such as feminism and affirmative action. How does the situation compare in a fundamentalist college that is dedicated by definition to furthering a dogma?

It compares very favorably, according to Mike Bryan. In the secular universities things are up for grabs, with the result that everyone is engaged in a power struggle. At Criswell the basic premise is settled: professors and students alike wouldn't be there if they didn't accept it. As a result, professors feel free to expand their students' intellectual horizons by teaching them to understand competing premises sympathetically. Here is a typical description of what Bryan saw and heard in the classroom:

> The theology was fascinating, the classes fun, the students were real people. . . . And where was the lockstep indoctrination I had feared from a Bible college? I sought for it in vain. Everyone was a conservative Christian, but much of what I heard from [the Criswell professors] was assorted challenges to students, to the point of riling them up. Speaking to captive audiences that agreed with their own beliefs, the professors constantly challenged those beliefs by calling attention to opposing views and requiring students to know them and understand them. "Liberal" was one of the first words that came to mind as a description of the atmosphere in Criswell College classes.

The Old Testament course Bryan remembered taking at Columbia was very different. There students were *not* encouraged to consider seriously any alternatives to the professor's naturalistic philosophy, or to the "inerrant" theory that the Pentateuch was patched together from documents of different centuries.

Sometimes the prayer warriors in the Criswell student body get a little impatient with the mind-stretching. In the manner of budding practitioners in a law school who want to learn how to attract clients and win cases, they ask "Do we really need all this?" Like a law professor telling students that they may one day be Supreme Court Justices, President Paige Patterson replies that Criswell graduates are meant to be generals in the Lord's army, not privates, and as such they have to understand the adversary's thinking. Patterson himself is a general on the conservative side of the Southern Baptist denomination's notorious internal war, and Bryan's portrayal of his easygoing ways will astonish anyone familiar only with the media stereotype of the participants in that conflict.

Bryan was favorably impressed not only with the intellectual atmosphere at Criswell, but with the personal integrity and generosity of the faculty and students. They were nothing like the television gangsters that have been such a gift (Godsend?) to the skeptical media. Near the end of the book, Bryan examines his own mixed feelings after Paige Paterson has genially introduced him at an alumni banquet as the school's guest atheist. Bryan is confident that Patterson's "unfailing kindness" is not merely the calculated cordiality that anyone might show to a visitor who is known to be writing a book about the experience. No, Patterson's "generous and undoctrinaire attitude, shared by almost everyone else at the school," is "another mark of his irrepressible mischievousness and genuine interest in all folks and their diverse ways—a mark of his personality, not his faith."

But why are these personal virtues so pervasive at Criswell College, if they are not marks of the faith? Bryan describes the atmosphere of "unadorned, joyful piety

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of the place," and quotes Patterson to explain where it comes from:

> One of the things that happens to you in conversion is that there's a fundamental change in your attitude toward people when the Lord moves into your life. You don't any longer see them as the girl who sells you the hamburger or the guy who changes your tires. You see each of them as very precious people, each of whom has a fascinating personal story. You get to where it's fun to be with them, see what makes them tick.

If Mike Bryan likes the people at Criswell so much, why doesn't he answer the altar call and spread the kind of joy that accompanies the finding of a lost sheep? The question is starkly presented because Bryan is under no illusions about the nihilistic world he presently inhabits. His metaphor for that world is the Mark Rothko Chapel, a shrine of the religious left on the campus of St. Thomas College in Houston. The chapel is supposed to be like a big tree that offers shade to everyone, and the lobby table holds all the sacred texts: the Bible, the Tibetan Book of the Dead, the Bhagavad Gita, and so on.

BRYAN sees the chapel as "the perfect embodiment of the godless world, the array of God-seeking texts on display notwithstanding, or even proving the point: belief in everything, belief in nothing." Visitors upon seeing the famous religious paintings look puzzled, or disappointed, but never joyous. "Where is the hospitable shade? Where was it for Rothko? The painter committed suicide before his pictures were hung."

Bryan understands that intellectual nihilism reflects an underlying spiritual despair. "There must be some connection between the disbelief on the part of most artists today in any kind of organizing principle for the universe (God), and their refusal to employ readily grasped organizing principles in their work. There must also be a connection between artists' disdain for those 'classes' that still believe in God and their delight in confronting those rubes with offensive images, such as the photograph of a cross dipped in a jar of urine."

The author swears that he remains a child of the 1960s, with no leanings to neoconservative politics. "Nevertheless, we would all agree that this culture is nearly overwhelmed by all the bullshit and bad faith, by the literally spellbinding vacuity, top to bottom, left to right." That much disenchantment with the culture produced by the death of God invites the big question: why does someone who knows he's lost in the desert turn away from an oasis that offers living water?

Criswell students tell Bryan that the stumbling block is pride, and he admits that he is afraid of looking like a fool. "Secularism is the easy road today. Telling friends with Ph.D.'s you've become a born-again Christian takes nerve." The irony is that those friends are undoubtedly relativists about everything except a few pet ideas like the death of God. Yet Bryan can't help thinking that these inconsistent relativists must be absolutely right. Why?

His problem isn't just with the fundamentalists' inerrancy doctrine, or their regretful insistence that unbelievers go to hell. Bryan has some attractive alternatives. He experiences an "epiphany of sorts" in a Catholic church in El Salvador, where the liberationist sculpture reflects an understanding of human suffering more suited to the spirit of our times than the Baptist emphasis upon personal sin. Why not, then, join the Catholic Church, which has many mansions?

Bryan also has an important conversation with the pastor of the Methodist church of his childhood, now retired. Bryan is unimpressed by the kind of vacuous liberal theology that C. S. Lewis called Christianity-and-water, but Don Pevey's liberalism inspires respect because it grows out of personal experiences with which Bryan can identify. "I would like to have spent hours with this man whose Christianity doesn't claim to be definitive, much less exclusive, who simply finds in the faith and communicates very effectively to anyone who cares to hear one deep and beautiful mystery: God incarnate determined to save his children from themselves." Why not become that kind of Methodist?

THE ANSWER has to be that the deep and beautiful mystery is, regrettably, a fairy tale. Bryan explains the ultimate stumbling block early in the book, in his discussion of liberal theology's campaign to "demythologize" Christianity. The attempt had to be made because we live in a technological age where "Science, not Scripture, is now inerrant." For a time, reason and revelation lived comfortably together in the two-level system of Aquinas, but a crisis arose when reason (Galileo, Hume, Darwin) began to cast doubt on what Scripture had revealed. As Bryan sums up the situation:

> The advances in scientific knowledge of the past four centuries have undercut the textual integrity of the Scriptures as a whole, but perhaps more damaging is the nature of the scientific enterprise itself, which postulates *anti*-supernaturalism as a necessary first principle for its endeavors. Thus the initially peaceful coexistence of reason and faith has become, in the secular mind, an irreconcilable contradiction. Faith is now opposed to reason—opinion, to put the best light on it, or ignorance, to put the worst. The Reformation thinkers had said all along that splitting reason from revelation would be fatal because it would give man an independent role and thus separate him from an objec-

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tive, inerrant source for knowledge—Holy Scripture. They were correct.

But modern man substituted science as another source of inerrant knowledge, and Bryan cannot shake off the influence of that choice. He is impressed by C. S. Lewis' argument that, although the Christian theistic point of view can comprehend science, art, and morality, "the scientific point of view cannot fit in any of these things, not even science itself." (That is because to reductionist science our minds are merely machines selected for their efficiency in producing offspring.) Bryan followed a similar line of reasoning but with different premises. "While Lewis and [Francis] Schaeffer presupposed our sense of meaning and purpose, I decided that I must therefore be a machine because nothing but a machine could evolve from a machinelike, purposeless process."

There are liberal theologians who embrace scientific naturalism but still think of themselves as Christians: in fact, they dominate the mainline seminaries. Bryan recognizes that these accommodationists have discarded the only metaphysical basis that can support a mystery of God incarnate determined to save his children from themselves, and so their Christianity survives only as a metaphor. That is why the Christians he respects are the genuine, unapologetic supernaturalists, but he thinks that option is foreclosed to one who has drunk deeply of the water of naturalism, death-giving though he may know it to be.

Chapter and Verse is generous in spirit but tough in mind, and the people it describes are a joy to meet. I hope Mike Bryan will visit another important subculture and write a book about the experience. This time I wish he would forego religion and inhabit the world of the scientists. He might take a good look at evolutionary biology, or at the dogmatically reductionist world of the biochemists who hope to redesign humanity after they crack the human genome code. Do these people understand, as the Criswell faculty does, that all thinking rests upon presuppositions, which by definition are not derived from logical argument or evidence? Do the biologists know the difference between what they presuppose and what they demonstrate, and are they even interested in finding out?

As Socrates used to say, you can't be too careful when it comes to scrutinizing the teachers into whose care you are committing your soul. Mike Bryan should look into it, and then write another book. He can put me down for one of the first copies.

Roger's Versions

THE PHILOSOPHER ON DOVER BEACH: ESSAYS. By ROGER SCRUTON. *St. Martin's Press. 350 pp. $24.95.*

Reviewed by **Kevin L. Flannery**

UNUSUALLY FOR A philosopher trained in the Anglo-American "analytic" tradition, Roger Scruton has read and admired Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, and a host of other figures of the "continental" school. He's attracted to the looser continental tradition not least because it would, he believes, afford philosophical respectability to the type of writing he is master of: the short essay on the current state of society as manifested in its art, its politics, sexual mores, etc. He praises Nietzsche, for instance, as a great stylist, even while acknowledging that "No such philosopher could exist in the Anglophone tradition, for the simple reason that, if he did exist, he would not be called a philosopher either by others or by himself. He would be identified as a critic or a social theorist, as an essayist or a reformer."

This constitutes a major recurring theme of this very fine book of essays on topics philosophical, aesthetical, and political. For Scruton wants to be this philosopher who cannot exist in the Anglophone tradition. He wants to write about Picasso, Stoppard, and Shaw and still call himself, and be called, a philosopher. He wants to write about photography, sexuality, and liturgy and be part of the discipline originating with Frege, Wittgenstein, and Russell.

He is a talented and wise writer, with a gift for insights that cut to the marrow of the modern dilemma. He manages, for instance, to put a word to the central inadequacy in so much modern thought and cultural endeavor, maintaining that at the end of the day, they espouse "nothing." He sees, that is, that the incessant clamor in certain journals and other forums about freedom, creativity, equality, etc. blinds us to the fact that none of the proponents of such abstract values has any idea what freedom should be used for, or what it is good to create, or how the sterile notion of equality might be filled out and made desirable. The message has become wholly the *packaging* of the message. As Scruton devastatingly remarks: "A work [of art] can now perform its economic function without being loved or admired; nobody need be enchanted or moved by its deeper meaning. The money pours through it unrestricted, like sewerage through a drain. . . ."

WHETHER a philosopher or something else, Scruton, standing on Dover Beach, certainly hears "the grating roar/ Of pebbles which the waves suck back, and fling."

His desire to give substance to ethical values also helps to account for his attraction to Hegel, whom he identifies (quite plausibly) as a conservative. For all his relativizing tendencies, Hegel recognizes at least that values are not invented on the spur of the moment but are found in society, already made. As Scruton puts it when discussing the misconceptions of the French revolutionists, society is not the object, but

KEVIN L. FLANNERY, S.J., *is finishing a doctorate in Ancient Philosophy at Oxford University.*

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the product, of consent. This constitutes a second recurring theme in these essays: the ethical life is found not by attending to the reports or preferences of the first person but by joining in social practices.

This essentially conservative emphasis on values as contained in the various institutions and affiliations within a society also accounts for Scruton's interest in Otto Gierke, a late-nineteenth-, early-twentieth-century German political philosopher whose name is rarely mentioned nowadays in academic circles, although he attracted a good deal of attention in Britain in the 1930s (significantly, before the atrocities of the Nazis became known). Scruton espouses Gierke's idea that "corporations" (clubs, churches, firms, etc.) should be regarded as moral persons. His reason for doing this, as far as I can make out, is to ensure that the mores embodied in such organizations be given full weight in social theory and legal practice. If they are persons, they have rights that cannot easily be overridden by arbitrary and momentary consent, or lack thereof.

As commendable as this goal might be, the objection of Sir Ernest Barker, the great expert on ancient political thought, seems decisive: "Moral responsibility falls only on the individual moral agent. But it falls on him in full measure, alike when he is acting with others and when he is acting alone. It is a dangerous doctrine which would avert it from him, and make it fall on any transcendent being" (by which Barker means any nonhuman entity such as a corporation). Scruton argues against Barker on this point, but his argument is not convincing.

A FINAL word about Scruton's relation to analytic philosophy. He rails against the "narrowness, the fruitless technicality, and the philistinism of analytical philosophy," remarking only partly facetiously that "only the closing of universities could remedy the situation." But one shouldn't place too much weight on such statements. Analytic philosophy is really just the continuation of the scholastic tradition. When in the past writers have wanted to ridicule scholasticism, they didn't pick on Scotus or Suarez—and certainly not St. Thomas—lest they appear ridiculous themselves. They have picked on lesser figures, whose names are now forgotten. This is also what Scruton does, quoting at considerable length some analytical posturing by a virtual unknown.

But Scruton realizes that this is not the whole story, for despite his railings, he never really deserts the analytic (i.e., scholastic) ship. He displays a healthy skepticism regarding the methodology of even the greatest figures of the continental tradition: Hegel, for instance, and Husserl. (I except Kant, whose influence, justly, has been great on both sides of the English Channel.) One finds not a trace of this attitude with regard to Wittgenstein or Frege, each of whom he mentions several times. The remark that best characterizes Scruton's attitude toward analytic philosophy occurs at the end of the essay in which he criticizes our unknown foot-soldier: "Philosophy must repair the rents made by science in the veil of Maya, through which the wind of nihilism now blows coldly over us. And, even with the needle and thread of conceptual analysis, this labor of piety can begin."

What, then, about the question that bothers Scruton so personally: whether or not he is to be called a philosopher—by which he means, if truth be told, an analytic philosopher. Well, he's not a Wittgenstein or a Frege; but then no one alive is. And neither Wittgenstein nor Frege could ever have written light essays of the sort that fill a goodly portion of this volume. But does this matter so much? Scruton occupies a position, as professor of aesthetics and editor of a major popular review, that allows him to span the channel between philosophy proper and the culture from which it arises. His voice injects into the contemporary scene arguments and insights that would not be there did he not have this one foot in analytic territory. As Wittgenstein might have remarked (although much more elegantly, I know), why hanker after a classification for the sake of a classification? Scruton is doing his work well. May he prosper at it.

BRIEFLY NOTED

ON THE THIRD DAY. By PIERS PAUL READ. *Random House. 259 pp. $20.*

You can't fault novelist Piers Paul Read for raising some intriguing questions around a fascinating pair of archeological conceits: What *would* happen if a skeleton bearing the marks of torture and crucifixion associated with Jesus of Nazareth were found beneath Jerusalem's Temple Mount—shortly after a hitherto unknown codex of Josephus' *Jewish War* had suggested just such a possibility? How would individuals react? And what about the various theological factions in the Church? Alas, Read gives us caricatured reactions to such hypothetical events, while devoting the bulk of his book to an unremitting attack against Zionism and the current government of Israel. True, it's not so bad as Edward Said. But one expects more in the way of art, and less in the way of polemics, from the author of such fine entertainments as *Alive* and *The Free Frenchman.* —*George Weigel*

BETWEEN KANT AND KABBALAH: AN INTRODUCTION TO ISAAC BREUER'S PHILOSOPHY OF JUDAISM. By ALAN L. MITTLEMAN. *SUNY Press. 227 pp. $44.50.*

A fascinating monograph about a little-known modern Jewish thinker. Isaac Breuer (1883-1946), one of the leaders of the strictest segment of German Orthodox Judaism, emigrated to Palestine in 1936. Although not a rabbi, he was thoroughly educated in the classical Jewish sources, as well as in philosophy and law. Although deeply

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opposed to secular Zionism, and even to religious Zionism because of what he perceived to be its too-easy acceptance of secularism in Jewish life, Breuer was committed to the rebuilding of the Jewish homeland in the land of Israel, where he hoped a "Torah state," governed and guided by Jewish law and tradition in the fullest sense, would eventually emerge. Mittleman places Breuer in both Jewish and European history, and shows that even though many of Breuer's ideas seem "deeply flawed," he nevertheless is important for those concerned with the moral and spiritual implications of Jewish "sacred nationhood" after 1948 (and 1967). —*David Novak*

INTERPRETING MAIMONIDES: STUDIES IN METHODOLOGY, METAPHYSICS, AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY. By MARVIN FOX. *University of Chicago Press. 356 pp. $27.*

As modern Thomists attempt to reappropriate the philosophy of Aquinas, some contemporary Jewish thinkers are attempting the same thing with the philosophy of Moses Maimonides. Professor Marvin Fox of Brandeis, foremost among them, has over the past twenty-five years published normative essays on Maimonides. His 1972 essay on "Maimonides and Aquinas on Natural Law," in which he argues against imputing any natural law theory to Maimonides, generated particular debate. In the present collection, Fox offers a coherent picture of his view of Maimonides, arguing against both natural law adherents and Kantians, who, he believes, make Maimonides too much of a rationalist. Fox may be seen as the mirror image of the late Leo Strauss (frequently mentioned in the book), who employed Maimonides in his attempt to separate revelation from reason for the sake of reason. Fox attempts to do the same thing for the sake of revelation. It is an important dispute, about which this book is essential reading. —*D. N.*

WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS. By BRUCE ACKERMAN. *Harvard University Press. 369 pp. $24.95.*

The author, Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale, acknowledges that in recent years there have been many criticisms of expansive government and judicial activism, but he boasts that he has not been influenced by them. In fact, it is not evident that he has read them. This brief for what used to be called "participatory democracy" ends with the proposal that we need a new Bill of Rights that would, among other things, "secure each citizen against the vagaries of unemployment, disability, sickness, and old age." Further, once adopted, Ackerman proposes that his Bill of Rights should be unamendable. "This is not the place to go into details," he modestly adds on page 319.



In this provocative analysis of the relationship between political anarchy and biblical faith, Jacques Ellul blends politics, theology, history, and exposition. He stresses that his aim is not to proselytize or to reconcile anarchy and Christianity, however; it is simply to clarify the views of each and to redress misunderstandings on both sides.

On the one hand, suggests Ellul, anarchists need to understand that much of their criticism of Christianity applies only to the form of religion that developed, not to biblical faith. Christians, on the other hand, should not reject anarchy as a political option, for it comes closest to biblical thinking.

In fact, Ellul argues, the Bible is the source of anarchy — anarchy in the sense of nondomination, not disorder. In defense of this view, he works through Old Testament history, Jesus' ministry, and the early church's view of power as reflected in the New Testament writings.

"With the verve and the gift of trenchant simplification to which we have been accustomed, Ellul lays bare the fallacy that Christianity should normally be the ally of civil authority."
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Richard John Neuhaus

The Public Square

A Continuing Survey of Religion and Public Life

The Feminist Revelation

That is the title of an important article in *Social Philosophy & Policy* (Vol. VIII, No. 1) by Christina Sommers, Professor of Philosophy at Clark University. The burgeoning academic industry of feminist/womanist studies is rife with declarations of a grand social revolution. Contemporary feminism, says Sommers, has more to do with revelation than with revolution.

She notes that Alison Jaggar identifies four dominant feminist "frameworks": liberal, Marxist, radical, and socialist. The last three frequently overlap, and all are determined that feminism requires the overthrow of prevailing social arrangements, especially the "nuclear family," and the wresting of power from men. As Andrea Dworkin puts it: "Men love death. In everything they make they hollow out a central place for death. . . . In male culture slow murder is the heart of eros, fast murder is the heart of action, and systemized murder is the heart of history."

Sommers simplifies the typology by suggesting that there are essentially two feminisms: liberal feminism and gender feminism. She identifies herself as a liberal feminist. Liberal feminists respect what women want, also if that includes such "gendered" choices as marriage and motherhood. The goal of liberal feminism is straightforward: women have a right to fair treatment and equal opportunity in trying to realize their aspirations. Gender feminism is very different, indeed radically different. Gender feminism views all of social reality in terms of the "sex-gender system." According to gender feminist Sandra Harding, this system is a "system of male-dominance made possible by men's control of women's productive and reproductive labor, where 'reproduction' is broadly construed to include sexuality, family life, and kinship formations, as well as the birthing which biologically reproduces the species. . . . The sex/gender system appears to be a fundamental variable organizing social life throughout most recorded history and in every culture today."

It is that system that must be replaced. And it can be done, for gender feminists agree with Richard Rorty's dictum that "socialization goes all the way down." Like Simone de Beauvoir, they deny that there is such a thing as a distinctive human nature. The mistake of such feminists, says Sommers, is that "they conflate mutability with corrigibility." Obviously, human nature is diverse and mutable in that it is affected by historical and social forces, but it is not politically corrigible, says Sommers. "For it does not follow that we have either the knowledge or the ability to effect the kinds of changes adumbrated by the gender feminists. To assume that we can effectively and responsibly intervene to change the mores that in fundamental ways define or determine us to be as we are—heterosexual, family-centered, genderized, and non-assimilationist—is to assume that we can take *full* charge of our social history. But nothing in history suggests that corrigibility goes all the way down."

Sommers notes the oddity that, just as our culture has become more sensitive to the dangers of reckless intervention in the processes of non-human nature, gender feminists are so wondrously insouciant about intervening to revolutionize the complex processes of human nature and behavior. "It is ironically true that so many who are sensitive and considerate when it comes to issues of ecology are so intemperate when it comes to embracing an activist and radical social philosophy whose goal is to eliminate such things as the 'gendered family.' Perhaps we need a group of moral ecologists who would protect our fragile but vital social institutions (some of which have taken millennia to evolve) in the way ecologists help us to protect systems in nature. Now I do not mean to say that we cannot look at utopian ideals for guidance in making needed changes; I simply mean that we cannot deploy any ideal in the wholesale utopian manner that the gender feminists do—as blueprints for the radical reform of preferences, values, aspirations, and prejudices. For those who do not like the word 'conservative' I offer the more accurate and, perhaps, less tendentious term 'conservationist.' The careful and socially responsible philosopher—the

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Aristotelian whig—is a liberal and a conservationist; she wants reform, but she treads carefully in her dealings with such fundamental institutions as the family or the rearing of children. By contrast, the feminist who believes in the pervasiveness of the sex/gender system of male oppression is led to look upon the women she wants to liberate as a duped constituency whose actual preferences need not be taken seriously."

Forced to Change

The fact that the overwhelming majority of women have no use for gender feminism does not deter its proponents one whit. Such women, in their view, have been "socialized" into accepting their oppression and need to have their "consciousness raised" to understand the need for revolutionary change. Sommers writes: "Here, the gender feminist—like other radical social philosophers—shows her illiberal colors. Where the liberal attends to the actual professed aspirations of those she wants to help, the radical is impatient with them. The goal of restructuring human beings and human society by changing what the average person professedly wants in favor of what he or she 'ought to want' is an essential feature of gender feminism. In this fundamental respect, gender feminism is crudely illiberal and undemocratic."

Christina Sommers thinks Simone de Beauvoir was at least refreshingly candid about what should be done about women who want to be wives, mothers, and attractive "sex objects" to men. Women who insist upon following the patterns of "craven femininity" should simply be forced to change their ways. De Beauvoir wrote: "No woman should be authorized to stay at home and raise her children. . . . One should not have the choice precisely because if there is such a choice, too many women will make that one." Thus does the gender feminist set herself up as a Philosopher Queen to make sure that people choose what is "good for them." Sommers observes: "Radical philosophers characteristically believe themselves to have a clear perception of the 'objective interests' of the people they want to help. Where liberal reformers are dependent on finding out about the ideals and preferences of those they help, radicals come to the task of social reform already equipped with a principled knowledge of what their constituents 'really' want and need. Deploying their understanding of the 'objective interests' of women, gender feminists tend to disregard the values of men and women who may like many aspects of *la difference*. The values of the uninitiated are 'subjective' and must be discounted when they conflict with the genderless ideal. (Radical philosophers are not good at seeing themselves in ironical perspective. The irony of an egalitarian elite would not have been lost on Hegel.)"

Scientific Pretensions

Academic feminists claim that they are not only involved in a revolution but that it is also a *scientific* revolution. Elizabeth Minnich declares: "What we [feminists] are doing is comparable to Copernicus shattering our geo-centricity, Darwin shattering our species-centricity. We are shattering andro-centricity, and the change is as fundamental, as dangerous, as exciting." Once one has recognized the androcentric scheme of "the gender system," everything else falls into place. Then you can see things *as they really are*, these feminists assert. Sommers contends, however, that this claim has much more to do with religion than with science: "The kind of revolutionary discovery that fundamentally changes our perspective on a wide range of phenomena, and that we associate with the likes of Pasteur, Copernicus, or Darwin, also had its analogue in prescientific days. One may think of Zoroaster preaching his doctrine of malicious evil forces doing battle with the forces of good, teaching his disciples to see their life struggle in a new light by viewing it as part of the battle between Ahura Mazda and the lying Druj. One imagines how Zoroaster changed the perspective of the farmer who henceforth saw himself fighting alongside Ahura Mazda and against the evil Spirit who threatened his crops. These insights of Zoroaster did radically change the lives of millions of people, shaping their reality by shaping their perspectives; henceforth, the world could never be the same for them. Indeed we may hear the disciples saying 'Now that the forces of the Druj have been exposed, we can see these forces at work everywhere.' "

What Zoroaster preached was no less revolutionary than the preachments of Darwin, Copernicus, or Pasteur, says Sommers, but it was not and is not science. Yet writers today are bringing "the feminist critique" to bear on everything from astronomy to physics. Liberal feminists want women to have parity in the sciences; gender feminists claim that the sciences today are "masculinist." Not only the sciences, but law, history, economics, and every other field must be revolutionized by the "feminist critique." It is not just bluster, Sommers notes, when feminists claim that they are out to "transform the academy." Their cause is not parity of enrollment or treatment in the several disciplines but redefining the disciplines following the demolition of their present structures of androcentric oppression.

The gender feminists are undoubtedly right in claiming that their perspective changes everything. Sommers writes: "If it is right to say that the discovery of the sex/gender system and its wholesale deployment to explain nature and society is basically religious, then that would help to explain why so few of us are vouchsafed the revelations that so exercise the feminist apostles. The inability to see what is revealed afflicts most people when a revelation is nonscientific and perspectival. Catherine MacKinnon

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looks on a married woman and sees her as a prostitute. To ask why MacKinnon sees what I do not see may be like asking why Ahura Mazda waited until the tenth century B.C. before revealing himself to Zoroaster, and why Zoroaster's revelation is still not accessible to most people."

Of course the Philosopher Queens indignantly protest the notion that their doctrines are more religious than scientific. They can even give an "empirical" explanation of why other women do not share their insights. The reason is that other women have a stake in defending the "masculinist" system that has so twisted their values. But, as Sommers notes, this is a stock answer of many believers. "Ask the Zoroastrian believer why so few people see the world as she sees it, and she too may tell you that most people are in thrall to the forces of evil." It is all very depressing. The end result is that gender feminists demean women by saying that they should not and cannot be held to the same standards as men because those standards are, well, the standards of men. Gender feminists are free to "critique" everyone (and in a literally *ad hominem* manner) while being critiqued by no one. They produce books beyond numbering, all gushingly reviewed by one another. Sommers observes that there is "an appalling dearth" of dispassionate analysis of this literature.

The gender feminists are one more contingent in a long line of radical philosophers who would employ "consciousness raising" to destroy an allegedly oppressive system and establish their notion of a just social order. "More often than not," writes Sommers, "the radical philosopher is innocuously utopian and socially irrelevant. The gender feminist would be so as well were it not that, in America, her influence on education is growing apace."

To Appease and Humor

The influence grows apace, we might note, because many more serious intellectuals are condescendingly tolerant of sundry radicalisms. People like Andrea Dworkin do not take kindly to being patted on the head, but when they rage, for instance, that marriage is rape, their colleagues opine that it is an "interesting viewpoint" to have around, and thus do they, in effect, pat the Andrea Dworkins on their heads. Of course that makes the radical feminists very angry, so they then rage something calculated to be even more outrageous, which also is received as an interesting viewpoint, even if somewhat extreme. Universities pride themselves on being "open," which means that people will tolerate most anything that doesn't interfere with their doing what *they* want to do. As for other institutions, such as theological seminaries, in some cases they are effectively under the control of gender feminists. Serious scholars have either retreated to their private little academic corners, or have sought employment elsewhere.

In addition to the politics of condescension and intimidation, however, there is another reason why the influence of gender feminism is "growing apace." An increasingly large sector of academe has a steep vested interest in Rorty's maxim that "socialization goes all the way down." Black studies, Chicano studies, Marxist studies, gay and lesbian studies—all claim to possess a "cognitively privileged truth" that enables them to critique everyone while being critiqued by no one. Each lays claim to a revelation, and the revelation is the uniqueness of the self and the self-interpretation of the self. These various "disciplines" have different and even conflicting ideals of the just society, but those employed in them have a common stake in demanding immunity from criticism issuing from those who do not share their socialization—and their particular construal of that socialization. Christina Sommers is right; radical feminist and similar studies are better understood as religions rather than as academic disciplines. When the university gets rid of religion, it does not end up with nothing to believe in but with a multitude of belief systems—most of them wildly incoherent and very, very angry.

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ORTHODOXY AND ORTHODOXIES

In the last twenty years a number of small Catholic colleges have been established to provide a "traditionalist" alternative to mainstream Catholic higher education. Gregory Wolfe taught in one of these schools for three years and is greatly disillusioned. Writing in *Crisis* ("Killing the Spirit?" September), Wolfe deplores the infighting among faculty and students who are out to demonstrate that they are more orthodox than thou. He continues: "Perhaps the most significant tension within the alternative college is over the nature of education itself. Though publicly these schools tend to laud [John Henry Cardinal] Newman's 'philosophical habit of mind,' in practice they are closer to Dickens' Gradgrind ('Just the facts, ma'am'). In other words, students get the impression that they are going to spend four years stocking up on the Truth, which consists of a body of doctrines and propositions (or even 'great books'). The emphasis is on acquiring correct opinions, not on learning how to think more clearly and imagine more deeply. A substantial percentage of these young men and women think of the alternative college as a munitions depot: when they emerge, they will be laden with 'smart bombs'

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that they can fire at the heretics and pagans. All too often, they start by shooting them at each other."

We cannot judge the accuracy of Wolfe's forceful critique. We have met students from, for instance, Christendom College in Virginia and Thomas Aquinas College in California who struck us as altogether healthy and personable in their considered commitment to Catholic orthodoxy. No doubt there are also the other kind described by Wolfe. But the article raises other questions about how to respond to impassioned sectaries of alleged orthodoxies. The questions are as pertinent to the Southern Baptists and Missouri Synod Lutherans, for example, as to the Catholic situation.

Wolfe calls upon the schools in question to cultivate a measure of moderation, dialogue, tolerance, pluralism, and so forth. But the problem is that truth is involved—and it is truth that, people believe, has eternal consequences. It is no virtue to be moderate in one's devotion to truth. People who recognize the patterns of apostasy in wide swaths of contemporary Christianity are understandably suspicious about words such as dialogue and pluralism. Where does tolerance of diversity end? they ask. The rhetoric of tolerance almost inevitably begins to sound like the disputes described in David Lodge's hilarious novel, *How Far Can You Go?* The rhetoric surrenders to the sectaries the claim to orthodoxy by suggesting that they are *too* orthodox.

The problem is that they are not orthodox enough. Smelly, sectarian, little orthodoxies can only be effectively combatted by a greater orthodoxy. Orthodoxy is a grand, capacious, multi-splendored thing, as G. K. Chesterton argued so grandly. When truth is turned into "smart bombs" it is no longer truth. It has become a weapon, an instrument of intimidation. It coercively violates the human freedom without which the truth cannot be apprehended. It is Christian truth itself that requires the rejection of narrow, stagnant, stifling pseudo-orthodoxies that produce nothing but toeing the line and browbeating those who deviate from the line. Christian schools rightly try to secure and cultivate a free adherence to an authoritative framework for teaching and learning. Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, for instance, calls such a framework "the structure of faith."

This structure, like a house, is to be lived in. It is not a jail cell but a home. It is a place of light and delight for the exploring of truth and truths that will never be exhaustively comprehended. It happens that there are those who turn against the structure of faith; they leave little doubt but that they want to dismantle and destroy it, and at some point they must be invited to leave the home that they have already left in spirit. Equally, there are those who, in the name of orthodoxy, would turn the home into a military barracks. They are drill sergeants of the spirit who think it their mission to muster out those who do not measure up to their regimen. To be sure, one tests for orthodoxy by the measure of dogma and doctrine. Orthodoxy is tested also by love, by gentleness, and by honesty of mind. Orthodoxies that turn narrow, nasty, and vindictive fail the test.

As we said, we do not know enough about the colleges in question to evaluate the justice of Mr. Wolfe's charges. But, to the extent that he is right, we are sure of this: The difficulty is not that they are too orthodox. They are not orthodox enough. Orthodoxy is the solution, not the problem. We spoke some years ago at an event where the late Methodist ecumenist Albert Outler prayed, "Lord, protect us from the mindless love that deceives, and from the loveless truth that kills." The appeal for love can sometimes obscure the truth. But the absence of love always destroys the truth. Those who are capable of loving only the truth understand neither love nor truth. They are anything but orthodox.

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Reformation to the South of Us

At least one writer is submitting a vigorous dissent from recent discussions of evangelical Protestant growth in Latin America. A number of scholars, including some regular contributors to this journal, have been urging that the evangelical explosion south of the border is bringing about massive cultural change that is conducive to the flourishing of democracy and market economies. The new Protestant communities—typically pentecostal in orientation—nurture habits of thrift, dependability, sobriety, and mutual support, it is said. Peter Berger expects "the new Protestant internationale . . . to produce results similar to those of the preceding one—to wit, the emergence of a solid bourgeoisie, with virtues conducive to the development of a democratic capitalism."

Timothy Goodman, writing in *The American Enterprise* ("Latin America's Reformation," July-August), however, is not at all sure about that. He contends, inter alia, that the statistics on Protestant growth are greatly inflated, that the charismatic churches and their leaderships are fractious and authoritarian, and that the Protestant challenge may be stimulating a renewal among Catholics along the lines of the Counter-Reformation's response to the sixteenth-century challenge. Above all, he argues, the prospects for democratic capitalism depend upon structural changes of a political and economic nature in countries that have long been captive to policies of

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pervasive statism. "Culture by itself," he writes, "is rarely able to explain economic and political change."

Few would assert that culture *by itself* transforms societies. But culture is never by itself. Culture—and religion as the heart of culture—is a powerful force interacting with other powerful forces, such as economics and politics. It is typically, we would suggest, the most powerful force. Of course economic disasters and politically generated wars can override the force of culture. But little that is constructive, including the structural changes urged by Goodman, can succeed unless it builds on the ideas, aspirations, mores, and patterns of behavior that make up what is called culture.

While we believe he is mistaken in pitting structural change against cultural change, Goodman's conclusion is a useful caution: "The jury is still out on whether the rise of evangelicalism in Latin America will hasten or hinder the onset of modernity there. It probably will not have much influence either way since modernization will depend more on structural than on cultural change. Although it is largely a matter of personal conviction whether or not the rise of evangelicalism should be applauded, the new faith incontestably gives its adherents—among the poorest inhabitants of a poor continent—much spiritual comfort and emotional help in bearing up under the stresses of life. That is no small mark in its favor."

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THE CLOSED CIRCLE OF ISLAM

Societies that close in upon themselves, that set themselves in a posture of unremitting hostility to outside influences, are doomed to wither and die. That proposition is set forth in two of John Paul's encyclicals this year, *Redemptoris Missio* and *Centesimus Annus*. In neither does he mention it by name, but there is no doubt that he is talking about Islam. Events of this past year, notably the crisis in the Gulf, have concentrated Western minds on Islam and the Arab world. Must reading in this connection is David Pryce-Jones' mordantly brilliant *The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs* (HarperCollins). Pryce-Jones is a British journalist who has spent many years in the Middle East, and he allows that he has been forced to a point of near hopelessness about the Arab world and its near kin, such as Iran and Turkey.

Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia—all seem to be irretrievably mired in brutal power struggles controlled by tribal codes of honor, shame, corruption, and ruthless careerism. "At present," he writes, "an Arab democrat is not even an idealization, but a contradiction in terms." Following the six-week war in the Gulf, some in the Bush Administration talked about pressing Iraq toward democracy. According to Pryce-Jones, the only possible response is to weep or to laugh, or to do both at the same time. "The Arab World has no institutions evolved by common consent for common purposes, under guarantee of law, and consequently there is nothing that can be agreed as the general good." Like V. S. Naipaul, he writes that the Arabs are caught in the bind of wanting the goods that the West produces while rejecting the cultural, economic, and political institutions that produce them. Their unqualified anger is directed against a world history that continues to be the story of the rise of the West.

Contempt and Envy

The kings, emirs, and princelings of the oil countries squander their one-shot wealth in displays of vulgar opulence, publicly thanking Allah for their good fortune, but knowing that they have momentarily lucked into the technology and needs of the infidels for whom their disdain almost equals their envy. Algerian novelist Kateb Yacine writes, "We are in a train which is rolling but we have little or no idea where it came from or where it is going. A people fortified by its history is a strong people. But we have lost our way in our history." "Our culture?" says the Syrian poet Nizar Qabbani. "Nothing but bubbles in washtubs and chamberpots." Fouad Ajami, a Lebanese Shiite now teaching in the U.S., says Arabs are living in "the foreigner's universe" and are "losers in the world system."

It is a Western conceit that, if only Arabs are introduced to our way of life, they will learn the ways of liberal democracy and economic productivity. More often than not, it seems the opposite happens. These pages have noted the ways in which nearly ten million Muslims in Western Europe have reacted by declaring an "Islamic Mission" to what they claim is an exhausted, secularized, and decadent West. Pryce-Jones observes that the most virulently anti-Western literature in the Arab world has usually taken its lessons from writers in the West. "Modern Arab literature is characterized by a somber and depressing self-hatred, as well as a hatred of the West and all its manifestations. These two tones are sometimes so intermingled that they can hardly be separated."

"More insidiously," he continues, "Western literature itself over the last fifty years has lost touch with the human imagination and narrowed into social criticism. In a highly complex phenomenon involving guilt and aggression and fashionability, Western writing has tended to denigrate and attack the spiritual values, human as well as scientific, which have made Western society what it is. Those

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Arabs who have turned for inspiration and example to the West have encountered the full force of these negative factors, with nothing positive as makeweight. Taught by Westerners themselves to the Arabs, the hate-engendering 'radical' and 'anti-imperialist' tradition has seemed to offer a high road to advancement and honor and reputation, in London and Paris as much as at home." And, we might add, in New York.

Islamic Revival?

In the last two decades there has been much talk about an Islamic revival. Like most writers on the subject, Pryce-Jones is profoundly skeptical. Surveying the last two hundred years in particular, it seems to him that Islam has lost its capacity to be, in the sociological jargon, an independent variable. With all its internal divisions, Islamic religion has become little more than a rhetorical cover to legitimate, most unconvincingly, the factional bloodlettings and individual careerism of Arab politics.

"Islam, to which the Arabs have always turned for identity," he writes, "ceased in its earliest years to be unitary. Whether Sunni or Shia, ambitious men in all centuries abused the Holy Law they were supposed to be upholding, in sectarian wars and challenges to advance themselves. Religious belief cannot now be conjured in protection. It is not possible to return to ancient simplicities as though science had never questioned nature and the universe, as though the West and its values did not exist. . . .'Islamic revival' has nothing to do with worship and man's relationship with God or nature, but is a fictitious catch-phrase on which anyone with the will for it may mount a bid for power, either Sunni or Shia, but divisive in any case. Without political form, strictly emotional in thought and practice, the appeal of this alleged revival lies in its apology for weakness, and in the converse of its apparent defiance of Western vitality. Unaffected in any important interest by any such nostalgia or defiance, Westerners take note of it, if at all, as a strange human curiosity, momentarily wondering at the psychological frame of mind in others that calls for hatred and cursing. . . .What part Islam would finally have in any putative rational order is something a Muslim philosopher has yet to define with authority."

The Closed Circle is without doubt a sobering book. Some think it is altogether too sobering, and they offer a more attractive picture of the Arab past, present, and possible future. Unfortunately, that picture is too often painted in the hues of romanticism, frequently revolutionary romanticism, and betrays the very loathing of the West that is the opiate of Islam. We may, quite understandably, want to believe that the interpretation advanced by Pryce-Jones and others is one-sided. It is an interpretation that, if true, portends a perhaps endless standoff between the West and the Arab world. We can continue to toss the emirs their opulent toys until the oil runs out and then they, too, will recede from world history into the bloody tribalisms from which they never really emerged. That is a dismal prospect, to which we should not acquiesce without resistance. Regrettably, there is little convincing evidence to support such resistance.

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WHILE WE'RE AT IT

■ Joseph Amato's *Victims and Values: A History and a Theory of Suffering* (Praeger) is an ambitious work and well worth the effort of what is, at times, a difficult read (see John P. Sisk's review in the October issue). From Plato to Isaiah to Paul to Bentham, Amato tracks the ways in which peoples and cultures have understood the meaning, or meaninglessness, of suffering. He ends up with modern political exploitations of suffering and victimhood. The public claim is made that "we" (meaning the state) should do something to "make right" the sufferings of the past. Here is but a taste, to whet the appetite for a more complete reading of *Victims and Values*: "Claims of victims' suffering from the past cannot be allowed to shadow the present. These claims, if admitted fully into the political discourse, put the living in the service of the dead. The democratic legislator must be leery of claims that exceed his everyday understanding and practice. As European politics of the 1920s and 1930s demonstrated, to choose only one example, a politics of suffering can produce parties of blood, resentment, and violence. Politicians, no doubt, need to speak about suffering, sacrifice, and victims, for they are irreducible, often composing, elements in any discussion of fairness and justice. The legislative process and the courts should, and have no choice but to, remain open to claims of wrong. Yet they must be cautious, for there are always abundant victims and nothing guarantees that today's victims won't be tomorrow's victimizers. Citizens do not reason well about blood, sacrifice, and martyrs. Myths become prisons for political thought and action. Democracies can fail when they speak mystical languages."

■ James Burtchaell, George Marsden, and others have written in this journal about the ways in which religiously associated higher education ineluctably became disassociated. Boards and administrators frequently did not realize where, step by step, they were being led. In that connection, a friend has dug up a letter from Woodrow Wilson, then president of

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Princeton, to a Mr. George B. Logan, who protested the use of historical-critical methodology at that school. Wilson wrote on February 4, 1909: "While we believe in the necessity of studying the Bible by critical methods, if it is to be a part of a university course, I can assure you that you are wrongly informed if you suppose that the methods or the effects of the instruction are destructive. The consistent aim of the instructor is to emphasize the positive conclusions to be reached. . . . You may rest assured, also, that the person of Christ as the cardinal and essential fact, the real Saviour of mankind, is dwelt upon with all the emphasis of profound conviction. [A university course] cannot be, in the ordinary sense of the word, a course of religious instruction. It inevitably becomes so, however, because of the extraordinary character of the books studied, their place in the whole history and development of the church and of civilization, and their inevitably divine character as a revelation of God to man." Eighty-two years later and it seems such sentiments would not be admitted in the religious studies department, never mind the president's office, of a respectable (read secular) university such as Princeton.

■ Stout hearts are always in short supply. For instance, Bishop William Milsaps of the "American Episcopal Church," one of the "continuing" groups that has parted ways with the other Episcopal Church, gives his testimony in *Christian Challenge*, which describes itself as the "voice of traditional Anglicanism." Writes the bishop: "In the years ahead it appears we shall witness some further unraveling of the Anglican Communion. . . . Some people will submit to Rome and others will seek refuge in Orthodoxy. Some, however, will maintain the Anglican heritage. Just as 'There will always be an England,' there will always be Anglicans. And perhaps by some miracle, they will be able to be Anglicans in the Church of England." Just so.

■ The question of when we're "letting die" and when we're taking a life will not go away. Gilbert Meilaender, a Lutheran at Oberlin College and frequent contributor to this journal, contends that withdrawing the feeding tube in a case such as Nancy Cruzan's is accurately characterized as being aimed at her death. Richard McCormick, a Jesuit at Notre Dame, disagrees. McCormick urges us to consider the following analogy: "Suppose hurricane winds bend and break a sapling tree. We prop it up, hoping to revive it, but see that it will never return to full budding form, even though it will stand and possibly produce a few anemic leaves. So we remove the prop and the tree dies. What killed the tree? Was it not the hurricane winds? Analogously, if we remove nutritional props from Nancy, was it not the original anoxic trauma that *caused* her death, that killed her?" Meilaender has considered the analogy and believes the answer to McCormick's rhetorical question is No. "Moreover," he writes, "as the language of assisted suicide comes increasingly to the fore, it will become apparent to all that the answer is No. McCormick's claim that we are simply 'letting die' those in Ms. Cruzan's circumstances when we stop nourishment will prove to have been a stopgap measure—language needed to tide us over while we worked up the gumption to face a more adequate description of the act. A human being who does not or cannot achieve 'full budding form,' who puts forth only 'a few anemic leaves,' but who can continue indefinitely to live this less-than-fully-flourishing life with some assistance (propping) from us, is not a dying human being. She may be ill or seriously disabled, but she is not dying. And therefore she cannot be 'allowed to die,' though she can be killed." Once again, that Meilaender strikes us as an uncomfortably clear thinker.

■ Ah, capitalism. In the leftist *Nation* we note this advertisement for *Liberal Opinion Week*, in which one can get weekly all the columns of the portside biggies. In *National Review*, on the other hand, we are offered *Conservative Chronicle*, which does the same thing for the right. Both are published by some presumably politically neutral entrepreneurs in Iowa. We did note one difference, however. The main pitch with *Liberal Opinion Week* is for 24 weeks at $18, whereas the only offer with *Conservative Chronicle* is for a full year at $39. Maybe our entrepreneurs have more confidence about conservatism being around for another year.

■ This from *Technology, Theology, and the Idea of Progress* by a David Hopper: "Only an intensification of social-political meaning can counterbalance the forthcoming restrictions on economic exploitation of the natural order. Faith's vision cannot be fixed on the next life, though that prospect is not denied." It never ceases to amaze that some folk seem to find it harder to believe in the promise of the next life than in the prospect of fixing up this one.

■ We have earlier remarked on the unfortunate rantings of the National Council of Churches in connection with the 500th anniversary of the European discovery of the Americas. You may recall that the NCC in solemn assembly handed up the equivalent of a Nuremberg indictment, declaring that what happened after 1492 was "an invasion and colonization with legalized occupation, genocide, economic exploitation, and a deep level of institutional racism and moral decadence." Karl E. Meyer of the *New York Times* responds very nicely in a little essay that points out, inter alia, that the NCC tirade is in a long line of Protestant fulminations against the real and alleged crimes of Catholicism, especially Spanish Catholicism. But the argument of the essay, "Columbus was not Eichmann," is broader

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in scope. "What is left out is that Spain almost from the beginning acknowledged that Indians were also God's children, a ruling that gave moral leverage to clerical defenders of indigenous peoples. And Spanish culture, which included Cervantes no less than Torquemada, gave Latin America a common tongue and a common framework of law. . . . Those who sentimentalize native American cultures overlook a grievous failing: All power was vested in the community, to which obedience was obligatory. The idea of individual rights—human, civil, and political—was a redeeming gift of haughty Iberians and, yes, Anglo-Saxons. The colonizers had much to answer for. But to ignore their achievements travesties history. Europeans passed judgment on themselves, thus nurturing the very universal norms that enable people today to throw mudballs at their ancestors."

■ Lord Zuckerman, the distinguished British scientist, reviews a slew of books proposing that animals, and apes in particular, are surprisingly like us. He thinks not. He quotes Noam Chomsky who claimed that the question of man's acquisition of a so-called language organ had no greater significance than the question of the origin of the heart. To which he says: "But perhaps there is a difference after all. All vertebrates have hearts that exercise the same functions as do our own, and anatomically we face no problem when we compare the structure of one heart with that of another. But there is nothing with which to compare language. However it came about, there is no form of animal vocalization with which it can be functionally compared. Language exists sui generis. That is why we are what we are. And that is a mystery no less profound than is the origin of life itself."

■ Discussing a number of books on cosmology in *The New York Review of Books*, Daniel Kevles quotes Charles Misner, a specialist in general relativity theory: "I do see the design of the universe as essentially a religious question. That is, one should have some kind of respect and awe for the whole business. . . . It's very magnificent and shouldn't be taken for granted. In fact, I believe that is why Einstein had so little use for organized religion, although he strikes me as a basically very religious man. He must have looked at what the preachers said about God and felt that they were blaspheming. He had seen much more majesty than they had ever imagined, and they were just not talking about the real thing. My guess is that he simply felt the religions he'd run across did not have proper respect . . . for the Author of the universe." You might want to pass that on to your preacher. If you're the preacher, you might want to give some thought to repenting. As might we all.

■ *catholic eye* is a spirited newsletter. Admittedly, some might think its style is best described by the expression "in your face." It does tend to let you know where it stands. Discussing abortion, a recent issue proposes that Cain should have adopted the maxim, "Every Abel should be a *wanted* Abel." In the same issue, and again on abortion, *eye* is not happy with the Catholic bishops. "It's hard to imagine a better example of what's wrong with the U.S. Bishops' 'approach' to the abortion battle. Instead of standing firm on the moral high ground, they're down in the political trenches, pushing compromises to win votes for half-a-loaf stuff. Isn't their job to teach what the Church teaches—you know, like the Pope did in Poland? They can always count on politicians to make the compromises (that's *their* job, and they love doing it). How can a Bishop 'teach' that rape-incest abortions are indeed justified? The unborn baby is totally innocent of its conception; if it is OK to kill even one of them, then there is a 'right' to abortion—exactly what the whole Abortion War is about. . . . There will never be a shortage of 'imperfect' bills spewing out of our woefully imperfect political system; only standing on principle (i.e., the truth) will make them less imperfect." There is, it seems to us, more than a little something to that. (If you wrote *catholic eye* at 150 East 35th St., New York, NY 10016, the folks there would likely send a sample copy.)

■ Alfred T. Hennelly, S.J., of Fordham University, a most correct academic, is vehemently opposed to simplisms. Everything is so *very* complex. That is why he says he does not like Paul Sigmund's fine book, *Liberation Theology at the Crossroads: Democracy or Revolution?* (Oxford). Reviewing the book in *Theological Studies*, Hennelly complains that Sigmund "tends to seek simplistic and immediate solutions to very complex problems and issues." He most particularly does not like the "simplistic approach" suggested by the subtitle of Sigmund's book. Fr. Hennelly concludes his rant with what he presumably thinks to be a truly nuanced complexification: "As Gutierrez continually reminds us, the real issue and the real task is not theology; it is the actual liberation of the continually growing masses of the poor throughout the hemisphere." In defense of Gustavo Gutierrez, the "godfather" of liberation theology, it should be noted that he has long since repudiated that most vulgar simplism.

■ Martin E. Marty of the University of Chicago reflects on the days when he was impressed by theologians who posited authentic Christianity against "religion." But in what he now takes to be a largely post-religious culture, he's not sure that is such a good idea. He writes: "I think that Barth and Bonhoeffer wrote during the late stage of a Christian culture when they could assume that those who rejected faith knew what they were rejecting. Those who entertained it knew what faith, faiths, and

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faithfulness were about; those who held faith did so against a common background of recognition. Mid-century America may still have represented something of that culture. . . . It is difficult to teach discrimination among wines to a cola culture or to point to the excellences of Mozart and Rembrandt in the cultures of rock-and-roll or comic books. It is harder to offer the wines, art, or music where no taste, hearing, or sight of any sort appears. It is difficult to point to the values of an agonizing and profoundly eucharistic faith in a culture that has nothing analogous. So my mind evidently has changed: let things analogous to articulated faith appear, problematic though they be. Then let people of specific faith get specific, demanding, and promissory."

■ The following headline from the *Washington Post*: "Christianity a Topic at Georgetown U." It seems the new president of the putatively Jesuit institution is moving toward a more balanced curriculum. "G.U. Choice," the official pro-abortion group on campus, may be upset, and we would not be surprised if the D.C. government takes legal action, charging that the new direction violates the separation of Church and Society (Society of Jesus, that is).

■ We are pleased to note the appearance of George Weigel's *Freedom and Its Discontents: Catholicism Confronts Modernity* (Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1030 Fifteenth Street NW, Washington D.C. 20005, $19.95). Parts of the book appeared in this journal and its predecessor, *This World*. Richard D. Land, head of the Christian Life Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, writes: "What a challenging and exciting book. My fellow Protestants will find the chapters on the revolutionary evolution of Roman Catholic thought on religious freedom since Vatican II particularly informative and encouraging. Weigel writes with eloquence, elegance, and passion." Richard D. Land is right.

■ Dr. Michael Donahue of the Search Institute in Minneapolis takes exception to our February commentary on their study, "Effective Christian Education: A National Study of Protestant Congregations." He notes that there *was* specific mention of Christ in the measure of faith maturity and that "conservative" churches, notably the Southern Baptists, came out looking good by the study's criteria. While we appreciate Dr. Donahue's corrections, neither point affects our conclusion that the study is evidence of "the credulity of church leaders who cannot distinguish between Christian faith and liberal sentimentalities."

■ Readers concerned about the euthanasia campaign discussed in this issue's editorial are urged to write for a new and exceedingly useful newsletter, *(Life At Risk: A Chronicle of Euthanasia Trends in America,* available from the NCCB Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, 3211 4th St. NE, Washington, D.C. 20017. The statements of Leon Kass, Yale Kamisar, and Daniel Callahan quoted in the editorial are from a *Commonweal* symposium in the issue of August 9, 1991.

■ Some years ago, Monsignor Harry Byrne of Epiphany Church in Manhattan visited The Hermitage in St. Petersburg. Commenting on Leonardo da Vinci's painting of the Virgin and Child, the young guide mentioned some technical details and then said, "The subject of this painting is 'Maternity.' " So effectively had her Marxist training erased any awareness of Mary and Our Lord, or so aware was she of what it was not permitted to say in public. The incident came to mind when a priest in upstate New York asked Msgr. Byrne what to do about a village atheist who was suing to have a crèche removed from a public space. Byrne, who is no slouch on church-state relations, told the priest about the legal niceties and then offered a suggestion. "It's a long shot, but you might take away the halos, rearrange the angels, remove any words proclaiming divinity, and then caption the display, 'Maternity.' Everyone could then interpret the display as they wish." It worked under Communist oppression. Maybe we could get away with it under the oppression of currently cockamamie court rulings on religion in public.

Sources: Quotation from Amato's *Victims and Values*, p. 196. Bishop Milsaps in *Christian Challenge*, April 1991. Meilaender versus McCormick on "letting die," *Midwest Medical Ethics*, Vol. 6 No.4. Karl Meyer on the National Council of Churches in the *New York Times*, June 27, 1991. Lord Zuckerman on human vocalization in *The New York Review of Books*, May 30, 1991. Charles Misner quoted in *The New York Review of Books*, May 16, 1991. On Catholic bishops and abortion, *catholic eye*, June 26, 1991. Hennelly review of Sigmund book in *Theological Studies*, June 1991. Martin Marty on authentic Christianity, *Christian Century*, July 10-17, 1991. On pro-abortion group at Georgetown, the *Washington Post*, September 7, 1991. Monsignor Byrne on crèches and "maternity" in Epiphany Church parish bulletin, June 23, 1991.

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